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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is a study of migration and its links to belonging, class, national identity 
and recognition in United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation. It focuses on Pakistani migrants, 
especially Pakistani professionals in Dubai, which is the second largest Emirate of the UAE 
because of its territorial extension and economic production (Davidson, 2008a). It is not only 
an empirical study but also partly a conceptual and analytical treatise on migration in the 
GCC countries. By comparing the extant literature on migration in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries and the findings of my own field research, I argue the need to move 
beyond concepts such as ‘belonging despite exclusion’ (Vora, 2013), ‘citizenship as 
belonging’ (Vora & Kock, 2015) and ‘nationalism for nationals’ (Kock, 2015), which have 
dominated the literature on migration in this region, to better grasp that belonging, class and 
national identity are contested and situational. Dubai as a ‘transit lounge’ is an expression 
used by one of my Pakistani participants to describe the dynamic nature of the city. But more 
than that, it was used to emphasize that foreign workers’ life in the emirate is characterized 
by temporariness.  
The UAE authorities have categorized people through the citizenship law (no. 17, 
1972) in Emiratis and non-Emiratis by conceiving of them as two distinct categories. In my 
view, this might be interpreted as a fracture between two groups of individuals. In particular, 
non-Emiratis have been considered and represented in the literature as a monolithic group 
(Mahdavi, 2011), as disempowered individuals and, especially low-wage migrants, as 
victims of the market economy over which they cannot wield any control (Kathiravelu, 
2016). The extant literature on migration in the GCC countries has portrayed the image of 
foreign communities in which the role of human agency in the migration experience is 
underestimated.   
Starting from the historical evolution of migration in the Arab Gulf region and the 
links with African and Asian countries, which have contributed towards shaping the ethnic 
diversity of the UAE and the GCC countries, my research focuses on the presence of 
Pakistani migrant professionals in Dubai in order to understand the development of 
migration in the Emirate; the role and importance of the Pakistan Association Dubai (PAD) 
in contributing towards determining belonging; and therefore how migration affects the 
Emirati national identity.  
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This thesis challenges the extant literature on migration in the Arab Gulf region by 
questioning the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals as two reciprocally-
exclusive categories. Instead, it argues the need to look at inter and intra dynamics that take 
place in the ‘field’ between the two groups in order to understand how their relations are 
constructed. It is thus important to consider social interactions between nationals and non-
nationals because individuals occupy contradictory and multi-layered locations, spaces and 
social categories (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Anthias, 2015). This reasoning stems from my 
historical analysis of ethnic composition and social stratification in the Gulf port cities, 
especially Dubai, where the coexistence of different ethnic groups resulted from economic 
exchanges and intermarriages with people coming from African and Asian countries, which 
in turn contributed towards shaping the ethnic diversity of the region. For example, the 
construction of belonging cannot be grasped only by looking at non-nationals as an ‘isolated’ 
category (Koch, 2015) but it has to be analysed and discussed in relation to ‘others’. As such, 
it is important to consider the role played by migrants and their ethno-national migrant 
associations in forging the discourse on the Emirati national identity. Migrants, through civic 
engagement and their participation in the Emirati public sphere, contribute towards 
strengthening Emirati national identity via their sense of belonging to the country and their 
agential capacity (e. g. migrant organizations).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The thesis is a study of migration and its links to belonging, class, national identity 
and recognition in United Arab Emirates federation (UAE, in Arabic al-Imārāt al-ʿArabiyya 
al-Muttaḥida).1 It focuses on Pakistani migrants, especially Pakistani professionals in Dubai, 
which is the second largest Emirate of the UAE because of its territorial extension and 
economic production (Davidson, 2008a). It is not only an empirical study but also partly a 
conceptual and analytical treatise on migration in the GCC2 countries. By comparing the 
extant literature on migration in the Gulf  countries (Figure 1) and the findings of my own 
field research, I argue the need to move beyond concepts such as ‘belonging despite 
exclusion’ (Vora, 2013), ‘citizenship as belonging’ (Vora & Kock, 2015) and ‘nationalism 
for nationals’ (Kock, 2015), which have dominated the literature on migration in this region, 
to better grasp that belonging, class and national identity are contested and situational. For 
example, belonging is dynamic and flexible; it is not necessarily linked to citizenship, and it 
cannot be limited to a specific locale, place, space and social category but it is constructed 
within a translocal and transnational perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 The transliteration of Arabic terms relies on the system used by the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. The only exceptions are those terms that are commonly used in English (e.g. rulers’ names and 
geographical names). The Arabic words used in the thesis are explained in the Appendix B. 
2 The Gulf Cooperation Council is a supra-national organization established in 1981. It includes Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
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Figure 1.1 Map of the GCC countries (in green) 
 
 
Blank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: https://www.google.it/search?q=map [accessed 8 November 2016] 
 
In this introductory chapter, I give an outline of the main characteristics of Dubai as a 
contemporary urban space that is occupied by a multitude of people of different national and 
socio-cultural backgrounds while governed by a traditional system of family rulers. The 
chapter also introduces the research aims that have guided my study, and demonstrates the 
original contributions of my thesis to the field of migration studies. Finally, the chapter 
includes an overview of the structure of the thesis, and a note on terminology. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Dubai: a ‘transit lounge’ for migrant workers 
Dubai as a ‘transit lounge’ was an expression used by Rahman,3 one of my Pakistani 
participants (see chapter 2 and Appendix C), to describe the dynamic nature of the city, 
which has been able to respond to the contemporary challenges posed by globalization 
(Elsheshtawy, 2013). But more than that, it was used to emphasize that foreign workers’ 
lives in the Emirate are characterized by temporariness. In the UAE, foreign workers are 
considered as contractual temporary workers. Because of the sponsorship (kafāla) system, 
                                            
3 The names of all my participants have been changed. 
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residence is allowed only if they have a work contract which must be guaranteed by a local 
sponsor. They are temporary workers because their contract expires after two or three years 
thus formally impeding their permanent settlement in the country.4 This system, which was 
adopted in the 1950s to guarantee a job to the Arab Gulf local population (Baldwin-Edwards, 
2011), has shaped the relations between the rulers and the ruled, ensuring that Emiratis have 
some privileges and benefits deriving from being nationals.5 The kafāla guarantees the 
interests of the ruling families and the benefits of the ruled (see chapter 5). The mutual 
protection of interests and benefits is defined as a ‘ruling bargain’ (Davidson, 2005), which 
means that nationals, in exchange of political de-mobilization and no pressure for democratic 
reforms, have lots of benefits and advantages granted to them by the UAE government (e.g. 
free education, free land/house, and a job in the public sector). Each Emirate is governed by 
a specific ruling family,6 which is represented in the Federal National Council (FNC). It is 
an institutional body that wields legislative power (Davidson, 2005). Moreover, each 
Emirate is administrated by a ruler, who acts as if he is a pater familias (Davis, 1991), who 
looks after nationals ‘from the cradle to the grave’. This paternalistic way of viewing and 
wielding power stems from the traditional social structure that revolves around tribal 
affiliation (Rugh, 2016). In this context, characterized by a massive presence of foreigners 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2011), the ruler cares for nationals by giving them lots of benefits from 
which foreign workers are formally excluded. 
The UAE is a ‘society in motion’ because of the presence of many foreign 
communities, cultures and religions; its population is socially, ethnically and religiously 
diversified. The discovery of oil in the 1950s and 1960s, the creation of the UAE federation 
in 1971 and the oil boom in the 1970s, required a foreign workforce to implement 
development projects because of the small size of the local population and the lack of skills 
among the locals. In the UAE, foreigners now represent 88 percent of the workforce 
                                            
4 Some Pakistani professionals whom I interviewed worked for multinational companies situated in free zones. 
They had a permanent contract but they renewed their residence permit (iqāma) every two or three years. Free 
zones are areas established in the UAE (and in other GCC countries) where employment, visa requirements, 
censorship do not conform to the UAE laws. “Multinational companies enjoy fully ownership and profit 
repatriation within the confines of the free-trade zones” (Kanna, 2010, pp. 108-109). 
5 On the categories of Emiratis and non-Emiratis, see chapter 4. 
6 Abu Dhabi is governed by the Al-Nuhayyan family; Dubai is governed by the Al-Maktum family; Sharjah is 
governed by the Al-Qasimi family; Ras al-Khaimah is governed by the Al-Qasimi family; Ajman is governed 
by the Al-Nuaymi family; Umm al-Quwain is governed by the Al-Mualla family; and Fujairah is governed by 
the Al-Sharqi family. 
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(Winckler, 2010); most of them are employed in the construction sector and they are 
overwhelmingly men from South Asian countries (Human Rights Watch, HRW, 2006). The 
presence of foreigners has represented one of the main issues for the UAE authorities 
because it has led to a so-called ‘demographic imbalance’, where non-Emiratis outnumber 
Emiratis.  
The links between South Asia and the Gulf countries, especially the port cities, is 
historically documented (Potter, 2009); it has led, in the course of several centuries, to 
millions of foreigners settling in the coastal areas and port cities, such as Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Indian and Iranian communities were 
the most important foreign communities in Dubai because they were merchants that also 
supported the rulers of the Emirate financially. They constituted communities that were 
linked to the political power, and these links pushed the local authorities to naturalize some 
Iranians and Indians, while other Indian merchants are now considered as ‘half-citizens’ 
because of some privileges granted to them even though they are not formally full citizens 
(Vora, 2013). Between the 1950s and 1970s, the discovery of oil, the oil boom and the 
development projects implemented by the UAE authorities triggered a new migration wave 
which included the presence of Pakistanis as numerically relevant. In 1971, Pakistan was the 
first country that recognized the UAE federation by establishing its embassy in the country. 
This official recognition led to a strengthening of the links between the two countries and it 
also fostered migration from Pakistan to the UAE. Currently, in the UAE, there are 1.2 
million Pakistanis, who are mostly employed in the construction sector (35%), followed by 
people employed in sales (16%), whereas Pakistani professionals represent 8 percent of the 
Pakistanis working in the country, followed by those employed in agriculture (4%).   
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Dubai has “erupted onto the world stage 
as a media and tourism spectacle” (Vora, 2013, p. 6). Its fascinating history, characterized 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by an extreme poverty and the presence of a few 
hundreds of individuals, dramatically changed between the 1950s and the 1970s when the 
oil economy transformed the poor and mercantile Emirate into a modern and global city 
(Abdulla, 2006b). The emergence of Dubai as a modern city and its development made it a 
metropolis embedded in the neoliberal world economy where the “human elements of the 
city seem to exist at extremes, with wealthy - and exploitative - Gulf Arabs and international 
business tycoons on one end, and downtrodden construction workers and maids, mostly from 
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South Asia, on the other” (Vora, 2013, p. 7). This separation between wealthy and 
marginalized and oppressed individuals has been addressed by the extant literature on 
migration in the GCC countries (Gardner, 2010a; Buckley, 2013; Vora, 2013; Kathiravelu, 
2016). In Dubai, the separation between wealthy and poor individuals is clearly evident in 
people’s different lifestyles, tastes, dispositions and behaviours (chapter 6). But more than 
that, as indicated earlier, the UAE authorities have categorized people through the 
citizenship law (no. 17, 1972) in Emiratis and non-Emiratis by viewing them as two distinct 
categories. In my view, this might be interpreted as a fracture that has been imposed upon 
two groups of individuals. In particular, non-Emiratis have been considered and represented 
in the literature as a monolithic group (Mahdavi, 2011), as disempowered individuals and, 
especially low-wage migrants, as victims of the market economy over which they cannot 
wield any control (Kathiravelu, 2016). For Mahdavi (2011), the extant literature on 
migration in the GCC countries has projected the image of foreign communities as 
‘flattened’ in which the role of human agency in the migration experience is underestimated.   
In conclusion, Dubai has evolved from a small sandy community to a global 
metropolis, and, as Elsheshtawy (2013, p. 275) acknowledges, it should become a model for 
the Arab world “not through its megaprojects but because it accommodates multiple 
nationalities, a fact that may contribute to its unique response to globalizing conditions”. 
However, the presence of multiple nationalities, ethnicities, and religions does not erase the 
hierarchical social structure existing in Dubai and which creates a fracture within the Emirati 
society not only between nationals and non-nationals but also within the same ethno-national 
communities (e. g. the difference between the Indian merchant class and unskilled Indians).   
 
 
 
1.3 Research aims   
The binary opposition between nationals versus non-nationals “as the primary form 
of social and economic structure” (Vora, 2013, p. 111) of the GCC countries has been the 
main topic on which different scholars have focused (Gardner, 2008; Ali, 2010; Kanna, 
2010). This has been pursued by analysing the everyday life of low-wage migrants, 
especially of construction workers (Kathiravelu, 2016). Only a few studies have focussed on 
highly-skilled migrants in the GCC countries (Kanna, 2010; Ali, 2010; Vora, 2013). Several 
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studies have analyzed the presence of unskilled and highly-skilled Indians and Filipinos in 
the Arab Gulf region: in Bahrain (Gardner, 2010a), Qatar (Nagy, 2008; Vora, 2014), UAE 
(Vora, 2013; Hosoda, 2013) and Kuwait (Longva, 1997). Moreover, research on Westerners 
in Dubai and Doha has also been undertaken in the last few years (Walsh, 2007, 2009; Vora, 
2014). However, the Pakistani community, which is historically linked to the Gulf region, 
has mostly been neglected by academics.7 Furthermore, the extant literature has largely 
overlooked the role that migrant associations play for the migrants in this region.  
Starting from the historical evolution of migration in the Arab Gulf region and the 
links with African and Asian countries, which have contributed towards shaping the ethnic 
diversity of the UAE and the GCC countries, my research focuses on the presence of 
Pakistani migrant professionals in Dubai in order to understand the development of 
migration in the Emirate; the role and importance of the Pakistan Association Dubai (PAD) 
in embodying migrants’ agential capacity and intra-community relations. The PAD was 
established in 1973 and it is the only Pakistani association officially recognized by Dubai 
authorities. Thus, I adopted an emic perspective to unpack the internal complexities, 
dynamics and ‘conflicts’ of the Pakistani community in Dubai.   
The thesis discusses the need to link international migration and social theory in order 
to elaborate substantive approaches that enable a better understanding of migration 
(Bakewell, 2010). To do so, the thesis revolves around the following aims: 
• To advance the debate on structure and agency in migration studies. Hitherto, 
this debate has mostly been neglected in migration studies, thus impeding the 
development of a coherent theory of migration (Bakewell, 2010). The thesis 
will bring the debate about structure and agency to the core of migration 
studies by introducing the concept of ‘migration project’ in relation to 
Pakistani professionals in Dubai. 
• To examine the role of migrant associations, which exemplify migrants’ 
agential capacity and at the same time their knowledge of the local structures, 
rules and laws. The thesis will discuss the importance of the PAD in relation 
to the existing hierarchical social structure of the UAE in which migrants are 
not fully recognized as equal peers in social life (Fraser, 2000).  
                                            
7 The only quantitative research on the Pakistani community was conducted at the beginning of the 1980s in 
Kuwait (Shah, 1983). 
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In order to address these aims, the thesis poses the following three research questions 
• How are structure and agency linked in extant migration studies, and can a 
case-study of Pakistani professionals in Dubai move forward our theoretical 
understanding of migration? 
• How has Pakistani migration developed in the UAE, and how can it best be 
understood?   
• What are the key issues in the migration project of Pakistani professionals in 
Dubai? 
Addressing these questions means substantially contributing towards understanding 
the link between international migration and social theory. As O’Reilly (2012b, p. 33) has 
put it, it “is only through the analysis of ‘situated action’ that we can see the outcomes of the 
interaction of structures and their perceptions”. Focusing on those research questions entails 
thinking of migrants no longer as disempowered individuals and ‘victims’ (Mahdavi, 2011) 
but as agents who act in situ (Stones, 2005) and capable to modify, interact and project their 
life in a specific time and place.  Thus, the notion of migration project allows recognizing 
that migration is dynamic, it is never taken for granted and it can change and develop in 
accordance with the context and situations. In the process of the interviewed migrants’ 
stories, I could not overlook the role that these migrants played in shaping the discourse on 
the Emirati national identity (Vora & Koch, 2015). In my thesis, expressions such as 
‘nationalism for nationals’ (Koch, 2015) and ‘citizenship as belonging’ (Koch, 2015) are 
contested because they portray a ‘false’ dichotomy between nationals and migrants as 
migrants, even though not formal citizens, are also involved with nationals in forms of 
governance of migration (e. g. the sponsorship system). However, this sort of ‘inclusion’ 
does not subvert the hierarchical social structure existing in the country.   
 
 
 
 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
Migration affects people’s lives both as migrants and as non-migrants. Different 
theories, approaches and concepts have been adopted to explain why people migrate and 
their decision-making process (Massey, et al., 1998; Castles & Miller, 2009; O’Reilly, 
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2012b). Multiculturalism, assimilation and integration have been discussed by several 
authors as the political projects that can contribute towards understanding how to deal with 
the diversity of religions, cultures and ethnicities that migrants ‘bring’ with them when they 
migrate (Modood, 2013). In the 1990s, globalization and improvements in technologies, 
transportation and communication led people and commodities to move around the globe 
cheaply and easily. Transnationalism and diaspora became the words commonly used by 
scholars to identify the fragmentation and the duality of migrants’ lives, which were 
fractured between the country of origin and destination and sometimes beyond (Glick 
Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc, 1995; Brubaker, 2005; Faist, 2010; O’Reilly, 2012b). The 
settlement of migrants in host societies has represented new challenges for scholars, 
politicians and policymakers (Yuval-Davis, 2011), and nationalism, identity, hybridity, 
inclusion/exclusion, citizenship and belonging have become very common issues debated 
around the globe and especially in Western countries (Parekh, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006; 
Jones & Krzyżanowski, 2008; Castles & Miller, 2009; Özkirimli, 2010; Anthias, 2015).  
My thesis, which examines international migration and patterns of settlement in the 
country of destination, aims to contribute towards discussing migration and its relation to 
belonging, class and national identity in a non-Western country. More specifically, the thesis 
makes the following three contributions:  
Firstly, the thesis contributes to an in-depth knowledge of migration in the Arab Gulf 
region by focusing on an understudied group, that of Pakistanis. Within the context of the 
Arab Gulf region, Indians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Filipinos are the most studied 
foreign communities. It might be easy to assume that unskilled and semi-skilled Indians, 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis face the same problems and constraints throughout the GCC 
area (Gardner, 2010a). However, if we look at the community level, the Pakistani community 
has a different history from, for instance, the Indian community, whose links with the Gulf 
region date back to the first movement of Arab merchants from the Arabian Peninsula to 
South Asia in the seventh and eighth centuries (Onley & Khalaf, 2006). Moreover, the 
presence of millions of foreign workers has also led to the formation of migrant associations. 
Nonetheless, the extant literature has largely overlooked the role that these organizations 
play for the migrants. Focusing on the PAD means understanding and discussing migrants’ 
agential capacity in the migration context.  
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Secondly, the thesis questions the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals, 
as well as the homogenisation of migrants to the Gulf States. As said earlier, non-nationals, 
such as the old Indian merchant class, is involved in the management of the migration 
system. Moreover, we cannot assume that all South Asian communities deal with the same 
problems and constraints. For example, unskilled Indians or Pakistanis cannot bring their 
families with them, as it happens among highly-skilled migrants. Furthermore, among Sri 
Lankan communities in the GCC countries, women are the main breadwinners, which 
contrasts with the other South Asian communities (Gamburd, 2010). The need to move 
beyond the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals, and to avoid the 
homogenisation of all South Asian migrants, is thus evident. 
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the debate on structure and agency in migration 
studies by emphasising the role of migrant’s agency, which has often been underestimated 
(Mahdavi, 2011). I introduce the notion of migration project to emphasize the role and 
importance of human agency in the migration experience (Bakewell, 2010) and to emphasize 
that agency and structure are interrelated insofar as they both affect and shape each other. I 
also discuss the concepts of belonging, class, national identity and recognition, which 
contribute to an acknowledgment of the relation between structure and agency in migration 
studies. 
In conclusion, this thesis challenges the extant literature on migration in the Arab 
Gulf region by questioning the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals as two 
reciprocally-exclusive categories (Vora, 2013). Instead, it argues the need to look at inter 
and intra dynamics that take place in the ‘field’ between the two groups in order to 
understand how their relations are constructed.8 It is thus important to consider social 
interactions between nationals and non-nationals because individuals occupy contradictory 
and multi-layered locations, spaces and social categories (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Anthias, 
2015). This reasoning stems from my historical analysis of ethnic composition and social 
stratification in the Gulf port cities, especially Dubai, where the coexistence of different 
ethnic groups resulted from economic exchanges and intermarriages with people coming 
from African and Asian countries (Potter, 2009), which in turn contributed towards shaping 
the ethnic diversity of the region (see chapter 4). For example, the construction of belonging 
cannot be grasped only by looking at non-nationals as an ‘isolated’ category (Koch, 2015) 
                                            
8 In the thesis, I focus more on intra-community dynamics than inter-communities ones. 
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but it has to be analysed and discussed in relation to ‘others’. As such, it is important to 
consider the role played by migrants and their ethno-national migrant associations in forging 
the discourse on the Emirati national identity. Migrants, through civic engagement and their 
participation in the Emirati public sphere, contribute towards strengthening Emirati national 
identity via their sense of belonging to the country and their agential capacity (e. g. migrant 
organizations).  
 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis focuses on the migration of Pakistani professionals who reside in Dubai. 
It is structured as follows: Chapter two introduces and discusses the methodological 
approach, and the research methods I adopted to conduct the research. I opted for an 
ethnographically-informed approach, firstly, because of the specific socio-political context 
where the issue of migration, because of the demographic imbalance (see chapter 3), is a 
sensitive topic. Secondly, my financial constraints and visa regulations pushed me to opt for 
a time-intensive ethnography, which is characterized by a diversity and variety of people 
that I met and talked with while I was in Dubai. 
Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis, against the 
background of the existing literature in migration studies and wider theoretical discussions 
in sociology. In particular, this chapter focuses on the relation between structure and agency 
and puts forward an approach which tends to emphasize the role of human agency and 
individual capacity to act and make choices and its relation to structure. In the chapter, I 
discuss the notion of migration project and its links with belonging, class, national identity 
and recognition.   
Chapter four is devoted to describing the context in which I conducted research. I 
analyze the historical dynamics in order to unpack the contemporary ethnic diversity and 
social relationships in the UAE. By adopting the literature on global cities and moving 
beyond methodological nationalism, I examine the complexities and dynamics linked to the 
understanding belonging and the porosity of the UAE as a nation-state. As I explain, the 
different nationalities, languages, religions and cultures and the lack of any policy aimed at 
integrating foreigners in the UAE society, has not hampered the coexistence of ‘diversity’ 
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which is historically evident and that has become one of the markers and characteristics of 
the Gulf region in the twentieth century. 
In chapter five, I focus on the historical evolution of Pakistani migration to the 
country. Moreover, I provide a preliminary analysis of the Pakistani community in Dubai, 
and how the relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis have developed. However, 
discrimination, which is described in the extant literature on migration in the GCC countries 
(Gardner, 2010a, Vora, 2013), is not perceived by some of my Pakistani participants as an 
issue because they seem to accept the gendered and racialized hierarchies existing in the 
country.  
In chapter six, I discuss the presence of Pakistani professionals in Dubai. It focuses 
on how they construct their sense of belonging to the Emirati context. People build belonging 
in reason of shared values, but more than that, belonging is constructed because individuals 
are located in a specific space, place, locale and social category. I also argue that belonging 
is flexible, which means that people belong, at the same time, to different spaces, places and 
locales. ‘Flexible belonging’ means that social relations are shaped by fluctuations between 
‘preserving’ ‘Pakistani-ness’ and feeling part of the Emirati context.  
In chapter seven, I examine the role and importance of the PAD, which epitomizes 
the role and dynamics of migrant organizations in Western countries. Because of the specific 
socio-political and cultural context, however, it has specifities and characteristics that are 
unique. I discuss the PAD first by developing a top-down perspective in which its 
positionality in relation to the Emirati context is addressed and then by developing a bottom-
up perspective in which I analyse the PAD as a ‘gated space’. 
In chapter eight, I unpack strategies adopted by the UAE to deal with perceived 
challenges posed by migration and globalization to the Emirati national identity. I thus 
analyse the process of construction of the Emirati identity, in light of the changes occurring 
within the country, by examining the cultural dynamics that drive this process. Moreover, I 
argue that the participation of Pakistani professionals in events to celebrate significant 
occasions for the Emiratis contributes towards enhancing the sense of belonging of my 
participants to the Emirati context.  
In chapter nine, I come back to the three contributions of the thesis.  
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1.6 Notes on Terminology 
This section aims to explain concepts such as the ‘Islamic’ and the ‘Arab world’, 
thus helping the reader to identify the geographical, religious and socio-cultural area.  
The thesis focuses on the Arab Gulf region which is the cradle of Islām and the first 
Islamic community (umma) that was established in 622 A. D. Before the advent of Islām, 
the Arabian Peninsula was characterized by the presence of different languages and 
religions. In the seventh century, God (in Arabic Allāh) revealed to Muhammad, who was 
married to a very successful merchant woman (Khadija), the principles and fundamentals of 
Islām. All these principles and fundamentals through the decades were gathered in a book, 
the Qur’ān and along with the ḥadīth (plural ʾaḥādïth) represent the two main sources of 
Islamic religion, social, economic, political and cultural life. 
Saudi Arabia, with its holy places of Mecca and Medina, is the most important 
country for Muslims. The kings of Saudi Arabia apart from their political role have also the 
honorific title of the custodian of the two holy places (khadim al-ḥaramāni) of Mecca and 
Medina. Over the centuries and with the consolidation of the most important Islamic Empires 
and the spreading of Islām throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa, and in Eastern Europe with the Ottoman Empire, Islām became one 
of the three Abrahamic religions that is spread all over the world (Lapidus, 2014).   
The historical links between the GCC countries and South Asia can be traced back 
for centuries (Potter, 2009). The diffusion of Islām in the Indian sub-continent dates back to 
the seventh century when cane farmers from the region of Sindh, in the current Pakistan, 
were imported to the Arabian Peninsula by Arab merchants (Izady, 2002). In this vast 
geographical area, my thesis focuses on the GCC (or Arab Gulf countries). The designation 
of the region is, however, contested, so the ‘Persian Gulf’ and the ‘Arab Gulf’ are both used 
in the literature. However, I avoid taking sides in this debate because it is not relevant to my 
research. Moreover, I also use the expression the ‘Arabian Peninsula’ to identify all GCC 
countries, including Yemen. The ‘Persian Gulf’ is also used in the literature and in my thesis 
to designate the whole area, in which case, Iran and Iraq are included and Yemen is excluded. 
I sometimes use the term ‘Gulf’ to identify the whole area (Arab and Persian side of the Gulf 
region) and when I need to refer to one specific side of the Gulf, I use the Arab or the Persian 
side of the Gulf. 
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Islām is spread all over the world; however, the ‘Islamic world’ and the ‘Arab world’ 
are two different concepts. The ‘Islamic world’ includes all countries that are members of 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: states that from North-West Africa (Mauritania 
and Morocco) reach South-East Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia).9 The ‘Arab world’ includes 
all countries members of the League of the Arab States.10  
I use the expression ‘non-Gulf Arabs’ or ‘non-GCC Arabs’ to designate all Arab 
migrants who are nationals of a non-GCC country. Moreover, I use ‘migrant worker’ as it 
has been defined in article 2 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), in which the term is used to 
identify a person “who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated 
activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”. However, the GCC authorities prefer 
to use the term ‘temporary migrant worker’ because “they work on a temporary basis and 
according to fixed-term employment contracts. Upon expiration of these contracts, they 
return to their home countries” (letter from the Ambassador Al-Shamsi permanent 
representative of the UAE at the United Nations in 2006, reported in HRW, 2006, p. 70). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv3/states/?lan=en [accessed 07 November 2016]. 
10 http://www.lasportal.org/ar/aboutlas/Pages/CountryData.aspx [accessed 07 November 2016]. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline analyse the methodological approach I used to conduct the 
field research within the Pakistani community in Dubai. I take the reader into my life and 
field site by discussing the encounter with the Arab and Islamic world and unfolding the 
complexities and dynamics of my research experience. I discuss the methodological 
approach, the data collection, the ethical concerns of undertaking field research in Dubai and 
I also reflect on my role as a researcher.  
The UAE society is a ‘closed context’ (Koch, 2013) where it is difficult to interact 
with Emiratis (Kanna, 2011); a censorship system exists and media and the Internet are 
controlled by local authorities (Davidson, 2005, 2009b). In this regard, when I asked some 
participants to do Skype interviews they expressed concerns about using the Internet for this 
purpose.11 Moreover, migration is considered a sensitive issue by the Emirati authorities 
because of the demographic imbalance, which means that Emiratis are a minority in their 
own country (Baldwin-Edwards, 2011). Dubai is also one of the most expensive cities in the 
world (Emirates 247, 2016), which poses a further barrier to research.12 The specific socio-
political context, the economic constraints and visa regulations forced me to reduce the 
length of my fieldwork in Dubai.13 Despite these difficulties, I was able to undertake field 
research, collect data, interview people, observe and participate in the Pakistani 
community’s life, and talk with migrants of different nationalities (Filipinos, Egyptians, 
Bangladeshis, Indians, a British-Pakistani, and a Jordanian) who provided diverse and 
personal perspectives on their migration experience. I also had a conversation with a 
                                            
11 However, John, one of my participants accepted to reply to some questions via email.  
12 http://www.emirates247.com/news/world-s-most-expensive-cities-where-dubai-abu-dhabi-rank-2016-03-
15-1.624198 [accessed 20 May 2016]. 
13 My research was funded by a scholarship granted by Loughborough University and contributions of the 
Department of Social Sciences. After my first field trip, I realized that Dubai was expensive; moreover, the 
more I engaged with the extant literature the more I realized that my topic was sensitive for the UAE authorities. 
Thus I opted for an ethnographically-informed approach that led me to reduce my permanence in Dubai. As an 
Italian citizen, in October 2014, I got a visit visa upon my arrival at the airport valid for 30 days and it could 
be renewed through a local immigration office for other 30 days. When I arrived at Dubai airport in October 
2015, I discovered that the rules had changed, I got a visit visa for three months but I could not change my 
plans because I rented the accommodation for only a month and did not have the possibility to renew the 
contract.   
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representative of the Pakistani Consulate. My research is characterized by the richness of 
data collected, and the diversity of people with whom I talked and the places that I visited. 
The variety and abundance of information allowed me to provide a detailed, articulated and 
dynamic analysis of the Pakistani community in Dubai.  
 
 
 
2.2 The origin of the topic   
The choice of research topic and methods are driven by personal and academic 
motivations; gender, age, class, religion, ‘race’ and nationality affected my research (man, 
white, in my thirties, working-class background, atheist and Italian) and how I carried it out. 
The interpretation of data, the discussion of research findings and conclusion are influenced 
by who I am, and my personal, emotional and academic stories.  
In the mid-1990s, I undertook a long ‘journey’14 to ‘discover’ the Arab and Islamic 
world, maybe for my inborn curiosity, maybe I just wanted to explore a different way of life, 
a different religion, a new language, a different history and events. This fascinating, 
sometimes difficult journey, led me to read, meet, talk and interact with many people of 
different ethnic origins, nationalities, gender, age, language and religion. It emotionally, 
physically and spatially led me to visit mosques both in Italy and in the UK, to participate in 
public events in support of marginalized people. In this long journey, my interest, passion 
and curiosity for the Arab and Islamic world has grown day-by-day and has widened from 
history to language, from sociology to anthropology and religion, and eventually to include 
not only the Arab world but also the African, South and East Asian countries. Much later, in 
2005, a meeting with a Pakistani woman in my hometown represented another turning point 
in my life and studies; she told me the story of her family who migrated to Libya to work in 
the national oil company and that of many other Pakistanis who had migrated to Dubai. In 
2008, I realized that the time was ripe to address my interest academically and explore the 
dynamics and complexities of the migration experience in an Arab and Islamic country. This 
interest culminated in a research project that combined my personal and scholarly attachment 
                                            
14 The ‘journey’ I undertook related to the university degree and research experience among Arab and South 
Asian migrants in my hometown in Italy.   
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to the Arab and Islamic world with training in migration and ethnography. It took me a long 
time before starting this project (in 2014), but here I am. 
This is a research project on the Pakistani community and especially professionals in 
Dubai (see chapter 6). It is a stratified community with internal divisions that seem to not 
have undermined its cohesion.15 My background of studies and my personal interests drove 
the choice of my topic and the methods I adopted.  
 
 
2.3 Overview of the methodological approach 
In this section, I briefly present my research design and data collection in order to 
provide the reader with preliminary information; however, these aspects will be unravelled 
in more detail throughout the chapter. For this research, I undertook two field trips to Dubai. 
I spent two weeks between October and November 2014 and, during this initial trip, I more 
narrowly defined my research aims in order to take into account the real situation I came 
across while I was in Dubai, such as my financial constraints, the difficulties in approaching 
migrants, especially construction workers in the labour camps (I initially hoped to look at 
these), and the difficulties in investigating such a sensitive issue for the UAE authorities 
because of the international condemnation of how construction workers are treated (HRW, 
2006). Thus I decided to focus on Pakistani professionals because it was an under researched 
and interesting group that perform their migration experience in a different way in 
comparison with, for example, Indian merchants and businessmen in Dubai (Vora, 2013). 
During my second trip, I spent four weeks in Dubai between October and November 2015, 
I started working on my research but, as happens in ethnography, the unexpected is ‘behind 
the door’ and it showed up when I had the opportunity to conduct participant observation 
within the PAD. Thus I focused on Pakistani professionals’ and on the role and importance 
of the PAD to the Pakistani community.  
My methodological approach was based upon a combination of ‘conventional’16 and 
focused ethnography (see below) due to the particular setting and regulations in force in the 
                                            
15 In this chapter, the divisions are mentioned in order to discuss how they ’methodologically’ emerged during 
the field research. However, they will be analysed in detail in chapter 7. 
16 I use the term ‘conventional’ ethnography to identify the anthropological ethnography conducted in a non-
Western country among people with an ethnic and cultural background that differs from that of the 
ethnographer. The anthropological ethnography is conceived as an archetype derived from the Malinowskian 
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country. This approach led me to fully grasp the complexities and dynamics of the Pakistani 
community in Dubai 
In total, I have spent six weeks in Dubai where I had a multitude of spontaneous and 
informal conversations with many Pakistanis, Indians, non-Gulf Arabs and Westerners. 
Moreover, I undertook twenty-five in-depth, formal interviews, recorded in English: 
• twenty interviews with Pakistanis, Emiratis, an Indian, a Jordanian and a 
British-Pakistani 
• three interviews with Abdallah (Pakistani), who was my PAD key informant.  
• two interviews with John (Pakistani), who was my key informant of the 
Pakistani professional group. 
Of the twenty-two individuals above, sixteen were Pakistanis, three were Emiratis, 
one was Indian, one was British-Pakistani, and one was a non-Gulf Arab. I recruited my 
participants by adopting snowball sampling which means that I ‘used’ my first contacts to 
recruit other participants from their acquaintances, friends and family members. I opted for 
this sampling strategy because I initially only had one contact (John) and through his 
acquaintances and friends my sample was generated. I chose members of the Pakistani 
professional group that were known to and introduced by my initial contact (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Pakistani participants17 
Interviewees 
 
Age Occupation Duration of 
interview 
Generation Residence  
in Dubai 
Religion Origin from 
Pakistan 
John 60s Banker/Media  6 hours First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Born 
Muslim; 
identified 
as atheist 
India/Punjab 
Khalaf 50s Pakistani official 1 hour First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Not disclosed 
Ismail 42 Teacher 1.30 hour First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim British 
Pakistan 
                                            
image of the ethnographer that travels alone in an ‘exotic’ place, he is male, white, live in the ‘field’ for one 
year or more, and establishes the tent in the middle of the ‘field’ to observe what happens around him. It is 
different from ethnography used in sociology where the segmentation of the modern society has required new 
developments and ‘tools’ to investigate and research social life (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). 
17 In this table, I included all Pakistani participants with whom I had informal conversations and formal 
interviews. 
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Ester 45 Manager 1.30 hour First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Not disclosed 
Leila 39 Marketing 2 hours First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa 
 
Peter 36 Accountant 1.30 hour First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Baluchistan 
Ali 38 Freelance 1.30 hour First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Not authorized 
to disclose 
Mahmud 48 Businessman 2 hours First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Ismāʿīlï 
Muslim 
Gujarat/Sindh 
Ibrahim 77 CFO 2 hours First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Sindh 
Zia 50 Businessman 1.30 hour Second Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Not authorized 
to disclose 
Omar 30 IT 2 hours First Internet 
City 
Muslim Sindh 
Abdallah 49 Doctor 5 hours Third Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Not authorized 
to disclose 
Naseer 70s Businessman 1.30 hour First Motor City Muslim Punjab 
Muhammad 53 Businessman 2 hours Second Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Punjab 
Rita 41 Manager 2 hours Second Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Sindh 
Katie 31 Employee 1.30 hour Second The Greens Muslim Punjab 
Rahman 41 Marketing 2 hours First JLT 
 
Muslim Not authorized 
to disclose 
Rashid 37 Employee 2 hours First Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim Punjab 
Bushra 27 Employee 1 hour Second Dubai/Shar
jah 
 
Muslim Not disclosed 
Suleyman 42 Engineer 4 hours Second Abu 
Dhabi/Dub
ai 
 
Muslim Not disclosed 
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As it emerges from the above table, the occupations of my participants are varied (manager, 
businessman, doctor) and this exemplifies how the category of middle-class professionals is 
varied and stratified (see chapter 6); the average or typical length of an interview is between 
one hour and a half and six hours; the majority of my participants are first generation 
migrants; I am not disclosing their residence because some of them did not allow me to do 
that and the region of Pakistan where they come from; they are all born Muslim, and all, 
with the exception of one, identify as Muslim. 
As O’Reilly (2012a, p. 45) acknowledges, sampling is ongoing thus meaning that 
deciding “who to spend time with, where to be, what to watch and so on in not one-off 
decision, but is part of the practice of ethnography”. In other words, during my field research 
I also decided to spend time and interview other individuals who were likely to enable a 
wider perspective on Pakistani professionals in Dubai. It happened that during my field 
research I met other people that I thought could provide a more insightful and/or a different 
perspective (convenience sampling).  These are listed below (Table 2.2.). 
 
Table 2.2 Other participants 
Interviewees 
 
Country of 
origin  
Age Occupation Duration of 
interview 
Residence  
in Dubai 
Religion 
Jamal India 40s Employee Dubai 
Government 
3 hours Not 
disclosed 
 
Hindu 
Kate UAE 32 University student 1 hour Rashidiyya Muslim 
Hussein  Jordan 35 Teacher 2 hours Mirdiff 
 
Muslim 
Lisa UAE 25 Employee Dubai 
Government 
1 hour Not 
authorized 
to disclose 
 
Muslim 
Helen UAE 22 University student 1 hour Rashidiyya Muslim 
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As it emerges from the above table, the other participants are members of Indian and Arab 
(Jordanian and Emirati) middle-class, some of them are university students and other are 
employed by the Dubai government; they are Muslims and one was Hindu.  
The main sample characteristics (Table 2.1) are important in my research because 
the interviewed participants occupy different niches of the local labour market; their ages 
ranged from their 20s to their 70s; they are of different immigrant generations; they are all 
born Muslim, with most of them being Sunni Muslims, while one participant was an Ismāʿīlï 
Muslim and one was an atheist with an Islamic background. The diversity of the sample 
enabled me to provide an account of different subjectivities and stories in my thesis. For 
example, those who are members of the first-generation migrants have a different story from 
those of the second or third generation, and this difference has allowed me to better 
understand the construction of sense of belonging and their social interactions both within 
and outside the Pakistani community.  However, this sample also constrained my research 
because it was limited in terms of gender; the majority of my interviewees were men, and I 
only had conversations with five Pakistani women (see below).  
Seven of my participants were women (three Emiratis and five Pakistanis), and 
fifteen were men (twelve Pakistanis, one British-Pakistani, one non-Gulf Arab and one 
Indian). Although gender is not a central dimension of the thesis, some Emirati and Pakistani 
women’s voices have been included. These are women I met in Dubai in 2014 and 2015 (see 
pages 30-32). There are several reasons for the relatively small presence of (Muslim) 
Pakistani women in my sample. First, as a white Western and non-Muslim researcher it is 
very difficult to approach Muslim women because of the traditional division of male and 
female space. In the Emirati society (and in the other Arab and Islamic countries) gender 
segregation is seen as a way to safeguard family honour, and women “represent the public 
face of the family and it is women who pass honor [sic] to their male descendants” (Bristol-
Rhys, 2010, p. 96). In this kind of society, as Bristol-Rhys (2010) argues, honour and 
modesty, which are both associated with the public behaviour of women, have to protected 
and safeguarded. Any meetings between a male researcher and a woman participant would 
have to be chaperoned, thus creating an additional barrier to the recruitment. Second, in 
relation to Pakistani professionals, which is the focus of my thesis, the small sample of 
professional women also related to the difficulties I had with gaining potential access to 
Pakistani professional women via my key informant (John). John was able to provide the 
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contact details of six women, but only four of them accepted to be involved and to participate 
in my research (see ethical issues).  Third, the majority of Pakistani men in Dubai are the 
main breadwinners in their family units, they undertake the initial migration and they travel 
on their own. Some of my male interviewees told me that they moved to Dubai on their own 
and that their wives (and children) only joined them after a few years. On all of these 
grounds, it is easier to facilitate research with professional Pakistani men than with 
professional Pakistani women. 
To a certain extent, the limited amount of time spent in the field affected my sampling 
method which allowed me to interview more men than women because the former were 
more likely to talk with a white Western man and researcher thus facilitating our contacts 
and interactions. In terms of the racialized and gendered politics of the relationships I 
developed with Pakistani professionals, my contacts with Pakistani men were easier and 
more immediate than those I had with Pakistani women. Being a white Western man 
represented an opportunity to get easy access to the male sphere in this deeply gender divided 
society. At the same time, it also provided an obstacle to obtaining access to the female 
sphere.     
Further to the more formal interviews, my research relied upon informal 
conversations in the PAD, field notes, observations, and on many spontaneous conversations 
I also had with taxi drivers (especially, Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Ethiopians) 
and with waiters/waitresses (mostly Filipinos) in restaurants where I had meals, and with 
some Westerners I met. 
 
2.4 The ethnographically-informed approach 
Given the context outlined above and my research aims, I adopted an 
ethnographically-informed approach that is a combination of ‘conventional’ and focused 
ethnography. In this section, before unfolding my approach, I discuss why I opted for 
ethnographic methods, the origins of ethnography and its recent developments, and I argue 
that such developments resulted from the segmentation of the modern and globalized society. 
Ethnographic methods were suitable to develop my research aims because of their 
characteristics and developments (see below). Ethnography allowed me to catch the 
complexities and ambiguities of the migration experience, to observe and participate in 
migrants’ lives. As an interpretivist, I hoped to understand the meanings and aspects of 
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actors’ life, which entailed spending time with them, empathizing with them, sharing 
personal and emotional experiences with them. As an interpretivist, I also participated in 
people’s lives and groups in order to catch the meanings and make sense of what people did, 
thus understanding the migration experience from the participants’ perspective.18 My 
assumption is that ethnography should describe, understand and interpret cultural elements 
and that this does not necessarily require a prolonged period of data collection in the field. 
For example, I had enough experience and a specific personal and scholarly background that 
facilitated and reduced the necessary length of my permanence in the field. As ethnography 
is based upon interactions and contacts between the researcher and the researched, we cannot 
define a priori which elements, dynamics, and whether and to what extent people will accept 
to participate in the research. Nonetheless, my ethnographically-informed approach (see 
below) is based on the assumption that the ethnographer, instead of choosing not to 
undertake the research in a specific context or group because of financial constraints, or lack 
of previous knowledge, or difficulties in gaining access, should interpret and describe such 
difficulties as part of his/her research experience because they also serve to ‘create’ 
knowledge, which is the ultimate aim of any research. 
 
A) Ethnography: origin and developments 
In the nineteenth century, the term ‘ethnography’ was used to indicate research 
conducted in the so-called ‘exotic’ societies or in non-Western countries. The Polish-born 
anthropologist Malinowski (1884-1942), who is considered the founder of modern social 
anthropology, adopted ethnography as his privileged methodology (Macdonald, 2013). In 
the twentieth century, ethnography became a methodology adopted in sociology in order to 
study the everyday life in modern and urban contexts by combining quantitative and 
qualitative approaches (in this regard, it was a privileged methodology adopted by Chicago 
School, or the Chicago School of Ethnography) (Deegan, 2013).  
                                            
18 The approaches and methods used by ethnographers can be influenced by different philosophical 
perspectives in social science. Positivism argues that the social world is external to human beings and it can be 
observed through our senses, but we cannot ‘impinge’ upon it (Brewer, 2000). Realism is based on the idea 
that a real world exists and acts “independently of our knowledge and beliefs of it” (Benton & Craib, 2011, p. 
121). There are other developments such as the ‘reflexive turn’ and postmodernism (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007; O’Reilly, 2009). 
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Ethnography involves a full immersion, for a protracted period of time, in people’s 
lives in order to watch what they do and what happens, listen to what they say, ask questions 
and collect documents (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). It is a methodology based upon 
different methods of data collection, “such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing, 
the use of personal documents” (Brewer, 2000, p. 59). It is characterized by “holistic 
participation of a researcher amongst a foreign and/or ‘exotic’, relatively bounded 
people…the researcher is typically unfamiliar with the cultural setting under study and enters 
the setting with a broad, undefined purpose (Wall, 2015, no page number). It relies on 
interactions among people, as such the unexpected is always ‘behind the door’ and this 
requires a dynamic and flexible approach. 
Ethnography is a term that lacks “a single, standard meaning… And we can outline 
a core definition, while recognizing that this does not capture all of its meaning in all 
contexts” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 2). This ‘flexibility’ has allowed it to develop 
in order to respond to the new circumstances and challenges posed to social life by 
globalization, international migration, development of the Internet and social media that 
require new methodological approaches in order to grasp the complexities and dynamics of 
the modern society, such as multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995) and focused 
ethnography (Knoblauch, 2005). Focused ethnography is based on the premise that “we no 
longer need to travel far-away places to study culture; nor is culture defined only along ethnic 
or geographical lines” (Mayan, 2009, p. 37, cited in Wall, 2015, no page number). As such, 
it  
usually deals with a distinct problem in a specific context and is conducted within a sub-
cultural group rather than with a cultural group that differs completely from that of the 
researcher [and it is characterized by] short-term or absent field visits, an interest in a specific 
research question, a researcher with insider or background knowledge of the cultural group 
(Wall, 2015, no page number). 
Focused ethnography is complementary to traditional ethnography insofar as it uses the same 
methods and techniques. For Knoblauch (2005), focused ethnography is able to respond to 
the segmentation and fluidity of the globalized world, and it allows focusing on a specific 
group, it does not require travelling abroad, it is conducted in a place that is geographically 
and culturally close to that of the researcher and it is time-intensive.  
Focused ethnography has, however, some weaknesses. For example, Knoblauch 
(2005) enhances and encourages the use of modern technological devices (tape-recorder, 
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video camera) in order to build dynamic and inclusive data collection methods that take into 
account the different perspectives of people involved in the research (inter-subjectivity). 
Conversely, ‘conventional’ ethnography, because it is mostly based upon field notes, is 
subject to personal authorship, individual analysis and personal interpretations, thus 
becoming more subjective. However, I find this point a weakness in Knoblauch’s approach 
insofar as technological devices can also be used in ‘conventional’ ethnography along with 
field notes, and notes of spontaneous and informal conversations and non-recorded 
interviews.  
 
B)  Ethnographically-informed approach 
In order to carry out my research within the Pakistani community in Dubai, which 
from my perspective as a Westerner is an ‘exotic’ place, I used an ethnographically-informed 
approach that is a combination of ‘conventional’ ethnography and focused ethnography. This 
approach means that I conducted research in a non-Western city among people with a 
different background from mine and it was time-intensive. I was an outsider but with 
knowledge of an ‘insider’,19 I travelled abroad (I was alone, I am white and male), I focused 
on a specific group and organization of the Pakistani community thus reducing time in the 
field, and I came to this community with specific research aims in mind. This specific 
approach resulted from my background in Arab and Islamic studies and previous research 
experiences in Islamic contexts with Arabs and South Asians. This facilitated the contacts 
and interactions with Arabs and Pakistanis and made it easier for me to approach them and 
build a trusting relationship (see below). My specific approach allowed me to conduct field 
research in spite of the financial constraints and the sensitivity of the topic. Due to the 
demographic imbalance, migration is considered as an issue by the UAE authorities (see 
chapter 3). For example, the ethnographer (insert first name too) Ali was conducting research 
on the second generation of migrants (born of migrant parents) in Dubai (Ali, 2010). While 
he was in Dubai, he wrote a blog on his observations and ideas on migration and he did not 
                                            
19 In 2002, I graduated in Italy in Arab and Islamic studies. I conducted ethnographic research for two years in 
a mosque in South Italy; I undertook ethnographic research with South Asians in South Italy (2002-2005). In 
2011, I conducted ethnographic research, for four months, in Swansea (UK) within the local mosque mostly 
frequented by South Asians (Errichiello, 2007). However, I am aware that my knowledge of the local language, 
religion and customs could not represent ‘insider knowledge’ in an ethnographic sense, but certainly they 
facilitated my contacts and the building of a trusting relationship with my participants, as the results provided 
in the thesis demonstrate. 
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cover up his identity. During his last day in the city, the police knocked on his door and he 
was taken to the police station, where he was questioned for about twelve hours, they 
ransacked his room and seized his computer. This story encapsulates the discourse on the 
control wielded by the UAE authorities on the Internet and social media, the sensitivity of 
the issue of migration, and the potential risks that researchers face in Dubai. 
Ethnography is a dynamic, flexible and reflexive methodology and it can thus be 
adapted to the unexpected that usually happens while conducting field research. My 
ethnographically-informed approach is based upon the idea that focused ethnography 
overlap with the ‘conventional’ approach. Ethnography is a flexible and adaptable 
methodology that, combined with my previous research experience, and a deep knowledge 
of the socio-political, cultural and religious context, allowed me to develop my specific and 
particular approach. I think the quality of the data from my intensive, short-term period of 
ethnographic research and qualitative interviewing has been greatly informed and enhanced 
by my previous experience, training and knowledge in Islamic contexts: I didn’t have to 
settle in Dubai and learn the way of life as a complete outsider. As I discuss in this chapter, 
the richness and variety of data collected, my field notes, observations and the conversations 
I had in the field helped me to interpret and analyze the dynamics and complexities of the 
Pakistani community in Dubai.  
 
 
 
2.5 Gatekeepers and key informants 
Given my research aims (see chapter 1), I identified two different gatekeepers and 
key informants. In this section, I discuss the importance of networks and the ‘weight’ of 
reliable people that can facilitate and legitimate the ethnographer’s presence in the field. 
The gatekeeper is a person that is able to grant access to a group or setting because 
s/he is in a position of persuading others or is an influential member of the group (O’Reilly, 
2009). Moreover, in the field, it is also important to identify a key informant (s) who, because 
of his/her experience, role and status within a community or a group can provide lots of 
information, and s/he has a deep knowledge of the community or group.  
My research revolved around discussing Pakistani professionals’ life and the role of 
the Pakistani association. The access to the Pakistani professional group was negotiated 
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through a member of this group, to whom I was introduced by a former Pakistani Consul in 
Dubai, who, in turn, was a friend of an academic that I contacted a few weeks before my 
first field trip in 2014. This former consul asked a friend of his, John, to help me while I was 
in Dubai. John is an important member of the Pakistan Professional Wing (PPW),20 and 
because of his help I had the opportunity to meet and interview members of this group. He 
has been both my gatekeeper and key informant. This is a case in which both roles are 
overlapped. John became my key informant because as a member of the board of the PPW, 
he knew many professionals and, because of his long residence in Dubai he had a deep 
knowledge of the Pakistani community’s constraints and dynamics. John was born in India 
before partition, in 1947 (see chapter 5) and he migrated to Pakistan in the mid-1969. He 
settled in Karachi; after his degree, he was employed by a Pakistani bank. In 1973, he was 
transferred by his bank to Doha (Qatar). In 1996, he moved to Dubai where before starting 
working in the media, he was employed by a local bank. He is married with a Pakistani 
woman; the rest of his family, his son and daughter, lives in a Western country, where he is 
planning to settle upon leaving Dubai (see chapter 6). 
A gatekeeper might grant access to a specific group because s/he is a member of that 
group, but if the researcher needs to enter another group, s/he might need a new gatekeeper. 
In 2015, during my second field trip, in order to gain access to the Pakistani association, I 
contacted a Pakistani woman. I knew about her because she was introduced by Jamal, an 
Indian man who works in Dubai (see below) and, in turn, I was introduced to him by an 
academic. She contacted her friend, Abdallah, who is a member of the board of the PAD, 
and she told him that I was undertaking research on the Pakistani community in Dubai and 
that this was a good opportunity for the PAD to be known outside the local environment, 
thus she was my gatekeeper. Abdallah became my key informant because of his role within 
the organization and his deep knowledge of the history of the Pakistani community in Dubai. 
His support was necessary to gain access to the PAD, and in a certain way he legitimated 
my presence as a researcher in the field. Abdallah is a doctor who was born in Kuwait where 
his parents spent twenty-two years. Then, because of the nationalization policy adopted by 
the country (see chapter 3), his family migrated to Pakistan where Abdallah graduated as a 
doctor. He, then, decided to move to South Africa where he spent about fourteen years. He 
                                            
20 http://www.ppwdubai.com/  [accessed 20 April 2016]. 
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is married with a Pakistani woman; it was an arranged marriage (Errichiello, 2009) and he 
has got one son. In 2009, he moved to Dubai where now he works for one of the most 
important private hospitals of the city and he is one of the most prominent members of the 
PAD. 
In this context, in order to build a trust relationship with my participants, I needed 
my presence to be legitimated by a credible person that they trusted. For example, the 
gatekeeper/key informant of the Pakistani professional group sent a collective email to his 
friends (this raised an ethical concern that I discuss below) and they all accepted to talk with 
me just because I was introduced to them by a person that they reckoned with. In this specific 
socio-political context, networks are fundamental to gain access and conduct field research 
(Clark, 2006).  
The choice of having two different key informants led me to reflect on divisions 
within the Pakistani community. If I had talked only with Abdallah, the key informant of the 
PAD, where I conducted participant observation (see below) between October and 
November 2015, he would have said to me that the Pakistani community is united, cohesive 
and inclusive. During my first field trip, in 2014, John told me that Pakistanis in Dubai had 
a strong sense of belonging to their origins and roots; however, divisions within the 
community existed (from my field notes, 29th October 2014). In order to illustrate this point, 
it is useful to report some excerpts from the interview with Abdallah.   
G [initial of my name]: During my research I perceived a sort of division within the Pakistani 
community and I am aware that it is a big community, and so it is ‘natural’ to have different 
perspectives. I also talked, this morning, with a Pakistani professional, and he said: ‘yes there 
is a big division within this community’. Do you perceive this division? How could you 
explain it? 
A [initial of his pseudonym]: I think that is the beauty of every society that you have different 
classes, but I do not think that it affects the community in general. You cannot have people of 
the same class. I do not see anything wrong in having different class in a community as long 
as they complement each other, they can assist each other. That is how a community is. I think 
everywhere in the world you will find that. 
G: Apart from class differences that I expected to find in a group or association, I also believe 
that there is a sort of ‘competition’ or someone said to me ‘envy’ among members of the same 
community. Do you perceive this envy within the community? 
A: No, not at all. Our association is a second home for the Pakistanis here in Dubai, anyone 
who is willing to contribute towards the community; he can come and join us. It is a voluntary 
organization. So, I do not see any reason why there should be any privilege or class difference 
related to the association. I would say you have been for some quite days, you have been 
visiting the association, and you have seen the activities (interview with Abdallah, 19th October 
2015). 
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In these excerpts, I was not talking of class division, but I was referring to the division or 
‘conflicts’ within the community that was mentioned by John in 2014. This is why I asked 
the second question. These excerpts demonstrate that if I had only interviewed the key 
informant of the PAD (Abdallah), I would not have grasped the division within the Pakistani 
community, as I explain below.21 Put differently, when talking with a member of the board 
of an association or a group, s/he might ‘flatten’ the community without highlighting the 
discrepancies and differences that nonetheless exist within a group or association. Thus it is 
vital to talk and establish contacts with different people in order to obtain different 
perspectives.  
The role of the gatekeeper and key informant are central to ethnographic research 
and sometimes their roles overlap. They are the first persons that the ethnographer meet and 
talk with in the field. In some cases, the ethnographer needs access to different settings or 
groups and it is important to ‘select’ a new gatekeeper and key informant. In my research, 
in order to have access granted to both groups (PAD and professionals) I had to contact two 
different gatekeepers and key informants. Despite being members of the same community, 
there was no chance that the same gatekeeper or key informant could grant access to both 
groups. This led me to think of the division within the Pakistani community. 
 
 
 
2.6 Participant observation 
One of my research aims was to investigate the role of the Pakistani association for 
Pakistani migrants. Thus, I used the main method of ethnography to conduct participant 
observation, which means to observe for a period of time people’s lives in the natural setting 
and investigate their social life that occurs in the setting. It also involves talking with people; 
asking questions; participate in some events and writing (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2007). In 
this section, I discuss the importance of participant observation within the Pakistani 
association and I argue that this method along with my background and experiences allowed 
me to catch the complexities and the divisions within the community.  
                                            
21 These divisions also emerged during a conversation that I had with Bushra in the PAD (5th November 2015), 
however, as I explain in this chapter, she refused to deepen such dynamics. 
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Time is important in participant observation in order to build a trust relationship and 
‘apprehend’ the cultural and social norms from people’s perspective (O’Reilly, 2012a). As 
outlined above, I was unable to spend many months in Dubai to observe and participate more 
deeply in the Pakistani community’s life. In order to conduct participant observation, I spent 
as many hours as possible in the PAD (at least thirty hours in about one month), on different 
days and times. I also participated in some events organized by the association where I talked 
with many people. Participant observation is an embodied experience (O’Reilly, 2012a) 
based on physical contact, interactions, and on empathizing with participants. In informal 
conversations and in-depth interviews (see below), I found that a way to empathize with 
them was to use some words that I had listened to and read in other ethnographic accounts, 
so words such as ‘discrimination’ and ‘frustration’ became part of my vocabulary and a way 
to express my emotional participation in their lives.22 Participant observation allowed me to 
catch the complexities, dynamics and ‘conflict’ within the Pakistani community. For 
example, on 5 November 2015, one spontaneous conversation that I had with Bushra in the 
PAD, a young Pakistani woman who studied at an international university in Dubai, urged 
me to develop the approach to my research in a different direction. That conversation, along 
with the conversation that I had with John in 2014, pushed me to reflect on the division 
existing within the Pakistani community and it helped me to delve into its dynamics by 
asking my key informants specific questions on that division. However, only John, when I 
met him again in 2015, responded clearly by underscoring the existence of divisions within 
the community. The conversation that I had with Bushra led me to reflect on the importance 
of interacting with the participants; every occasion offered good opportunities to engage in 
talks with people in the field. It led me to think of the importance of informal chats and 
spontaneous conversations to my research  
Since the 2000s, I have been undertaking ethnographic research with Arabs and 
South Asians in Italy and the UK. In that sense, I have learned to be culturally sensitive, 
which means learning about beliefs, habits and customs of participants and empathizing with 
them (Sieber, 1993). For example, I knew how to behave with Muslim women, and that 
some of them may not agree to shake my hand. My knowledge of Islām and religious 
precepts has always been a good way to ‘break the ice’ and easily build a trust relationship 
                                            
22 This might appear ‘strategic’. However, by reading the literature on migration in the GCC countries, I felt 
emotionally involved in their own lives.  
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with Muslim men. I knew that I could not ask Muslim women and men questions on sex, 
and that I could not deal with issues such as atheism and homosexuality. I am aware that 
every context varies, people are different but the ethnographer can learn from previous 
experiences. In some authoritarian Middle Eastern countries, a researcher that shows 
knowledge of the local language, religion and cultural aspects might be viewed with 
suspicion by local authorities (Clark, 2006; Gentile, 2013). In my research, I felt a sense of 
discomfort in showing my specific knowledge especially in the PAD where I did not know 
who the people were and I feared that they could talk with local authorities and tell them that 
I was conducting research on migration in Dubai because, as I said above, migration is a 
sensitive topic. I initially felt that some of the people at the PAD looked at me with suspicion. 
However, the more time I spent in the PAD the more familiar they became with my questions 
and me, and my fear gradually disappeared.  
Participant observation is a method that involves contact between the ethnographer 
and participants (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Although in some cases (depending on 
the context and the previous experience of the researcher) time is important to build a trust 
relationship with the participants, my previous experiences and background of studies were 
essential tools in facilitating the dialogue and relationships between me and the participants.  
 
 
 
2.7 Ethnographic interviewing 
In order to investigate Pakistanis’ migration, the ethnographic interview, which is 
conducted by the ethnographer during his/her research (Gobo, 2008), represented the main 
tool to unfolding the dynamics within the community. In this section, I discuss the 
ethnographic interview as a technique that I adopted to gather information. It can be a 
spontaneous and informal conversation that takes place in the field or it can be arranged in 
a separate place and at a different time (in-depth interviews or guided conversation). The 
ethnographic interview might be divided in two different categories: those that are 
spontaneous and informal conversations that take place in the field and those that are 
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formally arranged at different times and places established by participants (O’Reilly, 
2012a).23 
In the PAD, I had lots of conversations with different people, I observed what 
happened and asked questions. For example, the Health Awareness event, which is organised 
by the Medical Wing (MW) of the PAD (see chapter 7) to deal with health problems of 
migrants, and takes place every last Friday of each month, produced a good occasion to 
observe what happened in the field and ‘provoke’ spontaneous and informal conversations. 
I found out, for example, that men and women with children were seated in the courtyard; 
they were in two different but adjacent areas of the patio; that the staff of the PAD distributed 
medicines, that there were Pakistani doctors both men and women and one American doctor. 
All these led me to think of the importance of such events to the peoples’ life insofar as some 
of them do not have enough money to go to hospital, to buy medicines, and no health 
insurance because some are illegal migrants.  
On 5 November 2015, I was in the PAD and I was talking with some participants and 
one of them asked me what I had discovered about the Pakistani community. I explained that 
I thought that it was a united and well-organized community. At this point, Bushra said to 
me that it is not true because the community is divided. I asked to arrange a private 
conversation because I realized that it was not the right moment to deal with this issue, but 
she refused. I interpreted this refusal as a way to conceal the discrepancies within the 
Pakistani community; I perceived her frustration and at the same time the ‘remorse’ for what 
she had told me. I met Bushra on another occasion (during the Health Fair, organized by the 
PAD in the Pakistan Education Academy, on 7 November 2015) and asked for a meeting, 
but she kindly declined my invitation. This conversation has been useful for my research 
because it let the divisions within the Pakistani community emerge (see chapter 7).  
Before starting participant observation in the PAD, on 19 October 2015, during my 
first and second field trips to Dubai (2014-2015), I had already interviewed nine people: 
Jamal, an Indian academically-oriented professional (see below) and eight Pakistani 
professionals (six men and two women). As I embarked on my observations in the PAD, I 
expected to meet some of the Pakistanis I had already interviewed. In 2014, in an informal 
                                            
23 In my research all in-depth interviews, which were pre-arranged with the interviewees, have been recorded 
with an electronic device. However, on four occasions I had pre-arranged interviews that were not recorded: 
with Jamal on 28 October 2014; twice with John on 29 October 2014 and on 21 October 2015; and with Khalaf, 
the member of the Pakistani Consulate on 5 November 2015 (see Appendix C). 
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conversation, John told me that the PAD is a “religious-oriented group that he [John] defines 
as a fundamentalist association”24 (from my field notes, 29th October 2014).25 In three in-
depth interviews with Abdallah, the key informant of the association and in eight in-depth 
interviews with Pakistani professionals, I asked if the whole community was as united as it 
appeared. The division within the community was never mentioned, and they ‘strived’ to 
project the image of a united community, except for the personal confidence of the 
aforementioned Pakistani professional (John). I knew that the community was stratified but 
as they shared the migration experience and difficulties that such experience entailed, I 
supposed that they were close to each other. The conversation I had in the PAD, on 5 
November 2015, shed new light on my research and led me to interpret these divisions as a 
key to understanding the internal dynamics of the Pakistani community. What initially 
appeared as a discrepancy, which could ‘compromise’ the findings of my research, had 
become a way to interpret the internal dynamics of the community from their own 
perspective, where divisions and discrepancies are integral parts of the whole (O’Reilly, 
2012a).  
The recorded, formal interviews and the more informal conversations I had in the 
field have been analysed by adopting thematic analysis, which is defined as “a method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 
p. 79). I opted for this method because it implies an active role of the researcher in 
“identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest, and reporting them to the 
readers (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 80). Having chosen unstructured interviews (see below), 
I had pre-conceived ideas about the main topic to be covered during the interview, which 
was to understand and discuss their migration story. I encouraged my interviewees to tell me 
what they thought was important in relation to their experience as migrants in Dubai, and 
then I followed the topical trajectories, thus themes like the decision-making process, 
belonging and temporariness became important aspects and topics of conversations and 
interviews with my participants. I read through the interviews and transcripts and noted 
down codes and concepts that I thought were important and these emerged as common 
patterns/themes in all interviews. The identified themes became crucial in order to address 
my research questions (see chapter 1).  
                                            
24 I asked my participant to explain the meaning of his words, but he did not want to go in detail. 
25 John asked me to not record that conversation and to not mention to anyone (within the Pakistani community) 
what he said to me. 
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Conversations and in-depth interviews are important elements of ethnographic 
research because they shed light on specific circumstances, they clarify some aspects, and 
they let divisions and ambiguities emerge. These are not being viewed as a ‘problem’ but as 
a part of the ethnographic research.  
 
 
 
2.8 Data collection 
As I outlined above, my research was based on ethnographic interviews that can be 
distinguished between spontaneous and informal conversations, which take place in the field, 
and more formal, in-depth interviews, which are pre-arranged in a different setting and time 
established by the participant (O’Reilly, 2012a).  
In addition to ethnographic observations and spontaneous and informal 
conversations, I recorded twenty-five in-depth and unstructured interviews26 with twenty-
two different people (on sampling see above). It means that I interviewed some people more 
than once (Abdallah and John). I chose this style because it allowed me to go in-depth and 
follow the topical trajectories. I did not have any predetermined questions, but only three or 
four topics that I thought could be important in order to develop my research. This style 
encourages reflexivity and there is room for letting ‘conflict’, doubts and fears emerge 
(O’Reilly, 2012a).  
On 28 October 2014, I had a long conversation with Jamal in his office. On 3 
November 2014 (I also met him in October 2015), I met him again and I recorded an in-
depth interview that lasted more than an hour. He works for the Emirati government and he 
is also a journalist. He is married and has got one child. He moved to Dubai in 2000, after 
finishing his PhD in India. Jamal is a successful Indian migrant who is also member of the 
Indian middle-class, described by Vora (2013) in her book. He enjoys his life in Dubai and 
he is planning to return to India and establish an NGO to help Indians to acquire skills so 
that they can easily find a job either in India or abroad (from my field notes, 26th October 
2015).  
                                            
26 The ethnographic interviews can be distinguished in three different styles: structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews. In a structured interview, questions are prepared and predetermined with explicit 
research aims. In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer has a sort of ‘interview guide’ that is a list of 
questions to ask in a predetermined order, however, in this kind of interview, the interviewer has room to follow 
topical trajectories as they emerge from the interview (O’Reilly, 2012a).  
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In 2014, I interviewed Hussein, a Jordanian man and my housemate. He is a teacher 
and he moved to Dubai in 2012; he is single, and he has a well-paid job in an international 
school in Dubai. Moreover, I also interviewed his colleague and friend, Ismail, who is a 
British-Pakistani and moved to Dubai in 2011. He is separated and has got two children who 
live with his (ex) wife in the UK. During this field trip, I interviewed Kate, an Emirati 
woman; she is 28 years old and she is a student at Zayed University. She was one of the 
guides of the tour at the Centre for Cultural Understanding (see chapter 8). These first 
interviews helped me to understand that the topic was sensitive and that to approach Emiratis 
would not be easy. For example, during one conversation with Jamal, I asked him to address 
me to an immigration office in order to ask how to renew my visa if I decided to stay longer 
(see footnote 15). He said not to visit an immigration office whilst I was in Dubai because 
the local authorities would register my name and details and asked the reason why I wanted 
to renew it, which is something to avoid when conducting research on migration. He said 
that I would better ask to the Emirati Consulate in the UK or in Italy. 
During my field trips I hoped to interview some Emiratis (see chapter 4) in order to 
understand their perspective on migration in the UAE. However, it was rather difficult to 
talk with them because most of them “are still reluctant to open up to outsiders” (Kanna, 
2011, p. 12). It is not easy to approach them unless you are working or studying with them. 
In a shopping mall, I tried to approach an Emirati man who was working in customer service, 
but he was very formal. I asked questions about his dress and he replied but soon after he 
returned to his duties. The only way I found to overcome this impasse was to participate in 
two tours (6th November 2014 and 31st October 2015) around the old Dubai organized by 
the Centre for Cultural Understanding (see chapter 8) where I interviewed the two Emirati 
guides: Kate, as I said above; and in October 2015, I also interviewed Helen, who is a student 
at Zayed University in Dubai and works as a volunteer at the Centre. Each interview lasted 
about forty minutes. On 26 October 2015, I met Jamal again and on that occasion I 
complained how difficult it was for me to talk with Emiratis. He asked if I wanted to talk 
with Lisa, his Emirati colleague. I did not lose this opportunity, so I accepted. She joined me 
and Jamal left the room. I explained my research and aims. This interview lasted about forty 
minutes. Lisa is twenty-two years old and she graduated at Zayed University. She started 
working for the Emirati government few months before I interviewed her. Her father is a 
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retired policeman who migrated when he was 14 years old from the emirate of Ras al-
Khaimah to Dubai.  
I arranged and recorded in-depth interviews with Abdallah, the key informant of the 
PAD; we met three times and I recorded three interviews with him that lasted about thirty-
five minutes each. Our meetings were pre-arranged via email and phone. In the first two 
meetings, we met at the PAD; our last meeting took place in his office. I also recorded 
interviews with some Pakistani professionals and the link between the interviewees and me 
was John (see above). I arranged meetings with them via email or phone. In some cases, it 
was the first time that we met, and I explained to them who I was, what I was doing, and 
how I would use the interview. Our meetings lasted no less than an hour.  
The meetings took place in different settings: PAD, offices, hospital, cafe, park, 
shopping mall and private houses. Sometimes the setting was a ‘problem’. I interviewed 
many professionals in their offices. On the one hand, I thought it was good because they felt 
comfortable and we had a quiet place to talk. On the other hand, it represented an obstacle. 
On one occasion, I struggled to conduct the interview because every five or six minutes 
someone knocked on the door to talk with my interviewee (Abdallah). In two occasions, I 
recorded interviews with Ali (on 15 October 2015) and Suleyman (on 9 November 2015) in 
cafes and I also recorded the voice of waiters, other people around us and music. Ali was 
thirty-five years old when I met him. He works as a freelance in media and communication, 
he is married and his wife also works in Dubai in the fashion sector. He arrived in Dubai, 
after his MBA in Lahore, in 2011 and he started working in media production because there 
are some Pakistani channels in Dubai. Suleyman was thirty-nine years old when I met him. 
He moved to Dubai when he was very young and he did his A- level in Dubai. He is married; 
he is an engineer and works for an airline company.  
These interviews, the different settings (where they were recorded) and the people 
whom I interviewed provided information, experiences, ideas, ‘conflicts’, projects and 
stories that helped me to understand migration from the participants’ perspective. As an 
interpretivist, stories, events, observations and interviews represented a useful means to 
understand people’s lives.   
To sum up, I conducted twenty-five unstructured interviews with twenty-two 
individuals. I met my interviewees in different places: they were sometimes noisy, and 
sometimes very quiet. I spent more than one hour with each interviewee, on one occasion I 
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spent four hours in a cafe by talking with the participant (Suleyman). I was able to build a 
positive relationship with each interviewee because I knew how to behave and which topics 
and aspects I could enhance to make them aware of my knowledge on Islām and the Islamic 
world. This facilitated me in building a friendly and trusting relationship with the 
participants.  
 
 
 
2.9 Field notes 
Ethnographic accounts rely on field notes that are the first written representation of 
the social world that the ethnographer has decided to study (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2007). 
In this section, I discuss the role of field notes as the first written ‘document’ in my research. 
They were a key component of my research because I ‘recorded’ my thoughts and ideas.  
Based upon my previous experience as ethnographer, I knew that field notes 
represented a written form of my thoughts, ideas, events, observations and reflections. The 
importance of field notes to my research was linked to the need to avoid forgetting, 
overlapping and confusing events, words and people. They helped me to make sense, 
distinguish and reflect on what happened in the field. By writing field notes, I matched 
observations, events and thoughts to a specific day and person. In my research, I wrote field 
notes as soon as an event or conversation occurred, or observations pushed me to reflect but 
I also wrote them when I returned home, usually in the evening. I did not have a specific 
‘rule’, but it depended on to what extent an event, words or observations struck me (and, in 
turn, it pushed me to reflect and the opportunity that I had at the time to sit and write).    
In my view, field notes have to include thoughts, reactions, ideas, and questions. 
Observation, writing and interpretation are related phases and the ethnographer cannot write 
about events and actions without describing, interpreting, and adding his/her thoughts, ideas, 
questions and doubts on what s/he has observed. One day when I was in the PAD, I had a 
spontaneous conversation with a participant who asked what I thought of the Pakistani 
community and I underlined that it was seemingly a united community, as I said above. At 
this point, Bushra said 
but what kind of Pakistani community you are talking to. Here there are rich Pakistanis that 
you never see around, they never come here, and they just organize their own events but only 
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for them. I interpreted her words and anger with which she stated her point of view as a sign 
of division, a split within the Pakistani community. During my fieldwork in the PAD and my 
interviews with professionals I realized that the professionals have never participated in the 
PAD’s activities and events. Thus I had already perceived this detachment within the Pakistani 
community but I did not know how to interpret it. Today, this girl has helped me to interpret 
the split within the Pakistani community as a question of class (field notes, 5th November 
2015).   
On this page of my field notes, I described the event as it happened in the PAD. On the same 
page, I also reported my thoughts, ideas and interpretation of the conversation. My 
understanding of the event was based on my observations, ideas and conversations I had 
with several Pakistanis. This event provides me with a key to interpreting the discrepancy 
within the Pakistani community. In my perspective, the interpretation of the action or event 
in the field cannot be separated by the event or action itself. 
Field notes represent the first written ‘document’ that attests the physical presence of 
the researcher in the field. I used them extensively because they include details, facts, 
thoughts, ideas and they helped me to interpret the events occurred in the field.  
 
 
 
 
2.10 Ethical issues 
Conducting field research in this kind of socio-political context raises ethical 
considerations that are unique and also involves the researcher’s sensitivity. In this section, 
I discuss some of the ethical concerns that arose from my research. 
In ethnography, ethical considerations are prominent (Brewer, 2000) and they should 
be addressed in order to “keep us reflexive and critical” (O’Reilly, 2012a, p. 63) instead of 
considering them as a reason not to undertake research. There are several issues to analyse 
such as the role of the researcher, consent and confidentiality. There are also ethical issues 
raised by the setting or group in which the research is undertaken. 
 
A) Common ethical issues 
In my field research, I always disclosed my researcher role to the participants. In 
some cases, it is rather impossible to hide your role and identity. As an ethnographer, I have 
previously conducted research in Islamic contexts, such as in mosques. For example, in 
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mosques, I was the only Westerner, I disclosed my role because I was not Muslim, and as 
such, I could not participate in any of the daily five prayers.27 Thus, I was ‘forced’ to reveal 
my role; there was no way to hide who I was. In my ethnographic research in the Pakistani 
association I was the only Westerner and I could never conceal my role and identity. In 
specific contexts, the characteristics (gender, age, skin colour, religion) of the researcher 
may ‘force’ him/her to disclose his/her role and identity. In order to get fully informed 
consent, I explained to my participants what I was doing, why I was doing the research, and 
how I would use the interviews and my notes. At the beginning of our conversations and in-
depth interviews, I always said who I was; I gave them a leaflet (see Appendix A) to explain 
my research and to show that I was linked to an academic institution. This helped me to build 
a trust relationship and made it easier to gain full and informed consent from the participants. 
I also explained to them that all personal information, in terms of surname (some of them 
provided their surname or business card), town of origin, name of wives or husbands, and 
children would not appear in my thesis. I explained that all names would be changed and 
that I would use pseudonyms to protect them from potential repercussions (confidentiality). 
  
B) Specific ethical issues 
In the last few years, several field researches have been conducted in the Arab Gulf 
region. Among these researches, just one mentions the difficulties in conducting field 
research in Dubai (Ali, 2010); in other researches the methodological aspects are only 
superficially touched upon (Kanna, 2011; Vora, 2013; Kathiravelu, 2016) and two discuss 
in detail the methodological aspects (Longva, 1997; Gardner, 2010a). The ethical 
implications of undertaking field research in the GCC countries are mostly (almost 
completely) neglected in the literature. My research raised some ethical issues not analysed 
by previous field research. In the UAE, the Internet and other media are controlled by 
authorities (Davidson, 2005). Despite the existence of free zones, where it is assumed that 
the Internet is not controlled, during my fieldwork one of my participants told me that this 
is not completely true. During my sojourns in Dubai, I tried to access specific sites and blogs, 
but a page appeared on my laptop which stated that I was about to enter a prohibited website 
                                            
27 A Muslim is required to perform five prayers on a daily basis: 1) fajr (dawn); 2) ẓuhr (noon); 3) ʿaṣr 
(afternoon); 4) maghrib (sunset); 5) ʿishāʾ (evening). Friday is the day for Muslims to perform the ṣalāt al-
jumʿa (collective prayer) that must be made in common in the mosque. 
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according to the UAE law and if I had surfed it would have been done at my own 
responsibility. Despite living in a free zone (Dubai Internet City), I realized that Internet 
usage could be unsafe. The ethical issue that this suggested was how to preserve the 
confidentiality of email exchanges or any other conversation, for instance, by Skype. When 
I was in Dubai, I avoided providing many details and accounts of my meetings by email. I 
saved my interviews on my USB and I did not send any attachments. It is undeniable that 
the issue of migration in the UAE is a sensitive topic because of the growing imbalance 
between nationals and non-nationals (see chapter 3). Thus, I realized that this research could 
represent a risky situation for both the researcher and the researched. In order to protect the 
participants, I never recorded details (name, occupation, contacts) on my laptop just on 
paper. I never memorized their mobile numbers in my telephone. Thus, I tried to create a 
sort of paper archive with details and I read these details repeatedly so that I could memorize 
some of the details, in case I would lose it.  
Moreover, because of the socio-political context, I was concerned that my reliance 
on the snowball sampling technique that I used to contact especially Pakistani professionals, 
where everybody knew with whom I talked, meant that anonymity was compromised 
because the key informant sent a collective email (Clark, 2006). I did not feel very 
comfortable but I realized that the key informant of the Pakistani professional group was a 
person that deserved respect and some Pakistani professionals accepted to participate 
because they trusted him and in a certain way I ‘enjoyed’ his credibility. Suleyman, one of 
my participants, cancelled our meeting three times. At last, I told him that I would leave in 
a few days and he arranged a meeting the day before I left. When we met, on 9 November 
2015, he said to me that if he had not met me he would have been disrespectful towards my 
professional key informant (John), who, in turn, was a good friend of my participant’s father. 
This sort of respect for my key informant was also expressed by a few other participants, 
especially when they called him ‘uncle’. This would lead the reader to think that all my 
participants were under pressure but it was not the case because the collective email that my 
key informant sent was forwarded to more than twenty-five people but only some of them 
accepted to be interviewed. Moreover, when I met the participants I always said that they 
were free to withdraw their consent to be interviewed if they did not feel comfortable to talk 
with me. 
53 
 
Other ethical issues relate to the sensitivity of the researcher and her/his involvement 
in the participants’ lives. For example, how could I interpret the divisions within the 
Pakistani community that were distinctly expressed during my research? It was frustrating 
to contradict or ‘challenge’ what Abdallah, one of my key informants, told in relation to the 
cohesiveness of the whole community in light of the ‘discrepancy’ that instead emerged 
during my research, especially when I talked with John. This is not strictly related to this 
particular socio-political context though. It might create a problem when my key informants 
will read my research as some of them asked, thus compromising further research within the 
same community. However, during my research I always revealed, contradicted and 
provided my interpretations of the events, observations and conversations that I had in the 
field and they were aware that I acknowledged the division within the Pakistani community.    
Still, when I talked with Khalaf, the Pakistani Consulate’s representative to whom I 
was introduced by John, I felt discomfort because I disagreed with his words but I was in a 
diplomatic institution in a foreign country. I realized that what he told me did not correspond 
with what other people said to me, with the relevant literature and personal observations. 
However, I had to nod and apparently agree with him; silence was the best option I had but 
I perceived this as hypocrisy (Clark, 2006).  
Moreover, to protect me from potential problems during my fieldwork in Dubai, I 
also filled in the risk assessment of my university. Thus, my institution, supervisors and 
members of my family knew exactly where I was and whom to talk to in case of problems. 
I also stayed in regular contact via e-mail with my supervisors. 
Ethnographic research raises several ethical issues, some common to any kind of 
research and others specifically related to the setting, group, or people with whom the 
ethnographer is conducting the research. There are no specific prescriptions on how to deal 
with uncertain situations; it is only an informed sensitivity to issues as they arise that can 
help the researcher to avoid potentially risky situations. 
 
 
2.11 Reflexivity 
In this section, I explore my role as a researcher within the social world in which I 
conducted the research. I discuss how I felt in relation to my research experience and how 
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my previous experience and background help me to deal with the difficulties in undertaking 
field research in a Middle Eastern country.  
For O’Reilly (2012a), it is important to acknowledge the role of the researcher as a 
part of the social world s/he is studying. Reflexivity means making the researcher aware of 
the dynamics and relations with the participants in the field (Gobo, 2008). As Finlay (2002, 
p. 211) acknowledges, the researchers try “to make explicit how intersubjective elements 
impact on data collection and analysis in an effort to enhance the trustworthiness”. 
My journey in the Arab and Islamic countries started in the mid-1990s by reading 
books and listening to stories told me by Arab and South Asian migrants in Italy and the UK. 
At the beginning, it was only an emotional journey but on 26 October 2014, it became a 
physical and geographical journey when I arrived for the first time in Dubai. It was late 
evening, I took a taxi from the airport and the taxi driver, an Indian man, drove me to my 
accommodation which was in Mirdiff, a residential area in the outskirts of Dubai. It was very 
late, I was struck by the big buildings, lights of the city, the huge roads with two or three 
lanes on each side and the panorama changed rapidly, for a few metres I was looking at big 
skyscrapers and a few meters ahead I was looking at big desert areas and then buildings 
again. In the morning, I looked out of my window and I realized how big the compound 
where I lived was: hundreds of houses, buildings and villas, where Westerners, a few 
Emiratis and Arabs were accommodated (Picture 2.1).  
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Picture 2.1 View of Mirdiff compound 
Source: Photograph by the author, October 201428  
I also saw two black African men who were cleaning the cars of some residents in the 
compound (Picture 2.2).  
Picture 2.2 Africans working in Mirdiff 
 
                                            
28 All the pictures included in the thesis have been taken by the author.  
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On that morning, I started thinking that when I arrived at the airport all drivers and taxi 
drivers were South Asians and Arabs, and then I saw two black African men while they were 
cleaning the cars. These observations led me to reflect on how the presence of foreign 
workers in Dubai is pervasive, and they are willing to do even the most menial jobs in order 
to work. This, in turn, pushed me to question why they migrate to the UAE and why they 
accept these kinds of jobs; maybe some of them are highly-skilled migrants. These thoughts, 
in a certain way, drove my research in Dubai. Despite focusing on Pakistani professionals, I 
realized that I could not neglect what was evident in Dubai and peculiar of the UAE society, 
namely the presence of millions of migrants in menial jobs and construction workers that 
have ‘built’ this country, as some of the Emiratis told me. In Dubai there were dozens of 
construction sites because the emirate will host the 2020 Expo event, and I was struck by the 
presence of hundreds of construction workers on each site. I had the opportunity to observe 
that they work in safety; I saw construction workers wearing helmets and jackets on the sites 
I passed by (Picture 2.3). However, accidents at their workplaces are very common. For 
example, in 2005 in Dubai, 39 construction workers died (HRW, 2006).  
Picture 2.3 Construction workers in Dubai 
 
Outside of the construction sites, it was very common to find signs that explained how 
important safety is (Picture 2.4). 
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Picture 2.4 Sign outside a construction site, TECOM, Dubai    
 
The view of these signs led me to think of the ambiguity on how construction workers are 
treated. On the one hand, the need of guaranteeing safety is proclaimed to all workers as 
evident from the sign (Picture 2.4). On the other hand, the way in which the construction 
workers are treated, the long working hours in the hot summer in Dubai, even though they 
should stop working from midday to 3.00 pm, the constraints of the sponsorship system 
(sometimes the passport is withheld, and sometimes the first salary is not paid) are not 
considered as part of a system that should also guarantee ‘safety’ in a broader sense outside 
the construction site (HRW, 2006).   
During my trips in Dubai, I had the opportunity to visit the city and observe what 
happened around me. By walking in Dubai, I was impressed by the presence of millions of 
foreigners (and tourists as well), and only a few Emiratis. I perceived why some of my 
Emirati participants in our conversations talked of a sense of detachment and ‘frustration’. 
In Dubai, the financial and consumer service is managed by foreigners (Westerners, Asians). 
They are the productive component and they work in the private sector, whereas Emiratis 
mostly work in the public sector (Kapiszewski, 2002). However, during my second trip I 
saw some Emiratis that worked in customer services. This led me to think of the changes 
within the UAE society, to think of stereotypes very common in Western countries. I 
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remember when I said that I was going to Dubai, my family said to me that I would only 
meet rich people; they associated Dubai with oil and luxury life. The reality is different, not 
all Emiratis are rich, and not all people in Dubai work in the public sector.  
During both trips in Dubai, I talked with many taxi drivers coming from Egypt, 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Syria, and everyone had something to tell me, 
everyone had different stories to tell, but they all have in common the sense of temporariness 
that characterized their lives in Dubai, the need to plan the future back home because they 
know that at a certain point they will have to leave the country. I heard many stories, many 
different plans, many different ideas, but all linked by the need to migrate to find a job, even 
a temporary job, but it was thought of as a sort of investment. They borrowed money, they 
were suffering the constraints of the sponsorship system that crushes their lives, and which 
makes them powerless and vulnerable. For example, I talked with Rashid, a Pakistani 
participant in the PAD who told me that he got married a few years before leaving Pakistan 
where he had been working previously. But a friend asked him to move to Sharjah, the 
emirate not too far away from Dubai, to earn more money. He accepted because in the UAE 
“there is a better lifestyle, it is a safe country and you can combine the modernity, security 
with the Islamic component” (from my field notes, 3rd November 2015). His wife is still in 
Pakistan and he is planning to return to his country in a few years and establish a garment 
company with his brother. 
 Dubai has developed in the last fifty or sixty years to become an international 
financial centre. One day I was walking along the Dubai Creek on the Deira side, and I saw 
many dāws, which are the traditional boats that leave from Dubai and travel to India, Iran or 
East Africa (Picture 2.5).  
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Picture 2.5 Some dāws on the Dubai Creek 
 
This reminded me of the history of Dubai, its seafaring activities, its multi-cultural and 
cosmopolitan environment, and the importance of links with Persians, Indians and Africans 
(see chapter 4). I had not grasped the extent to which those historical links are still evident 
in the modern Dubai; I realized that something of the past was still there. During my second 
trip in 2015, I also visited the historical area of Dubai, which revolves around the Dubai 
heritage village. When I visited this village, it was quite empty and I questioned the 
importance of this historical area. I then came to understand that it is important for Emiratis, 
as a symbol of the past and national identity that risks being ‘uprooted’ because of the 
presence of millions of foreign workers and forgotten by the young generation whose 
lifestyle is often modelled on that of Westerners (Picture 2.6).  
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Picture 2.6 The entrance of the Dubai Heritage Village 
 
I heard many stories, I talked with different people and I recorded interviews. I talked with 
lots of taxi drivers and by listening to their stories I felt part of their lives, they made me 
aware of how much they earn, how difficult the life was in Dubai. However, when I talked 
with professionals, who obviously had a different lifestyle and did not suffer at least partially 
from all the limitations and constraints of the sponsorship system, I realized that they had 
different stories, and words such as poverty and insecurity were not mentioned in our 
conversations.  
As Mauthner and Doucet (2003, p. 416) acknowledge, it is important to incorporate 
“reflexive observations into the actual analysis” of the data. Reflexivity is not time and space 
bound but my current position of self-reflexivity is informed by my previous experiences in 
the field. One of the challenges in ethnographic research is the unequal balance of power 
between the researcher and the researched, which means the need to avoid that the latter 
feels exploited by the former (O’Reilly, 2012a). As Roald (2001) argues, the relationship 
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between Muslims and Western researchers is flawed by the participants’ perception that 
social research is a means of establishing a sort of Western imperialism. Thus, “Muslims [...] 
believe that non-Muslims misunderstand Islamic ideas and practices either deliberately or as 
a result of a conduct of attitudes” (Roald, 2001, p. 69). The relationship between the Western, 
non-Muslim researcher and the Muslim research participant is a ‘party game’, where the 
Muslim agrees to be studied because s/he gives a ‘real image’ of Islām and Muslims, and 
the researcher analyses and interprets the structures and attitudes that constitute the object 
of his/her research (Roald, 2001). This perspective, as it may seem utilitarian by both parties, 
worked in my relationship with Muslims in terms of mutual interests and benefits. When one 
of my female gatekeepers in Dubai contacted a member of the PAD to invite him to 
participate in my research, she writes in her email invitation that this was a good opportunity 
for him ‘to give the right perspective’ (from the email sent by one participant to the key 
informant of the PAD on 12 October 2015) on the Pakistani community in the UAE.  
As a white Western researcher, the power relationship between the two involved 
parties, the researcher and the participants, might be viewed as unbalanced insofar as the 
latter could feel exploited by the former. In terms of positionality, in my research in Dubai, 
there was an intersection of whiteness, nationality, student and masculinity. was aware that 
as a white Western researcher I was in a privileged and advantageous position compared 
with my interviewees. They presented themselves to me as highly-educated migrants with a 
family background characterized by an affluent lifestyle, thus showing that they were 
different from the majority of unskilled and semiskilled Pakistani migrants in Dubai. They 
could afford a lifestyle that most of the migrants could not. In this regard, I perceived their 
will to project the image of affluent and educated people able to interact with a white Western 
researcher and as such able to understand the purpose of my research.  
Being a non-Muslim could represent an obstacle to the full development of good 
relationships. However, my previous experience with Muslims, my knowledge of Arabic 
language and Islamic religion facilitated the dialogue and the rapport between the researcher 
and the participants. Many times, when I was introduced by a previous participant to 
acquaintances or friends, I was referred to as someone who knew and studied the Islamic 
culture and Islamic world. To be a white Western and non-Muslim researcher could be 
viewed as an obstacle and create an unbalanced power relationship, but my experience, my 
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knowledge and my sensitivity was perceived and viewed by my participants as an ‘ice-
breaker’, thus breaking down barriers and facilitating the dialogue.   
As a student/researcher, I was in a non-privileged position compared with my 
participants. I was seeking knowledge and they were those who could provide me with the 
knowledge and information that I was seeking. I perceived myself as having an inferior 
social status also because some of my participants could afford to live in and enjoy a lifestyle 
in Dubai that I, as a white Westerner, could not afford. Age was also another element that 
emerged as important in terms of self-reflexivity. Some of my participants were younger 
than me and they had a permanent and a good job. As a white Westerner, I perceived that 
inequalities between myself and the research participants could go both ways; for example, 
as a student I was in a precarious economic situation which could not allow me to live in 
Dubai, whilst younger Pakistani professionals whom I interviewed could live in the city and 
enjoy an affluent lifestyle that at my age I could not afford.  
It is undeniable that as a man, I was facilitated in approaching and building trusting 
relationships with Pakistani professional men rather than with women. It is easier to get 
access to women’s sphere for a female researcher than a male researcher (Roald, 2001). 
Based upon my own experience as an ethnographer who has conducted research for some 
years in Islamic associations, I was very aware of the difficulties in engaging in any kind of 
discussion with Muslim women (Errichiello, 2007, 2008). I had the opportunity to interview 
a few Pakistani women in Dubai, and although I thought that they could feel a sense of 
discomfort from talking with a white and non-Muslim man, I was surprised when, in our 
meetings, none of them actually wore the headscarf and they all shook my hand. I 
interviewed Pakistani professional women in public spaces, so their behaviour, their physical 
contact (e. g. by shaking my hand) impressed me in relation to the closeness and separation 
that I experienced in my previous research. The different behaviour between Muslim women 
has been important because it has allowed me to reflect on the importance of context and 
class. To conduct an interview in an Islamic association, which is mostly frequented by 
Muslim men, could be viewed as compromising women and men’s honour and 
respectability. Muslim women who had a job or interact outside their ethno-national 
community, as it happened in Dubai both with Pakistani and Emirati women, had a more 
‘open’ attitude than those who did not work (as it happened when I conducted my research 
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in Italy and UK), thus meaning that their boundaries were strictly demarcated by their 
belonging to the Arab and Islamic community. 
The Pakistani professionals (men and women) I met in Dubai were educated, they 
spoke English, as it was their first language, and they understood what I was doing. They 
are among the privileged who have the opportunity to migrate without coping with the 
constraints and difficulties that are experienced by low-wage migrants. Their social status 
entails some privileges (e. g. bringing their family with them) from which unskilled and 
semiskilled migrants are excluded. This makes their migration experience less traumatic and 
difficult than those who have a different economic and social status (Gardner, 2010a). In 
Dubai, I interviewed my Pakistani participants in their office and in cafes and I perceived 
their sense of freedom from the alleged pressure of their community. This facilitated the 
dialogue; they described themselves and their sense of belonging to the Pakistani 
community, but also their independence, which was also evident among Pakistani women 
who are working outside the home. Some of these women are also the main breadwinners; 
for example, one of my participants is a single mum, and another one lives on her own.  
Within the Pakistani community in Dubai, I perceived a very friendly atmosphere. 
For example, I remember many hours I spent with Suleyman in a café. He told me the 
anecdotes of his life in Dubai and things that even his wife did not know. I found an open 
community, generous and willing to help their fellow nationals, not embedded in and infused 
with religious extremism; it seems open to the ‘other’ and seemingly inclusive of all 
Pakistanis regardless of their class or job. In spontaneous and informal conversations with 
the Pakistani participants, they argued that the image projected by media, which often 
associate Pakistan with religious extremism, madrasa or burqaʿ was flawed by a Western 
bias. I met friendly and sociable people who were willing to be part of my research. For 
example, on 16 October 2015, I spent a few hours with Mahmud, a Pakistani participant in 
his studio/office by enjoying together Pakistani food and talking and discussing his life and 
family in Dubai.  
On 5 November 2014, I had a conversation with Khalaf, a Pakistani official in Dubai. 
He asked me to not record the conversation. He started saying that Pakistanis were happy to 
live in Dubai, that the Pakistani government encourages migration because of the importance 
of remittances to the Pakistani families back home. For him, Pakistanis did not complain 
about their lives in Dubai, and they lived well in the labour camps because they were well-
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equipped where labourers found all facilities they needed. He added that in case of problems 
they could complain to the UAE federal court. This led me to think of how many of them 
are educated to do so and with which consequences for their visa and job. At the beginning, 
I considered this meeting rather useless; however, it turned out to be very enlightening. I 
expected that the Pakistani authorities tended to project a positive image of Pakistanis living 
and working in Dubai. This experience shed light on how Pakistanis with whom I talked had 
a lifestyle rather different than the Pakistani authorities perceived. I think that the latter were 
conscious of difficulties of poor migrants in Dubai, but they tended to hide this aspect to a 
researcher. However, the illegal migrants and poor Pakistanis can survive only with the 
informal support of the entire Pakistani community without asking help of the Pakistani 
authorities in Dubai, as some participants told me. Despite the image projected (to me) by 
the Pakistani authorities that seems detached from the reality and the division and multi-
layered structure of the Pakistani community, this experience pushed me to reflect on the 
fact that this community was more open and inclusive than I expected.  
One of the weaknesses of my fieldwork relates to economic concerns, which 
prevented me from spending lengthy, uninterrupted periods of time in the field. This 
impacted on my ability to engage with my participants’ everyday life. The length of time 
required to get to know my participants in a more intimate way, which could potentially 
facilitate invitations to their family homes, was simply not available to me. Moreover, it 
would have been challenging for me to invite my participants to my own home in Dubai, as 
I lived in rented accommodation where I was not allowed to have guests. Therefore, I was 
not able to spend time with my participants in their home or at social events outside the 
confines of the PAD. Nevertheless, despite the time limitations, my research has a central 
strength because it is the first attempt to conduct research among Pakistani professionals in 
Dubai, a topic that has largely been neglected by the extant literature on migration in the 
GCC countries (see chapter 3).   
The positionality of the researcher in relation to the field is shaped by the distance 
between the data collection and writing up. This distance in time and space let my ideas, 
thoughts and interpretations, which are, in turn, embedded in my personal and emotional 
experiences, take a shape. Reflexivity is an emotional ‘exercise’ that serves to shed light on 
the research experience. The stories that I have been told, the events in which I participated 
and the places that I visited represented my personal, emotional and embodied experience of 
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ethnography through which I am trying to take the reader into my life and my research 
practice. My personal and scholarly background has made my experience lively, dynamic 
and real. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW. 
MIGRATION BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND AGENCY  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the extant literature on migration in the Arab Gulf countries, 
which will be read through the lens of the concept of ‘migration project’. This concept allows 
me to achieve a balanced approach that covers both structure and agency in migration 
studies; it brings in migrants as agentic subjects while considering how their actions and 
perceptions are shaped by internal and external structures. This chapter also includes a 
discussion of four concepts that I view as central to the migration project; namely, the 
concepts of belonging, class, national identity and recognition. These concepts contribute to 
an acknowledgment of the relation between structure and agency in migration studies. 
Belonging helps to understand how migrants interact with the local context; class is 
important due to the focus on Pakistani professionals in the thesis; and national identity and 
recognition refer to how migration affects not just migrants but also the receiving society 
and how that society manages its relations with migrants  
The contribution of this chapter to the whole thesis relates to the adoption of the 
notion of migration project, which relies on individuals’ ability to cope with unexpected 
circumstances, migration policies and the social structure of the country of settlement that 
may push a person to change his/her migration plans.  
The chapter is structured as follows. After explaining the notion of migration project, 
I discuss a further four key concepts of the thesis: belonging, class, national identity and 
recognition. I also provide an overview of the extant literature on migration in the Gulf 
region and I focus on some ethnographic accounts which discuss migrants’ everyday life and 
how their migration project has been modified in relation to their personal experiences, 
circumstances and events (Mahdavi, 2016; Ahmad, 2017).  
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3.2 The notion of migration project  
Different theories have been proposed in order to explain migration (Massey et al., 
2008), and as Bakewell (2010, p. 1692) argues, the relation between structure and agency 
“is a major stumbling block for the development of an integrated and coherent theory of 
migration”. Some attempts to bring to the core of migration studies the relation between 
structure and agency have been made by adopting either the duality of structure (Giddens, 
1979; Goss & Lindquist, 1995; Morawska, 2001) or analytic dualism (Archer, 1995; 
Iosifides, 2001, 2017; Carter, 2000).29 In this regard, it is necessary to identify a theoretical 
perspective that is able to bring the debate on structure and agency to the core of its 
discussion, thus elaborating substantive approaches to explain migration. For Bakewell 
(2010, p. 1702), this can be gained by adopting a critical realist approach especially analytic 
dualism (Archer, 1995). However, I find his argument not fully convincing insofar he does 
not use, in his paper, any research to demonstrate that analytic dualism provides a different 
and more coherent view of migration. By following Morawska (2001, 2009) and Goss and 
Lindquist (1995), in the thesis I introduce the notion of migration project which allows 
bringing together the discussion of the duality of structure and agency in migration studies. 
It focuses on migrants and their actions but at the same time also considers how structures 
affect and shape human agency.  
The term ‘migration process’ “sums up the complex sets of factors and interactions 
which lead to international migration and influence its course. Migration is a process which 
affects every dimension of social existence, and which develops its own complex dynamics” 
(Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 21; see also Van Hear, 2014). It seems to me that migration 
process is a ‘neutral’ term that does not unpack the migration experience, practices and 
migrants’ everyday life, at least in the Arab Gulf countries. I thus propose the notion of 
migration project to affirm that migration is characterized by a conscious, concerted and 
dynamic decision made by migrants in accordance with their families and households. It 
does not mean that there is a project established a priori but it emphasizes the ability of 
                                            
29 At the core of Giddens’s approach there is the concept of duality, which means conceiving of structures and 
agency as independently variable but mutually interdependent. Archer (1995) defines Giddens’s approach as 
conflationary in which both components are interdependent and intermingled; they have no autonomy from 
one another but exist, transform and reproduce themselves only by virtue of their interdependence. In 
opposition to duality, Archer defines her approach as analytical dualism meaning that structure and agency 
“belong to different strata, there is no question of reducing one to the other or of eliding the two and there is 
every reason for exploring the interplay between them” (Archer, 1995, p. 62). 
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knowledgeable agents to mobilize and articulate their migration experience in order to deal 
with the evolution of migration and the arising/emergence of any new circumstances.  
The migration project is a complex set of choices, decisions, mechanisms, procedures 
and institutions through which migrants shape and modify their migration experience. It is 
not limited to the decision-making process, which is related to the reasons that push people 
to migrate, but it is negotiated, created and recreated every day. It focuses on the structural 
context and how it shapes the migration experience, but at the same time it also focuses on 
migrants’ agential capacity to interact with the structure and modify their migration project 
in relation to the structural context. It focuses on the agency of individuals, groups and 
households to mobilize resources in order to migrate and their knowledge of structures that 
can enable and constrain their agential capacity. Agents are “not only…always rooted in a 
structural context, but [they]...inevitably [draw] upon their knowledge of that structural 
context when they engage in any sort of purposeful action” (Stones, 2005, p. 17).  
In my view, Giddens’ (1979) notion of duality appears to be the most useful 
framework to explain the historical-sociological evolution of migration in the Gulf region. 
First, it conceives of structure and agency “as processes of continuous “becoming (rather 
than as entities fixed in time) and their forms and contents as always changeable and never 
fully determined” (Morawska, 2013, p. 223). Thus, the historical-sociological perspective 
fits this sense of becoming, movement and dynamism, as Morawska (2001) argues. 
Second, the notion of duality “holds that the answer to why social phenomena come 
into being, change, or persist, is revealed by demonstrating how they do it, that is, by showing 
how they have been shaped over time by the constellations of changing circumstances” 
(Morawska, 2013, p. 223, original emphasis). In other words, migration is shaped by 
structure and agency insofar as macro-structural circumstances and events affect the micro-
lives of migrants (Morawska, 2001; Mahdavi, 2016). When the structural context changes, 
migrants use their agency to adapt and respond to these new events.   
In conclusion, the migration project relies on the relation between structure and 
agency, on the ability of knowledgeable agents to interact with structures in ways that define 
and negotiate their migration by adapting to the new circumstances and events that migrants 
encounter in their everyday life.    
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3.2.1 Structure and agency within the migration project 
As said earlier, the migration project relies on duality, thus meaning that structure 
and agency are interrelated and conceived of as two reciprocally-inclusive components; it 
means that they are independent and that they have a certain autonomy granted. But it also 
means that changes in one component inevitably affect the other component because agents 
are rooted in a structural context, and their knowledge of the context drives their purposeful 
action (Stones, 2005). Structure and agency develop and change independently, but when a 
change has occurred inevitably the other one is ‘forced’ to modify itself in order to adapt to 
the new circumstances and events. This is the sense of ‘becoming’ proposed by Morawska 
(2001).  Giddens’s notion of duality relies on the idea that structures are part of agents as 
knowledgeability or memory traces (Stones, 2001). As O’Reilly (2012b) argues, there is the 
mutual involvement of agents and structures and neither agents nor structures are given 
primacy; the connection between structure and agent “is complex because structure is part 
and parcel of the agent and the agent is part and parcel of the structure” (O’Reilly, 2012b, p. 
17).  
Structures are conceived of as “more or less enduring organisations of social 
(including economic and political) relations and cultural formations, [which] are created and 
recreated through the everyday practice of social actors” (Morawska, 2009, p. 3). They are 
constituted by a multiplicity of elements and characteristics, such as different-purpose 
organizations and strong and weak informal networks (Morawska, 2001), that make them 
endowed with different capacities to enable or constrain human agency (Morawska, 2009). 
The interrelatedness of structures and their dependence on human agency makes them 
mutable (Morawska, 2001) and “dynamic, not static” (Sewell, 1992, p. 27). This definition 
of structures resembles the idea of external structures as it has been proposed by Stones 
(2005) and O’Reilly (2012b). External structures are conditions of action; they “are, 
conceptually, the context that exists before the ‘agent in focus’ acts” (O’Reilly, 2012b, p. 
23). For Stones (2005, p. 52), external structures are autonomous of the agent but “they work 
on the basis of agents acting in situ”. In other words, external structures represent the 
structural context of action within which the agent in focus acts. There are also internal 
structures, which drive human agency. One such internal structure is defined as habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1979; Stones, 2005). Habitus is “the set of dispositions inculcated in each of us 
by conditioning that follows from our social environment” (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 99). 
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Habitus is produced by social conditioning and pushes us to behave in ways that reproduces 
the existing practices; it might be viewed as virtual at least in the sense that it represents a 
repertoire of knowledge that individuals have acquired through their social life and 
unconsciously transmitted from practice to practice; however, it does not mean that Bourdieu 
underestimates the role of reflexivity, as Crossley (2001) instead argues. For Elder-Vass 
(2010), individuals have choices to make every day and this pushes them to ‘act in situ’, to 
reflexively act in relation to the context especially in time of crisis.   
For Giddens (1979), structures are rules and resources that exist on a virtual level; 
they are instantiated “when people draw on them in order to act or interact in time/space” 
(Mouzelis, 2007, p. 313). In other words, they are part of knowledge or memory traces of 
agents and they are actualized in concrete social contexts (Mouzelis, 2000). For Sewell 
(1992, p. 7), rules should be replaced by (cultural) schemas because individuals are 
knowledgeable agents, and “what people know is culture”. Broadly speaking, culture is 
defined as those abilities, notions, beliefs and practices that individuals acquire in social 
interaction (Kuper, 1999; Eriksen, 2010; Parekh, 2006). Culture is created and continually 
recreated by people through their social interaction, rather than being imposed upon them. 
Culture is therefore constituted by symbols and those symbols have to be interpreted, and 
social interaction is contingent upon such interpretations (Cohen, 1985).30 For Sewell 
(1992), schemas are virtual because of their generalizability or transposability, thus meaning 
that they represent a sort of repertoire (to adopt a definition used by Morawska, 2001) of 
principles and strategies of action that rely on past experience and memories that are 
“adjusted to present situations and projected outcomes in the future” (Morawska, 2001, p. 
53).  
Structures are also resources (Giddens, 1979), which can be human (knowledge, 
skills, positions in different social structures and the opportunities derived therefrom) and 
nonhuman (animate and inanimate objects) and both “are media of power and are unevenly 
distributed” (Sewell, 1992, pp. 9-10). The resources are actual because they “exist in time 
                                            
30 In this regard, Giddens (1984, p. 21) has argued that “Formulated rules – those that are given verbal 
expression as canons of law, bureaucratic rules, rules of games and so on – are thus codified interpretations of 
rules rather than rules as such. They should be taken not as exemplifying rules in general but as specific types 
of formulated rule”. In other words, when Giddens used the expression codified interpretations of rules, he 
implicitly recognized that such interpretations depend on the context, circumstances and human agency. 
Following Geertz’s (1973) approach, it can be argued that those interpretations rely on a system of meaning 
and symbols. 
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and space as specific characteristics and possessions of historical actors, and it is their 
actualization in people's minds, bodies, social relations, and the physical surroundings they 
control that makes them resources” (Morawska, 2001, pp. 53-54). They can be transposable 
to new and different circumstances that actors have to deal with in their everyday life when 
pursuing their purposes. Thus, resources and schemas reciprocally reconstitute each other 
over time.  
Agency is an attribute of all humans (Sewell 1992), and for Giddens (1984), 
structures enable and constrain human agency. For Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 970), 
human agency means 
the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the 
temporal-relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, 
and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the 
problems posed by changing historical situations (original emphasis). 
In their definition, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) identify three different but analytically 
intertwined dimensions: the iterational, projective and practical-evaluative. The iterational 
(or habitual, as Morawska defines it) dimension means that agents recall, select and apply 
the taken-for-granted schemas of action developed through the past interactions. In 
migration studies, this dimension of human agency relates to what Massey et al. (2008) 
defined as the ‘culture of migration’, thus meaning that migration has become part and parcel 
of individuals’ everyday life, especially in specific socioeconomic and cultural contexts. 
The projective dimension means that human actors are also inventors of new 
possibilities for thought and action; agents tend to act reflexively in order to reconfigure their 
actions to their hopes and desires for the future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).  The projective 
dimension relies on actors’ capacity to move from past orientations toward future 
possibilities.  
The practical-evaluative dimension means that actors have the capacity to identify 
and respond to the emergent circumstances in the present situation by looking at the past and 
future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Actors exercise their agency in order to pursue their 
aims and projects thus challenging and transforming the context of action itself. 
These three dimensions do not correspond to a precise temporal sequence (past, 
present and future); rather they explain that social action is constructed through “a 
sequentiality of discrete acts or stages of one act” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 972). As 
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these three dimensions of agency illustrate, there is interrelatedness between human agency 
and structural context. A certain degree of autonomy and reflexivity on the part of agents is, 
however, recognized. The agency of individuals is not always predetermined and taken-for-
granted, and individuals can exert their reflexive capacity. As Giddens (1984, pp. xxii-xxiii) 
points out, the “reflexive capacities of the human actor are characteristically involved in a 
continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the contexts of social activity”. 
This capacity emerges at the level of practical consciousness, which is the level where agents 
know how to ‘go on’ in everyday life; it consists of practical knowledge which is taken for 
granted “that it is hardly noticed, if at all, by the person exercising it” (Stones, 2005, p. 28). 
This is the routine, which is viewed by Giddens as the basic element of everyday social 
activity. The repetitiveness of daily social activities is what Giddens (1984) defines as the 
recursiveness of social life. However, for Giddens (1984), agents are always able to act 
otherwise; or as O’Reilly (2012, p. 19) has put it, it “is always possible to say no, or to refuse 
to comply”.  
In conclusion, the migration project relies on the duality of structure and agency. 
Social actors bend their habitual responses and future-oriented projects to their evaluation of 
the practical circumstances of the moment. As Morawska (2001, 2009) points out, this 
reproduction relies on the capacity of actors to appropriate, reproduce, and potentially to 
innovate in relation to their ideals, interests and events. This capacity, which is a common 
feature of socially embedded actors, is based upon cultural orientations and resources 
available in a specific time and place. As Morawska (2001, p. 54) has put it, human agency 
“arises from the actors' knowledge of schemas and (some) control of resources, which means 
the ability to apply these tools to new situations. New situations, in particular, enable actors 
to reinterpret schemas and redesign resources”. Thus conceptualized, the migration project 
relies on a duality in which the capacity of migrants to move into or between different 
environments and challenge new circumstances becomes evident, and their agency is 
enabled and constrained by structures. The notion of migration project allows recognizing 
that migrants’ activities “are neither simply the products of structures nor their agentic 
volitions but of the time- and place- specific contexts of the interactions between the two” 
(Morawska, 2009, p. 5).  
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3.3 Belonging and the migration project 
Belonging is a central concept in the thesis because it allows understanding how 
migrants interact with the local context. Migrants construct their sense of belonging as 
‘agents act in situ’ (Stones, 2005). As such, the migration project is shaped in relation to the 
agential capacity to construct a sense of belonging, which relies on different aspects and 
characteristics and varies according to the context and people.  
Belonging has been used interchangeably with identity (Antonsich, 2010) and it has 
also been used in association with citizenship (Parekh, 2006). In recent years, the concept of 
identity has been criticized in the social sciences because of its inability to grasp the 
dynamics, complexities and difficulties of the migration experience, thus suggesting that it 
“has become something of a catch-all concept, which is used to support uncritically an 
untenably disparate range of claims” (Jones & Krzyżanowski, 2008, p. 39). Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000) argue that identity “means too much…, too little…, or nothing at all” (p. 1) 
because, in the social sciences, it has been used both as a category of practice (used in 
everyday life experiences) and a category of analysis (used by scholars) and this makes the 
discourse on identity complex. Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 14), therefore, advocate the 
use of “less congested terms”, such as identification and categorization. Despite the efforts 
to theorize identity as a fluid and multi-layered process (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), some 
scholars have focused more on belonging rather than identity because the latter has lost its 
appeal and efficacy. However, identity is still used as a heuristic device (Yuval-Davis, 2006) 
because it continues to have a meaning for many people in everyday life (Antonsich, 2010).  
One of the most prominent academics who have used the concept of belonging is 
Yuval-Davis (2006), who argues that there is a difference between belonging and the politics 
of belonging. Belonging denotes what people feel, their orientations and attachments to 
places, locales, and social categories. It is a dynamic process and it is constructed through 
different and interconnected facets. Belonging is about different social locations that are 
linked to different axis of power and social categorizations. People belong to a specific social 
location, such as gender, age and class, and their belonging is constructed in light of certain 
positionalities that they tend to have along axes of power in each historical moment. 
Belonging is about people’s attachment and identification to different groups and 
collectivities. Belonging is also about shared ethical and political values, which means that 
it relates to how people who identify themselves as belonging to the same group or 
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community value the people with analogous social locations, thus suggesting its inter-
subjective nature. Yuval-Davis (2006) also focuses on the politics of belonging which means 
the capacity to construct boundaries and which determines “the inclusion or exclusion of 
particular people, social categories and grouping within these boundaries by those who have 
the power to do this” (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 18). The politics of belonging refers to the 
contestations, negotiations and struggles around who belongs and who doesn’t belong (see 
chapter 8). 
Yuval-Davis (2011) argues that belonging is constructed along multiple axes of 
difference, such as race, gender, age, and class, and the intersectionality approach 
(Crenshaw, 1989) allows acknowledging that discourses on differences have their own 
ontological bases and that they cannot be reduced to each other but have to be analysed as 
constituting each other. In other words, in order to understand how belonging is constructed, 
it is important to examine intersections between all different social locations.  
Anthias (2006) has also written extensively on the concept of belonging. For Anthias 
(2006), belonging is more than shared values, because an individual can share with ‘others’ 
some ideas about racial equality but the same individual might not be a member of any 
minority group. Belonging is then more than shared values because it also relates to spaces 
and places “to which people are accepted as members or feel that they are members” 
(Anthias, 2015, p. 6). Belonging is also forged in relation to belonging ‘with’, which means 
that one belongs with ‘others’ because s/he shares with them the everyday experiences and 
engagement. Anthias (2015) also contends that belonging relates ‘to’ people with whom one 
shares values, customs, culture, tastes and dispositions. Belonging ‘to’ is an expression of 
belonging to a group, social club, or being accepted within a nation, and it does not mean 
that you cannot belong to something else. For Anthias (2015), belonging is both boundary-
making and boundary-breaking. It is boundary-making because it identifies people who 
share customs, culture, traditions and language, thus creating a boundary with ‘others’ 
(Anthias, 2015). At the same time, it is also a boundary-breaking concept because it moves 
beyond shared culture, gender, class, ethnic and national identities to also include the 
‘others’. Hence, the impossibility of thinking of belonging ‘to’ without considering the 
practices, experiences and everyday life that people share with ‘others’ (Anthias, 2015; May, 
2011).  
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Anthias (2015) advocates the adoption of what she calls a ‘translocational 
positionality’ approach, because it enables us to recognize the role and importance of the 
context and the situational nature of struggles, practices and emotional ties. She argues that 
the translocational approach allows viewing belonging as no longer linked to a fixed place 
or location, but to a range of different locales in different ways. Translocational positionality 
focuses then on locations rather than on cultural differences and boundaries, and it allows 
conceiving of belonging as a process thus emphasizing that it is constructed in relation to 
and with ‘others’ (Anthias, 2015). 
Apart from their different theoretical approaches, Yuval-Davis (2006), as mentioned 
earlier, distinguishes between belonging and the politics of belonging, whereas Anthias 
(2015) finds this separation not fully convincing because contestations and struggles around 
who belongs and who does not belong revolve around and include emotional and affective 
ties. It means that people are pushed to struggle because they are driven by feelings and 
emotions attached to a locale, place, context or a social category. In my view, and I agree 
with Anthias (2015), the separation between belonging and the politics of belonging seems 
blurred because boundaries are determined by emotional and affective ties which can also 
be ‘institutionalized’ (e. g. through a specific citizenship law, see chapter 4). 
As Anthias (2015) argues, agents’ sense of belonging is created and recreated in light 
of the specific context and location where they are placed; belonging is thus considered as 
situational and contextual. It follows that belonging is never predetermined and stable but it 
is dynamic and mutable. In this regard, Ahmad (2017, p. 190), discussing conversion to the 
Islamic religion by South Asian women, argues that becoming “Muslim … is a dynamic and 
encompassing process in which the boundaries between Islam and other forms of belonging 
are conceived as porous and fluid, where they are configured and reconfigured together “. In 
the same vein, migrants tend to adopt their agential capacity to shape their migration project 
in their everyday life and consequently they renegotiate their sense of belonging in light of 
the structural context in which they act and spend their life. 
In conclusion, belonging is linked to the migration project insofar as the latter is 
negotiated in light of the context, place and social location. For example, South Asian 
domestic workers in Kuwait have negotiated their sense of belonging in light of their 
conversion to the Islamic religion, and this has pushed them to recreate their migration 
project in their everyday life (Ahmad, 2017).  
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3.4 Class and the migration project 
Class, which is also a key concept in the thesis, relates to my focus on Pakistani 
middle-class professionals. The concept is also relevant because it allows understanding the 
migrants’ decision-making process, their settlement, and their construction of a sense of 
belonging in Dubai. Class affects the migration project because it focuses on how capital (in 
Bourdieusian’s terminology) informs the migration experience: the routes, channels, 
settlement and residence in the receiving countries (Van Hear, 2014).    
The relevant literature on migration and class has focused on Western countries, and 
on the outcomes of migration in terms of socio-economic inequality in the country of origin 
(Van Hear, 2014); it also addresses migrants coming from developing countries; and on how 
the presence of migrants has allowed many indigenous workers to move from unskilled 
positions and gain a “real social promotion” (Castles & Kosack, 1973, p. 478).  
Moreover, the literature is also focused on how class affects relationships within a 
migrant community. For example, research conducted on British people in Spain 
demonstrates how “class judgments are employed to militate against” other British (Oliver 
& O’Reilly, 2010, p. 62). Furthermore, it is important to highlight the link between class and 
belonging. This link was partially emphasized by Anthias (2015) when she argued that 
belonging relates, amongst other things, to material resources and economic gains, because 
they tend to provide a sense of safety and participation in a society. Material resources (and 
formal membership) thus seem to contribute to building a sense of belonging to a society.  
However, Benson’s (2014) contribution on residential choices, class and belonging 
is really valuable. In her analysis of housing choices made by middle-class people in London, 
Benson (2014, p. 3097) argues that residential choice is driven by the acknowledgement 
“that belonging is a dynamic process, generated and maintained through residence that feeds 
back into understandings of classed identities” (p. 3097). In other words, Benson recognizes 
that residential choice is linked to habitus because the decision to settle down in a specific 
residential area relies on an unreflexive, taken for granted and unquestioned choice driven 
by the unconscious transmission from practice to practice. However, Benson (2014, p. 3106) 
also recognizes that reflexivity drives residential choices insofar as it indicates social 
mobility, or, as she has put it, the choice made by some members of the middle-class of 
living in a residential area which is different from the place/area where one has grown up or 
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spent much of her/his life seems “to indicate a change in … habitus” (p. 3106). This process, 
discussed by Benson, is also visible among the participants in my research (see chapter 6).   
Another important point to address is how migrants are able to mobilize capital in 
order to migrate and how it affects the migration project in terms of “migrant decision-
making, routes, channels, and destinations” (Van Hear, 2014, p. 101). I would also add how 
resources (or capital) can inform migration. In other words, capital drives and affects the 
migration experience. In this regard, Brubaker (1985, p. 761) argues, “class divisions are 
defined not by differing relations to the means of production, but by differing conditions of 
existence, differing systems of dispositions produced by differential conditioning, and 
differing endowments of capital”. According to Bourdieu (1987, p. 4), there are different 
forms of capital 
firstly, economic capital, in its various kinds; secondly cultural capital or better, informational 
capital, again in its different kinds; and thirdly two forms of capital that are very strongly 
correlated, social capital, which consists of resources based on connections and group 
membership, and symbolic capital, which it the form the different types of capital take once 
they are perceived and recognized as legitimate (original emphasis). 
 
Each person has a position in ‘social space’ because s/he is endowed with capital, which can 
be economic, cultural, social and symbolic, as Bourdieu (1987) argues. Capital is very 
important in migration studies because “it helps to explain how someone with little economic 
capital may be able to convert their social capital so as to be able to migrate” (Van Hear, 
2014, pp. 104-105). For example, Indians in Kerala mobilize their symbolic and social 
capital to help Indian would-be migrants by providing information, accommodation and a 
job in the GCC countries (Osella & Osella, 2009). Each person is endowed “with certain 
volumes of capital in certain compositions or propositions” (Van Hear, 2014, p. 111).  
The migration project is a class-based concept, in the sense that whatever the amount 
and type of capital that migrants possess and mobilize, it seems to drive their migration 
experience (Van Hear, 2014). The migration project is linked to migrants’ agential capacity 
to mobilize, convert and transfer their capital (e. g. by mortgaging their assets, such as 
livestock, land, and house; or by borrowing money from friends and family) in order to 
migrate. They are also likely to possess knowledge of the structures or macrostructural forces 
and events (e. g. the sponsorship system) that occur in the destination country. It follows that 
capital can inform their agential capacity and their choices. For some migrants who possess 
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a certain ‘quantity’ and type of resources it is easier to migrate than those who are not 
endowed with sufficient capital to convert or transfer. As Van Hear (2014, p. 111) 
acknowledges, “international migration is not typically for the poorest of the poor, but is 
engaged in by those who can mobilize some level of resources”. As the ethnographic 
accounts illustrate (see below), would-be migrants from South Asian countries tend to 
migrate by mobilizing their network resources. This is why they incur the ‘debt bondage’ 
and, as Gardner (2012) argues, they thus tend to fuel the ‘migration industry’.   
In conclusion, the migration project is a class-based concept; however, as 
demonstrated by some research undertaken in South Asian countries, and despite poverty, 
there are forms of capital (e. g. network) that would-be migrants can mobilise. In other 
words, capital possessed appears to not entirely determine the decision to migrate; however, 
it does affect the migration project in various ways (e. g. migration routes, channels and the 
settlement in the destination country).  
 
 
 
 
3.5 National identity, recognition and the migration project 
As stated above, national identity and recognition are two further key concepts in the 
thesis. Both relate to the migration project insofar as migrants’ agential capacity is enabled 
and constrained by the structural context. In other words, national identity, when it is 
‘threatened’ (e. g. by migration and globalization), is reshaped via the adoption of rules and 
laws, and through the enhancement of some aspects and characteristics (e. g. by celebrating 
the national day) that can enable and constraint human agency (Parekh, 1995a). At the same 
time, migrants bring with them their pre-existing ‘national identity’, which is often expressed 
through the establishment of migrant associations in the land of settlement. This entails being 
recognized by the local authorities as members in social life. Thus recognition “implies 
uniform or identical treatment” (Parekh, 2008, pp. 41-42) in contexts in which some groups 
or individuals are marginalized. These associations embody migrants’ agency and their 
knowledge of the local rules and laws. Therefore, I discuss national identity and recognition 
as two important concepts which tend to affect the migration project.  
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Broadly speaking, national identity represents a set of elements, characteristics and 
aspects which are thought to be of great importance for a community, and those elements 
are used to differentiate one’s national identity from another. In this regard, several authors 
(e.g., Smith, 1991; Triandafyllidou, 1998; Guibernau, 2007) conceive of national identity as 
sharing certain common features (e. g. a presumed common descent, a shared culture), which 
distinguishes members of a group from members of another group. Parekh (1995a) also 
argues that national identity is based upon shared common features. However, the value of 
his approach lies in his contention that national identity has a dynamic, fluid and adaptable 
nature in order to react to the changes taking place within a society. As such, national identity 
is reconstituted and reshaped by reinterpreting the past to respond to present needs and 
aspirations. The construction of boundaries between different groups is a marker of national 
identity because every society tends to define who belongs on the grounds of having 
something in common. In so doing, every society also distinguishes those who do not belong 
(Cohen, 1985).  
For Parekh (1995a), national identity is divided in two overlapping levels: cultural and 
political identity. Cultural identity refers to a shared way of life (or a shared culture) that is 
a way in which members of a community tend to organize their life, interpret ideas, past and 
myths, and assign meanings to each other’s behaviour and words (Parekh, 1995a). This is 
why a community is never homogeneous and static; instead, it varies according to the 
meaning and significance that individuals attribute to things and that as such may regulate 
their lives (Cohen, 1985; Parekh, 2006). Political identity refers to shared rules, procedures 
and institutions implemented to manage society’s collective affairs (Parekh, 1995a). These 
two levels overlap because the political identity of a community is shaped by its wider 
culture and vice versa. The distinction between political and cultural identity will be 
discussed in chapters 4 and 8 respectively.  
Migration and globalization are rendering boundaries among countries blurred, and 
this undermines the traditional systems of values, beliefs and meanings of a society (Parekh, 
1995a). Countries tend to defend their boundaries and define who belongs and who does not 
belong. When these changes are deep, communities are required to redefine themselves and 
‘adjust’ their identity (Parekh, 1995a). This process, defined by Parekh (1995a) as ‘self-
creation’, occurs within a historical framework. When a community feels a sense of 
insecurity and detachment, historical roots and traditional way of life are recovered in order 
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to spread a sense of belonging among its members (Cohen, 1985). It thus starts to reshape 
its ‘authentic’ self (Vannini & Franzese, 2008). Seemingly, there might be a contradiction 
between the concept of ‘authenticity’ and the dynamism of national identity. In my view, 
this contradiction does not exist. Here I follow Parekh (1994, 1995a), for whom national 
identity has an adaptable, fluid and dynamic nature; as such, it is able to respond to the 
contemporary needs, expectations and aspirations of a society. Moreover, as Vannini and 
Franzese (2008) argue, the definition, and perception of what is ‘authentic’ changes over 
time, according to the priorities, people, emotional experience, and demands of a society. 
Thus, the concept of ‘authenticity’ is also dynamic and situational. In specific contexts, such 
as the UAE where the foreigners outnumber nationals (Davidson, 2005), national identity is 
reshaped in ways that create a fracture within the society, in which ethno-racial and gender 
hierarchies drive the migration project. Thus, for example, the use of tribalism as a political 
component to reshape the Emirati national identity tends to establish a division within the 
UAE society between nationals and migrants (see chapter 4).  
However, it is also important to bear in mind that migrants bring with them their 
‘national identity’; it means that migrants tend to express their sense of belonging and 
safeguard their own traditions and customs within the same ethno-national community. At 
the community level, this is evident in the establishment of migrant associations, which 
embody migrants’ national identity, traditions and customs. The importance of such 
organizations also relates to the issue of recognition, which has informed the current debate 
on the politics of collective identity.  
By recognition, I mean that a group of people is recognised by others as constituting 
a group of some kind. For Honneth (1992), as for Taylor (1994), recognition has a relational 
nature because it is built through the relation with the ‘others’, and it is a matter of inter-
subjectivity. It follows that misrecognition (or the denial of recognition) “impairs these 
persons in their positive understanding of self” (Honneth, 1992, p. 189). For Taylor (1994) 
and Honneth (1992), recognition is an important matter for living a good life: when a group’s 
identity is recognized by ‘others’, the members of the group feel, in some sense, valued. For 
Fraser (2001), this model, which she calls the identity model, has an implicit risk that relates 
to the pressure imposed on a single individual to conform to the group’s collective identity. 
On a different level, Fraser (2001) argues that recognition is a matter of justice 
because “it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners 
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in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value” 
(p. 26). Fraser (2001) proposes a new model of recognition, which she calls the status model. 
In this model  
what requires recognition is not group-specific identity but rather the status of group members 
as full partners in social interaction. Misrecognition…means social subordination in the sense 
of being prevented from participating as a peer in social life…in the status model, rather, it 
means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party 
as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members (Fraser 2001 
p. 24; original emphasis).  
For Fraser (2001, p. 24, (original emphasis), when groups or individuals are conceived of as 
inferior and their worth is determined by institutionalized cultural patterns that regard the 
‘others’ as inferior thus excluding them as “full partners in social interaction, then we should 
speak of misrecognition and status subordination”. In the status model, the split within a 
society among different groups is institutionalized by the dominant culture (Parekh, 2006), 
and as such, it should be addressed by focusing on cultural elements (e. g.  by re-evaluating 
disrespected identities and valorizing cultural diversity) rather than on political, legal or 
economic ones (the redistribution-recognition dilemma). I adopt Fraser’s approach, and, as 
I explain in chapter 7, recognition of the PAD seems to create ‘integration’; however, I argue 
that it is more gratitude than recognition of the Pakistani’s status within the UAE society.  
In conclusion, national identity, migrant associations and recognition are interrelated 
within the migration project. The reshaping of national identity is ‘activated’ in order to 
create a sense of cohesion and stability for nationals thus excluding the ‘others’ (e. g. 
migrants) (Parekh, 1995a), who are to some extent forced to shape their migration project in 
accordance with the structural context. It follows that their agential capacity is 
simultaneously enabled and constrained (Giddens, 1979) by the rules, laws and socio-
cultural elements enhanced by the local authorities which tend to institutionalize the division 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see chapter 4). The migration project also relates to the 
establishment of migrant associations because it reveals migrants’ agential capacity to 
interact with the structural context. Migrants (some more than others) as knowledgeable 
agents are aware of the local rules and laws that regulate the establishment of such 
organizations. They exhibit their agency to act in situ (Stones, 2005) both within and outside 
their ethno-national community. Migrants’ agential capacity relates to recognition from the 
receiving countries’ authorities; it means that, within the migration context, migrants are 
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recognized as peers in social life in the local context. However, recognition is also entangled 
in the ethno-racial and gender hierarchies existing in the GCC countries, and such hierarchies 
enable and constrain migrants’ agency. The basic idea of recognition is that humans interact 
as equals (Fraser, 2001; Parekh, 2008), however, in the Emirati social structure, social 
interactions are mostly hierarchical, and the idea of equality seems to conspire against 
recognition as expressed by extant literature (Fraser, 2001). I will return to this aspect in 
chapter 7 when I discuss the role of the PAD in Dubai.      
 
 
 
3.6 Literature on migration in the Arab Gulf countries. An overview  
The previous sections of this chapter have provided an overview of the five key 
concepts that I use in the thesis to examine and understand the Pakistani professionals 
migration to Dubai (migration project; belonging, class, national identity, and recognition). 
Before I introduce the findings of the study in relation to these concepts, the thesis needs to 
be situated in relation to the specific literature on migration in the region. As said in chapter 
1, the contribution of my thesis relates to the discussion of the Pakistani (middle-class) 
community in the Gulf region. As will emerge in the following sections, the extant literature 
has mostly focused on Indians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Filipinos. Socio-economic 
and demographic studies, as well as ethnographic accounts, have focused on different 
aspects and communities in the Gulf region, but the Pakistani community has been subsumed 
under the label ‘South Asian’, thus neglecting the peculiarities that Pakistanis bring as 
migrants. This thesis is the first attempt to unpack their experience in the Gulf region.  
As Thiollet (2011) argues, the narrative of international migration in the Arab Gulf 
countries is well documented and articulated. The first and foremost important studies were 
carried out in the 1970s (Birks, Sinclair & Seccombe, 1986, 1988) and focused on the impact 
of the oil boom in the Arab Gulf region from a socio-economic perspective by identifying 
those structural and economic factors that triggered migration outside and within the Arab 
world (Birks & Sinclair, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980a, 1980b). These studies 
emphasized the historical, economic, demographic dynamics of migration in the Gulf 
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countries (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d; Seccombe 1983, 1986b; 
Serageldin et al., 1983, 1986).  
In the 1980s, some quantitative research explained the paths, the evolution and 
institutions that facilitated migration from South and East Asia to the GCC countries (Keely, 
1980; Arnold & Shah, 1984; Huan-Ming Ling, 1984; Halliday, 1984; Nagi, 1986a, 1986b; 
Choucri, 1983, 1986). These studies focused on the macrostructural forces that pushed the 
Arab Gulf countries to foster migration from Asian countries and how the latter provided the 
legal and political frameworks to encourage migration to the Gulf region.  
Between the 1990s and 2000s, several quantitative and ethnographic studies were 
carried out which underscored the economic, demographic, and social composition of 
migrants and the everyday issues that they have to deal with when migrating to the GCC 
countries. The most important studies in this regard were those carried out by Kapiszewski 
(1999, 2001), Longva (1997), Ali, (2010), Kanna (2011), Vora (2013).31 In particular, 
Kapiszewski’s (1999, p. 27) studies, which were mostly based on a sociological perspective, 
addressed “some major problems treated to population growth and to the development of the 
workforce”. In so doing, he adopted a multidisciplinary approach in order to “cover complex 
social, economic, political and cultural issues” (Kapiszewski, 1999, p. 28).  
Several studies have also focused on the links between migration, oil development, 
and class. For AlShehabi (2015), the demographic profile affected the political and economic 
structure of the GCC countries, thus contributing towards the segmented structure of the 
population divided between citizens and non-citizens, which resulted from the “restricted 
citizenship with unrestricted migration” (AlShehabi, 2015, p. 3). Khalaf (2015, p. 55) 
focuses on the role of migration in the rentier32 Gulf states, and how migration has become 
“an integral tool in the ruling families’ strategy to maintain the stability of their regimes”. 
For Khalaf (2015), this has been possible because the ruling families have been able to 
maintain the stability of their rule in light of the fragmentation, segmentation and hierarchies 
that exist and are perpetuated by the ruling families. Tibi (1990, p. 128) described this aspect 
                                            
31 This list is not complete, and I have mentioned only some of the many ethnographic studies on migration in 
the GCC countries that have addressed different issues of migrants in the region. I shall use these studies and 
many others throughout this chapter and the whole thesis when I discuss the evolution and dynamics of 
migration in the Arab Gulf region. 
32 In rentier states, “rulers disburse funds in order to build a cohesive, stable state, and buy themselves the 
political consent of their people” (Babar, 2014, p. 409). 
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by introducing the concept of ‘the simultaneity of the unsimultaneous’ meaning that there is 
“the parallel existence of two social and political patterns with their origins in crucially 
different historical periods: the old tribes and the modern nation-state”. Hanieh (2015), by 
criticising ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002), which focuses 
on a single nation-state as self-contained unit, focused on space, class and region, inspired 
by radical geography. Hanieh (2015) proposed a new lens through which it is possible to 
look at labour migration to the Gulf region: migration can be explained as a process of class 
formation defined by citizenship, which creates boundaries within and between nationals 
and migrants. In so doing, he advocates the need to break with ‘methodological nationalism’ 
because of its limited outlook. He argues that migration should be analysed as a “‘spatial 
structure’ that extends beyond the nation-state and reflects both the uneven and combined 
development of the region as a whole, and the nature of the Gulf’s position within the wider 
world market” (Hanieh, 2015, p. 72).  
In conclusion, these studies have focused on migration in the Gulf States from a 
political economy, geographical, sociological and demographic perspectives. They have 
discussed migration and its relationship with macrostructural forces and events that have 
fostered the emergence of the rentier economy. Further studies have also been conducted 
(see also, Kapiszewski, 1999), and especially from the 2000s some ethnographic accounts 
have focused on migrants’ everyday life in the Gulf countries. However, none of the extant 
studies have focused explicitly on Pakistani migrants to the Gulf region. 
 
 
 
3.7 Ethnographic research on migrants in the GCC countries 
By the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, many ethnographic studies were 
undertaken to examine migrants’ everyday life in the Gulf countries. This section draws 
upon some ethnographic accounts focused on Asian communities in the GCC countries, 
especially in the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. Ethnographic methods (O’Reilly, 2009) 
allow capturing the complexities and ambiguities of migration as emerging from migrants’ 
voices.  
Ethnographic works serve to widen the perspective on migration in order not to 
reduce a migrant to a homo oeconomicus (Longva, 1997; Kamrava & Babar, 2012; Babar, 
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2017). This broader approach emerges in some studies conducted among Westerners in 
Dubai and Qatar. For example, Walsh’s ethnographic works (2007, 2009; Coles & Walsh, 
2010) have, amongst others, focused on the emotional and sexual behaviour of the British 
expatriates in Dubai. Walsh (2007, 2009) underscores the need to examine the migrants’ 
lived experiences in a broader perspective in order to forefront the complexity and ambiguity 
of migration through the migrants’ narratives. Vora (2015) has focused on expatriates (North 
American and Europeans) in Doha. In her research, she deconstructs the idea of camps as 
places that only accommodate construction workers. She focuses on those “camps occupied 
primarily by white professionals from North America and Europe” (Vora, 2015, p. 170).33 
These camps reflect specific tastes and lifestyles that differ from those of unskilled workers. 
As Benson (2014, p. 3110) has put it, people accommodated in a specific area can “become 
familiar with and align themselves to new residential environments”. Thus, the expatriates, 
with their lifestyles and everyday experiences and practices, perpetuate the GCC ethno-racial 
hierarchies that are based upon a strict spatial and ethnic separation (Vora, 2015). These 
ethnographic studies focus on migrants’ everyday life in the Gulf countries. However, both 
Walsh (2007, 2009) and Vora (2015) claim that there is an ethno-racial system that 
encapsulates the white Western expatriates in a hierarchical structure in which they are 
subject to uncertainties and instability of migration and are also entangled in a system of 
residential segregation. 
In conclusion, ethnographic works demonstrate that migrants articulate their 
migration project in light of their skills, resources and knowledge of the structural context. 
In the last few decades, ethnographic accounts have demonstrated the importance of moving 
beyond the economic aspects in order to grasp the complexities, constraints and difficulties 
of the migration experience (see below).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
33 Vora’s work on the Indian middle class in Dubai has been discussed throughout the thesis, see also chapters 
4, 5 and 6.  
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3.7.1 Ethnographic research: decision making, networks and recruitment, 
Ethnographic accounts illustrate that migrants as knowledgeable agents ‘employ’ 
their families, kinship, community ties and recruitment agencies to migrate with the aim to 
alleviate their poor economic conditions but also to escape from dangerous situations. 
Migrants’ agential capacity is projected in new situations and places for future possibilities. 
At the same time, external structures (in Stones’ terminology), and the existing migrant 
institutions (Goss & Lindquist, 1995) such as recruitment agencies and the sponsorship 
system, enable and constrain migrants’ agency.34 For Gardner (2012, p. 54), in the decision-
making process there is a subjectivity “aligned to a set of pre-established identities (like the 
“Gulfie”) constructed in an early era when the association between Gulf migration and 
wealth was more assured” (see also Osella & Osella, 2000). The decision-making process 
seems to be shaped by habitus, or what is also defined as the ‘culture of migration’; it relies 
on a conscious and concerted choice made by agents by adopting their reflexive capacity 
which, according to Elder-Vass (2010, p. 101), Bourdieu recognises that individuals employ 
in “times of crisis, or critical moments”. 
Gardner (2012), in his ethnographic work among Indians in some GCC countries, 
suggests that the decision to migrate is not simply a personal choice but that it also involves 
families and households that view migration as a means to diversify their sources of income 
(Castles & Miller, 2009). For Gardner (2012), the decision-making process, however, is also 
driven by structural violence (Farmer, 2004) in the sending countries, which means that 
social disorders and political turmoil induce migrants to leave their countries (Gardner, 
2010a, 2012). For Afsar (2016), the decision-making process of Bangladeshi migrants, apart 
from economic reasons, is driven by several factors such as marital discord, family violence 
and drug abuse. But more than that, the decision-making process of many unskilled and 
semi-skilled Bangladeshi would-be migrants is affected by the visible effects on neighbours 
whose lives have changed from 'rags to riches' as a result of migration to the GCC countries 
(Rahman, 2016).  
For Osella and Osella (2009, 2012), the reputation and achievements of early Indian 
migrants in the GCC countries play a key role in supporting the Indian would-be migrants 
                                            
34 Migrant institution is “a complex articulation of individuals, associations, and organizations which extends 
the social action of and interaction between these agents and agencies across time and space” (Goss & 
Lindquist, 1995, p. 319). Migrant institutions are individuals, networks, recruitment agencies, governmental 
organizations, rules and regulations that help migrants find a job abroad and regulate migrants’ everyday life 
in the receiving countries 
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by providing information, accommodation, and a job in the Arab Gulf countries. This is also 
observable among the Pakistani professionals in Dubai (see chapter 6) For Hosoda (2013), 
solidarity within the Filipino community in the UAE represents a net of assistance in case of 
troubles for all Filipinos. Social and ethnic networks are advantageous because they provide 
support to potential migrants by exchanging information. However, information exchanges 
are not always beneficial. For Gardner (2012), some South Asian migrants are engaged in 
the production of disinformation about the real working and living conditions in the GCC 
countries. Migrants tend to project a positive image of their migration experience in the Arab 
Gulf countries because they do not want their family, or community to perceive their 
experience as a failure.  
Recruitment agencies employ their gained experience, their knowledge of rules and 
resources (e. g. the sponsorship system) and their contacts to help would-be migrants to find 
a job in the GCC countries. Theoretically, the recruitment process should be virtuous and 
safeguard migrants’ interests. However, this is not always the case. For Breeding (2012), 
asymmetric information35 about wages and recruitment of job candidates in the rural areas 
jeopardize the effectiveness of the procedure, and ‘force’ migrants to enter illegally the GCC 
countries or become irregular (Shah, 2009). It thus allows for abuses and corruption 
(Breeding, 2012). For Gardner (2012), the GCC countries are not the only ones that take 
advantage from migration, but also recruitment agencies and agents that work as brokers, 
and cheat potential migrant workers (migration industry). The stories told by Wadhawan 
(2016) illustrate how the role of recruitment agencies is not beneficial for Nepali women 
who migrate to the GCC countries to work in the domestic sector. In particular, in 2012 the 
Nepali authorities imposed a ban according to which all Nepali women under thirty years of 
age are prohibited from migrating as domestic workers to the GCC countries. As Wadhawan 
(2016, p. 196) contends, this ban “has led women to rely on unregistered agents who channel 
such migrants through illegal means and charge higher fees to facilitate the process”.  
For Osella and Osella (2012), the informal networks do not have a sharply negative 
effect but they are also useful because they help migrants in Kerala (India) to benefit from 
knowledge and experience of previous migrants to overcome the obstacles present within 
                                            
35 Asymmetric information means that job recruiter does not disclose to the job candidate all conditions of the 
employment in the Arab Gulf region. Agents ‘fish’ for candidates in Indian rural areas and they tend to create 
a nice picture of life in the Gulf cities and not mention the long working-hours, work outdoors at high 
temperature, and living in the labour camps (Breeding, 2012). 
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the system. They argue that the Indian would-be migrants are aware of the working and 
living conditions that they might find in the Arab Gulf region and the salaries that they might 
expect (Osella & Osella, 2012). Thus, most would-be migrants decide to get a tourist visa to 
go to Dubai and, through their contacts in the Emirate, they can easily find a job.  
In conclusion, these ethnographic accounts illustrate how macrostructural forces 
affect the micro-lives of migrants. The establishment of recruitment agencies, the adoption 
of the sponsorship system and the ensuing ban imposed by some South Asian countries on 
migration to the GCC countries have constrained migrants’ agency but also enabled their 
capacity to find a way to migrate. In other words, migrants’ agential capacity becomes 
evident when they adopt strategies to overcome the legal obstacles, for example when they 
migrate as illegal migrants (Wadhawan, 2016).   
 
 
 
3.7.2 Ethnographic research on migrant women 
This section, which focuses on migrant women, gives better evidence of how 
migration project works and its implications for migrants’ everyday life in the Gulf region. 
In the last few years, the GCC countries have undergone profound changes that are evident 
when considering the participation of national women (Zovighian, 2012) in the local labour 
market and the ensuing presence of migrant women who are mostly employed as domestic 
workers.36 The ‘feminisation of migration’ is the term used to capture “the changing pattern 
of female migration flows – women migrating for work, often without family – rather than 
a mere increase in the number of women migrants” (Timothy & Sasikumar, 2012, p. 20). As 
such, it requires gender-sensitive policies because migration entails gender-distinguished 
experiences and outcomes.   
In the GCC countries, the main flow of migrant women is from South and South-
East Asia (Timothy & Sasikumar, 2012). In these countries, the domestic work is 
unregulated and the national labour laws are not applicable (Khan & Harroff-Tavel, 2011; 
Lori, 2012). Once in the GCC countries, the migrant domestic workers are in an extremely 
vulnerable position and at the mercy of their kafīl (see chapter 5). This happens because the 
                                            
36 Between 2008 and 2011, migrant domestic workers working in the GCC countries were 1,132, 641: in Saudi 
Arabia (506,950), in Kuwait (310.402) and the UAE (146,075) (Fernandez, 2014). 
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sponsor has total control and power over a domestic worker’s employment and sojourn in 
the country. In order to cope with problems encountered by ‘their’ women employed in the 
Arab Gulf countries, Asian governments have imposed some restrictions on the migration 
of women to these countries.37  
Ethnographic accounts have underscored the importance and the role of migrant 
women in information exchanges in the home countries (Osella & Osella, 2012), and how 
migrant women contribute significantly to family incomes (Gamburd, 2008). Moreover, 
Vora’s (2013) ethnographic research among the Indian middle-class in Dubai, suggests how 
Indian women view migration and their life in Dubai as a concrete opportunity to build their 
own independence, and, because of lack of constraints from male and family, it is a chance 
to become ‘emancipated’. However, women are the most vulnerable in terms of exploitation, 
abuses, harassment (Breeding, 2012) and trafficking (Mahdavi, 2011). In her ethnographic 
research on the informal economy in the UAE, Madhavi (2012) underlines how the notion 
of trafficking has been narrowly viewed in terms of sex trafficking, and she calls for a 
reconceptualization of this notion by looking at the migrants’ narratives, where a discrepancy 
between lived experiences and policy framework emerge.38 For Mahdavi (2012), the 
sponsorship system needs reforming because as it is conceived, it protects only the employer 
(sponsor) and not employees.39  
Mahdavi (2011, 2016) and Ahmad (2017) focus on the intimate lives of women in 
Dubai and Kuwait respectively. In their research they both emphasize how the migration 
                                            
37 “A policy of restricting the migration of female workers below a specified age exists in India, Indonesia and 
Pakistan. Female migration, especially of domestic servants, from Pakistan has been almost non- existent. 
During the last few years, Bangladesh has introduced a rule restricting overseas employment as domestic 
workers to those women, who are accompanied by their husband. Sri Lanka has imposed no restrictions on the 
migration of female domestic workers, but has placed a ban on the migration of nurses” (Shah, 2004, p. 185). 
38 In her analysis, Mahdavi (2012) argues the need to enlarge the notion of ‘trafficking’ because it has been 
conceived of and interpreted only in terms of ‘sex trafficking’ thus neglecting other situations in which, 
especially domestic workers, are trapped when they have to escape from specific situations and abandon formal 
economy and are forced, because they are not protected by laws, to enter informal economy (sex worker).  
39 In 2016, in the UAE, the system has been reformed, so “most migrant workers are permitted to seek different 
employment when their contract ends; without penalty, workers and their employers can mutually agree to 
terminate their contract; and workers can unilaterally decide to end their contract as long as they comply with 
the legal requirements of early termination, including providing one month’s notice” (Parreñas & Silvey, 2016), 
but these reforms do not apply to the domestic workers. In 2009, in order to protect foreign workers, the Wage 
Protection System (WPS) was also implemented, which entails that UAE-based companies have to transfer 
“the wages of their workers through banks, money transfer companies and other service providers, rather than 
make cash payments” (National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking, NCCHT, 2014, p. 23). Still, a 
reform implemented to protect low-wage migrants but not domestic workers. There is, to a certain extent, a 
reluctance to enter the private and domestic sphere from the UAE authorities. In Bahrain, the system was also 
reformed in 2008 (Hertog, 2012).  
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experience (or what I have defined as migration project), is negotiated and recreated in light 
of the new circumstances and events take that place in the migration context and affect their 
migration experience. Mahdavi (2011) argues that when new circumstances take place, 
migrants can decide to change their migration project; this is evident in the conscious choice 
made by some migrant women to start working in the sex industry. Thus, Mahdavi (2011) 
emphasizes migrants’ agency and their ability and knowledge of the structures that they can 
use to make money. 
Ahmad’s (2017) ethnographic research emphasizes how conversion to the Islamic 
religion by South Asian domestic workers represent a change in their migration project 
insofar as some of them decide to settle down in Kuwait permanently. Her research illustrates 
how migrants’ agential capacity relates to structural forces and how their conversion was 
mostly driven by a spiritual and emotional attachment to the new context rather than a chance 
to overcome the social hierarchies existing in the country. As Ahmad (2017) has put it, being 
a (converted) Muslim does not erase ethno-racial and gender differences.  
In conclusion, women, who are mostly employed as domestic workers, risk being 
exploited and abused by the recruitment system because of the lack of legal protection in the 
GCC countries. However, the current literature also portrays women as agents; they are not 
always viewed as victims of exploitation or as disempowered individuals that are making 
unreflexive choices. It is undeniable that women’s agential capacity and chances to improve 
their status are entangled with existing ethno-racial and gender hierarchies (see chapter 4).   
 
 
 
 
3.7.3 Ethnographic research on belonging and class  
Ethnographic accounts focus on how migrants use their economic, social and cultural 
capital to migrate (Vora, 2010, 2013; Buckley, 2012, 2013), and how they use their capital 
once they have settled in a GCC country to overcome complexities and difficulties of the 
migration experience (Gardner, 2008, 2010a). Since the mid-2000s, some ethnographic 
works have illustrated how migrant labourers (Buckley, 2012; Kathiravelu, 2016), the Indian 
elite (Vora, 2010; Gardner, 2010a), and the Indian middle-class (Vora, 2013) have coped 
with the complexities of migration in different ways.  
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Since the 2000s, the Dubai government’s strategy has focused on diversifying its 
economy, thus paying more attention to construction, tourism, service and financial sectors 
(Davidson, 2008a). Dubai’s ‘adoption’ of neoliberalism (see chapter 4) has resulted in 
increasing foreign investments and labour attracted by “lower taxes and customs, relaxed 
environmental standards, and the privatization of governance into the hands of individuals” 
(Vora, 2010, p. 47). In her ethnographic research, Vora (2010) argues that neoliberalism in 
Dubai has been functional to the Indian elite, who, acting as ‘unofficial citizens’, have been 
able to enjoy the benefits of Dubai’s free market. In other words, neoliberalism has allowed 
the Indian elite to become part of the structure of power and get involved in the management 
of migration (Vora, 2010). Vora’s discourse on the Indian elite revolves around the idea of 
belonging/non-belonging, thus meaning that the Indian elite consider themselves as Indians 
“and nothing else” (Vora, 2013, p. 101). In other words, they are not interested in belonging 
politically to the UAE through citizenship or other ways. This sense of belonging/non-
belonging is also articulated in preserving the Indian tradition and “providing a platform 
from which to educate their children to Indian customs, language, and history” (Vora, 2013, 
p. 101). For Vora (2013), the Indian elite or merchants are more attached to their Indian 
traditions and customs and are more patriarchal in their family structures than those of 
middle and working-class Indians.  However, Vora (2013) contends that the Indian middle-
class (unlike the Indian elite) in Dubai is suffering from the changes that have occurred in 
the Emirate over the last decade because of neoliberalism (Vora, 2013), which has resulted 
in property owners and business managers who are increasing rents and are recruiting white 
Westerners who provide “companies with a better “image”, and raising prices on consumer 
items so that it [is] practically impossible to save money” (Vora, 2013, p. 124). Vora’s (2013) 
ethnographic research underscores how the Indian middle-class suffers the consequences of 
neoliberalism because of the Emirate’s failure in supporting a truly free market where 
employees can freely ‘sell’ their skills (Vora, 2013).  
Between 2002 and 2003, Gardner (2008, 2010a) conducted ethnographic research on 
the Indian diasporic elite in Bahrain. He defines the Indian diasporic elite as professionals, 
skilled workers, and merchants that bring their families with them to Bahrain. By contrast, 
he defines the Indian transnational proletariat as a class composed by the Indian working-
class, individual men that left their families in India (Gardner 2008). In his ethnographic 
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research, Gardner (2008) talks of ‘strategic transnationalism’ (see chapter 6),40 which is the 
ability of the Indian diasporic elite to construct transnational networks to diminish the 
vulnerability that non-citizens face in Bahrain while seeking to profit from local labour 
market opportunities. This has led Gardner (2010a) to conclude that even the Indian 
diasporic elite are subject to the vulnerabilities and constraints of the transnational 
proletariat. However, unlike the Indian working-class, the Indian elite is able to cope with 
the vulnerabilities of the sponsorship system because they have tools and chances to opt for 
convenient strategies in order to relocate their family, work and investments in several places 
and locations. 
From a different perspective, Buckley (2012, 2013) examines the consequences of 
the 2008 economic crisis41 on the Indian construction workers in Dubai. Her research is 
interesting because it shows that the migration project of low-wage migrants was severely 
affected by the economic crisis. Unlike the Indian elite and middle-class, the Indian low-
wage migrants were forced to remain in Dubai because they did not have money to leave the 
country; an option that was available to Westerners and the Indian elite and middle-class, 
who left Dubai and abandoned their luxury cars at the airport (Hilotin, 2009). The Indian 
low-wage migrants’ narratives illustrate that they suffered the effects of the economic crisis 
because many construction projects were cancelled or scaled down; they were forced to 
borrow money to pay the recruitment agencies and survive in Dubai, where many of them 
were obliged to stay because their passports were withheld by their employers (HRW, 2006). 
Since the 2000s, Dubai has attracted many professional migrants and foreign firms, which 
contributed to inflate construction workers’ wages (Buckley, 2013). The growth in the cost 
of rent and food, and wage theft by employers,42 made it impossible for many Indian builders 
to survive in Dubai (Buckley, 2013). Therefore, Indian construction workers suffered the 
consequences of the growth in the cost of living and some were helped by private welfare 
initiatives to survive. For Buckley (2013), these initiatives, established to help Indian 
                                            
40 This concept relies on the notion of ‘flexible citizenship’ proposed by Ong (1999). 
41 For Irudaya Rajan and Narayana (2016), the 2008 financial crisis, which represented another macrostructural 
event that could affect the migration project, only a “few thousands [migrants] lost their jobs and had to come 
back but the number migrating to the Gulf has hardly fallen” (p. 305). However, this macrostructural event had 
effects on micro-lives of migrants. 
42 It is a common practice, among employers in the UAE, to withhold wages of their employees. This happens 
because employers want to prevent workers from finding a better job after few days or one or two months in 
the UAE. This ‘custom’, however, entails serious effects for migrant workers, because they cannot pay 
recruitment agencies, so the interest raises, and they cannot send money back home to families (HRW, 2006). 
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migrants squeezed by the economic crisis, have not influenced Dubai’s autocratic and 
authoritarian regime because they have served to “maintain workers’ body capital” 
(Buckley, 2013, p. 264). In other words, Dubai’s authorities have tolerated these initiatives 
because they have addressed workers’ corporal needs (food and shelter) and not their 
political needs (Buckley, 2013).  
These studies demonstrate how the migration project cuts across classes and how it 
can be shaped and negotiated differently according to the context, situations and 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
3.7.4 Ethnographic research on migrant associations 
One of the chapters (chapter 7) of the thesis focuses on the PAD, which is the main 
Pakistani association in Dubai. In this section I therefore examine extant literature on 
migration in the Gulf countries that pay particular attention to migrants’ organizations. Thus 
far very few studies have been undertaken on the importance and role of migrant associations 
to the foreign communities in the Arab Gulf region. Migrant associations are places where 
the sense of belonging and identification is very strong (Fortier, 2006). Migrants bring with 
them their ‘national identity’ and migrant associations are places that embody this sense of 
belonging. The role and importance of migrant associations has, in my view, been neglected 
within the most influential literature on migration in the Arab Gulf region. However, these 
associations are important, as they clearly embody migrants’ agential capacity and their ties 
with their home country. Furthermore, the associations illustrate that migrants are aware of 
the local structures, rules and laws that regulate the establishment of migrant associations.   
Gardner (2010a, p. 100), who has focused on the Indian associations and clubs in 
Bahrain, argues that they are “the primary social foundation for foreign workers’ 
participation in the complex public sphere of contemporary Bahrain”. For Gardner (2010a), 
the presence of Indian associations and clubs in the public sphere serves to display the 
division between nationals and non-nationals. In this view, these associations and clubs are 
not agents of change but are public manifestation of ‘India-ness’. Gardner’s approach relies 
on Habermas’s concept of public space, which is conceived of as a space in which 
“individuals develop a collective identity and a set of interests distinct from those of both 
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the private sphere and the state” (Gardner, 2010a, p. 97). The establishment of these 
associations is tied to the migration project insofar as they represent migrants’ capacity to 
interact with the structural context in order to create a space of belonging and identification 
which in turn can be supportive of migrants’ needs and exigencies.  
In conclusion, Gardner (2010a, p. 117) warns us against the risk of conceiving of 
these spaces as “components of discrete diasporic public spheres, [thus suggesting] we think 
of them as active participants in this plural and more comprehensive Bahraini public sphere”. 
Gardner’s conclusion seems to locate migrant associations in the public sphere as equal to 
Western and Bahraini associations, however, as I will discuss in chapter 7, in Dubai, these 
organizations are officially recognized but subject to the scrutiny of the local authorities.  
 
 
 
3.8 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter has been to contribute to the debate about the relationship 
between structure and agency in migration studies. For Bakewell (2010), the extant literature 
on migration is not able to propose a substantive theory that could explain migration. In 
order to overcome this impasse, it is important to put at the core of migration studies the 
debate on structure and agency. I have addressed this debate by focusing on the duality of 
structure (Giddens, 1979, 1984). In this regard, I have thus introduced and discussed the 
notion of migration project in order to explain that migration relies on the link between 
structure and agency. Furthermore, the concept of migration project emphasizes the agential 
capacity of migrants to create and recreate their migration experience and interact with 
structures in their everyday life. In my view, the notion of migration project is able to better 
grasp the relation between structure and agency, as it emphasizes how the structures enable 
and constrain human agency whilst also serving to emphasize the idea that migration is a 
concerted and reflexive choice made by individuals who, as knowledgeable agents acting in 
situ, are able to mobilize their resources in order to deal with circumstances and events that 
occur in their everyday life.  
Belonging, class, national identity and recognition have also been discussed in 
relation to the notion of migration project in order to demonstrate that the relation between 
95 
 
structure and agency is fundamental to better grasp the complexities and dynamics of 
migration; to understand how macrostructural forces and micro-lives of migrants interact.  
In conclusion, the main contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, the thesis focuses 
on the Pakistani middle-class professionals, which is often subsumed under the label ‘South 
Asian’, and it emphasizes their subjectivity and their peculiarities. Second, the thesis 
introduces the concept of migration project and suggests that it enables us to better 
understand and explain migration, especially in specific geographical and socio-economic 
contexts such as Dubai.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND DUBAI. 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have introduced the notion of migration project and its 
relation to the main concepts (belonging, class, national identity and recognition) discussed 
throughout the thesis; in this chapter, I focus on the setting of my field research, its 
characteristics and peculiarities. Until the mid-twentieth century the borders of the Gulf port 
cities, such as Dubai, Lingah, and Bandar Abbas between the Arab and Persian sides of the 
Gulf were fluid and culturally dynamic (Fuccaro, 2014). This fluidity and cultural diversity 
has been recorded by archeological findings and has been explained in terms of relationships 
and exchanges among people living in the coastal areas (Potter, 2009) (Picture 4.1).  
 
Picture 4.1 Map of some Gulf port cities  
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Source: https://www.google.it/search?q=map+of+Dubai+and+Bandar+Abbas&biw 
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These links, over the centuries, led to the establishment of the khalījī (‘Gulfies’) community 
(al-mujtamaʽa al-khalījī), which was a multi-cultural community, stratified and 
economically dependent on the seafaring activities (Potts, 2009; Redha Bhacker, 2009).   
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the historical dynamics in order to understand 
the contemporary ethnic diversity and social relationships in the UAE. The analysis relies 
on my personal observations, field notes and the existing literature on history and migration 
in the Gulf region. My argument is that, despite the presence of different nationalities, 
languages, religions and cultures and the lack of any policy aimed at integrating the 
foreigners in the UAE society, migrants and nationals coexist, at least on the surface, 
peacefully in the country. However, the existence of gender and ethno-racialized hierarchies 
is evident (Mahdavi, 2011; Vora, 2013).  
The starting point of this chapter is to discuss the evolution rather than the 
disintegration (Chernilo, 2007) of the khalījī community, which led, between the 1960s and 
1970s, to the formation of a new form of socio-economic and political organization, namely 
the nation-state. This sense of continuity between the past and the present and the spirit of 
cohesiveness was partially resurrected in the 1980s by the formation of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Naufal & Genc, 2012). It thus becomes evident that in order to understand the 
formation of the nation-states it is necessary to move beyond national borders and to look at 
the relationships that the Gulf countries have developed within and outside the region. In 
other words, it is important to acknowledge the need to move beyond methodological 
nationalism, which is the idea of nation-state as a bounded societal entity (Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller, 2002). For my particular context, methodological nationalism can be ‘overcome’ 
via the concept of ‘global city’ (Glick Schiller, 2010), thus meaning that city is viewed as a 
site in which are concentrated “financial services and [it] acts as a command and control 
centre for the rest of the world” (Elsheshtawy, 2013, p. 21). This concept in relation to Dubai, 
allows acknowledging the internal tension between local and global, between Dubai’s need 
to ‘safeguard’ its socio-cultural and religious background and the vocation of being global 
with its neoliberal policies that have created ethno-racial and gender hierarchies (see also 
chapter 8).  
The relevance of this historical analysis to my research relates to the need to illustrate 
that Emiratis and non-Emiratis are dynamic, contested and multi-layered categories, and the 
latter appears to be ‘integrated’ in the UAE social fabric. This allows moving beyond 
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methodological nationalism and through the concept of global city, it is possible to grasp the 
transnational and multi-cultural ‘nature’ of Dubai. The extant literature on migration in the 
GCC countries has largely treated these two categories as opposing and static without 
grasping their dynamic and fluid nature (Gardner 2010a; Vora, 2013). The discovery of oil 
in the twentieth century (Errichiello, 2012a), the formation of new polities in the 1960s and 
1970s affected the economic and commercial aspects of the old Gulf’s community but did 
not undermine the social fabric of the region (Izady, 2002; Potter, 2009). In port cities, such 
as Dubai, the presence of foreigners was so pervasive that they contributed to its 
development and prosperity.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first two sections, I discuss the ethnic 
diversity of the Persian Gulf whose economic survival was linked to the seafaring activities, 
and the formation of the UAE federation. I then discuss the UAE as a nation-state in terms 
of its political structure and measures adopted in order to institutionalize the ethno-racial and 
gender hierarchies (e. g. sponsorship system) and the need to move beyond methodological 
nationalism thus avoiding being trapped in its reductionist and circumscribed approach. The 
emergence of Dubai and the ‘adoption’ of neoliberalism as a market ideology are addressed 
in the next sections that through the lens of the concept of global city allows acknowledging 
Dubai’s tension between local and global. Lastly, I address the relationships between 
Emiratis and non-Emiratis and how ethno-racial and gender hierarchies have developed in 
the UAE. 
 
 
 
4.2 The historical evolution of the Persian Gulf 
In this section, I analyse the dynamics that have shaped the history of the coastal 
areas and port cities of the Gulf, which led to the formation of the khalījī community.   
A “view from the sea” (Potter, 2014, p. 2) allows outlining the historical evolution 
of the coastal cities of the Persian Gulf. Recently, historians (Potter, 2009; Fuccaro, 2014) 
have considered the littoral area and port cities of the Gulf as a cultural area, where people, 
until the mid-twentieth century, shared a common social structure, economic, cultural and 
environmental characteristics (Fuccaro, 2014) that made this area different not only from the 
rest of the Middle East but also from the interior zones of the Persian Gulf (Potter, 2009). 
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The historical lack of borders among port cities in the Gulf region (Peterson, 2011), a 
multiplicity of identities and the relative autonomy that the Gulf cities enjoyed led to the 
formation of a hybrid society (Potter, 2014). It means, for example, that in the tenth century 
in Oman and Aden was very common to hear people that spoke Persian, or Persians in 
Lingah that spoke Arabic (Potter, 2009). In the nineteenth century, a British politician (Lewis 
Pelly) noted that the population on the Persian side of the Gulf “appeared to be African” 
(cited in Potter, 2009, p. 7). This hybrid community was the result of commercial exchanges 
and of the role played by the slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Gulf 
(Potter, 2009).  
In the coastal areas of the region, the most productive economic activity “was limited 
to the exportation of pearls and dates, the importation of goods from abroad, shipping and 
ship-building” (Onley & Khalaf, 2006, p. 192). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
before the discovery of oil (in 1908 in Persia and in 1932 in Bahrain) (Errichiello, 2012a), 
fishing, pearling industry and trading represented the most important economic activities for 
the coastal people. The pearling industry dominated the local labour market (Onley & 
Khalaf, 2006); it employed many workers for a seasonal period (July to October) each year. 
It was such a lucrative activity that at the beginning of the twentieth century, Indian pearl 
merchants moved to the Gulf cities to buy pearl harvest from Arabs and Persians and then 
they sold pearls in the Indian market (Onley, 2014).  
The links with the African continent started developing when Arabs and Persians 
moved to East Africa before the advent of Islām (seventh century A. D.). In particular, the 
Iranic Barzangi43 dynasty moved to East Africa (Izady, 2002) because they needed to 
establish new commercial routes to develop their economic activities that were in contrast 
with “the nascent Sasanian dynasty of Persia [they reigned from 224 to 651 A. D. in Persia]” 
(Izady, 2002). However, from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the enslaved 
Africans in the Gulf port cities became a pervasive presence because many of them were 
employed in the flourishing pearling industry (Hopper, 2014). Both in Africa and Asia, 
Arabs and Persians consolidated their presence through intermarriages between the Gulf 
merchant families and the local elites. Thus, the “resulting genetic diversity overseas sooner 
or later reflected itself back in the Gulf as well” (Izady, 2002, p. 45).   
                                            
43 This dynasty was “originally from the Shiraz area but dominant in the Laristan-Shabankara region of the 
northern Gulf coast and the Strait of Hormuz” (Izady, 2002, p. 41). 
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People living on the coastal cities in the Trucial States44, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and 
in Persia were physically separated from the interior zones because of the presence of the 
Zagros mountains in the north, and the deserts of Najd in the west and Rub al-Khali in the 
south (Izady, 2002). It was thus ‘natural’ for people living on the coastal areas to decide to 
move to the Indian Ocean to secure a livelihood and establish contacts and settlements in 
East Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and South China (Izady, 2002). This expansion 
contributed to the Gulf’s ethnic diversity that is also observable today. During my field 
research, I realized that this ‘diversity’ is reflected in the physical characteristics of some 
Emiratis. 
Over the last few days, I have walked around Dubai, especially in some shopping malls, 
and I have seen many Emiratis who have different physical characteristics in terms of 
appearance. So for example, I have seen Emiratis with brown skin, others with dark skin 
and others with white skin and blue or green eyes. This has led me to reflect on the fact 
that the UAE society is ethnically different, and whose history and ethnic diversity has 
been shaped over the years because of the contacts of local merchants, fishermen and 
Muslim preachers, who travelled for commercial and economic reasons in different 
areas of the Indian Ocean, with people from East Africa to East Asia (from my field 
notes, 6th November 2015). 
As Kanna (2010) points out, the ethnic diversity existing in Dubai resulted from the 
movement and connections between the Gulf countries with Asia and Africa. The Indian and 
Persian merchants moved to Dubai at the beginning of the twentieth century and still today 
they represent the backbone of Dubai’s society. They enjoy some privileges but, as Kanna 
(2010) argues, they are considered by the UAE authorities as second-class citizens (see 
below). This diversity is historically sedimented and has become one of the major 
characteristics of Dubai.  
In the Gulf region, the traditional social and political structure revolved around the 
prominent role of tribes and tribal affiliation. As an ideal type, “tribes represent large kin 
groups organized and regulated according to ties of blood and family lineage” (Khoury & 
Kostiner 1990, p. 4). Before the formation of new polities (e. g. the UAE federation in 1971), 
the tribe represented a social and territorial unit, whose members were tied because of 
different factors, such as livelihood, territorial proximity and, in some cases, a presumed 
                                            
44 Until 1971, the sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and 
Fujairah were known as the Trucial States. Sheikhdoms (in Arabic mashyakhat) “were small scale in terms of 
their economic, military, political and demographic resources…their populations were small…their boundaries 
were fluid and shifting, defined by political loyalties rather than political borders. Sovereignty was seen in 
terms of people, not territory” (Onley & Khalaf, 2006, p. 191). 
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common descent (Heard-Bey, 2013). However, the tribe could join other units and in this 
way it “began to develop new affinities when they identified themselves with groups which 
were geographically near to them or which had adopted the same primary source of 
livelihood” (Heard-Bey, 2013, p. 23). The tribal groups gave preference to genealogical, 
territorial, geographical and occupational elements and this is why they included among their 
ranks different units and members of other tribes or ethnic groups, which were dispersed 
across a vast geographical area. This led these tribal groups to increase and to disperse over 
a vast area of the Persian Gulf (Cooke, 2014).  
In the twentieth century, tribal affiliation was very important in the Gulf region 
because tribes were “the key to forming modern states in the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
dynasties presently ruling there are all of tribal origin” (Potter 2009, p. 2). Tribalism is still 
alive and well in the Gulf (Al-Qassemi, 2012) and it coexists with the modern state (Tibi, 
1990).  
 
 
 
4.3 From the khalījī community to the UAE 
In this section, I discuss the evolution of the khalījī community and the formation of 
the UAE federation, which challenged the economic and political stability of the community 
but not the social fabric. 
The lack of borders, the commercial exchanges, intermarriages and tribal affiliation 
led different ethnic groups to interact with each other. For Beeman (2009), the similarity in 
lifestyle based on the seafaring activities in the Gulf littoral area, and the practice of 
unrestricted movement led to the formation of the community of the ‘Gulfies’ (al-mujtamaʽa 
al-khalījī), which resulted from social interactions between people of the Persian Gulf with 
people arriving from India, Southeast Asia and East Africa that occurred over the centuries. 
Potter (2009, p. 2) uses the word khalījī to invoke a “distinction between dwellers on the 
Iranian or Arabian coasts and those living in the interior”.45 Despite people on the coastal 
areas in the Persian Gulf had intense economic and social relations, they did not share a 
common identity (Potter, 2014). The term khalījī community encapsulates the Gulf’s ethnic 
                                            
45 Today this word is not applicable to the Persian Gulf because Iranians tend to identify themselves as Iranians 
and not as khalījī, “and do not embrace a Gulf-wide identity” (Potter, 2014, p. 12). 
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diversity. It was a community, which had more “internal cultural communality than explicit 
ties with either the Arab or Persian cultural world” (Beeman, 2009, p. 147, original 
emphasis). This community was not based on an integration of different cultures and groups 
but was an aggregation of different ethnic groups held together for economic and commercial 
reasons (Cohen, 1985). As such, this community was not uniform, and ways of behaving 
varied among its members. This diversity and variety of behaviour did not disrupt the sense 
of belonging and boundaries of the khalījī community (Cohen, 1985). As Cohen (1985, p. 
21) has put it, although members of a community “recognize important differences among 
themselves, they also suppose themselves to be more like each other than like the members 
of other communities. This is precisely because, although the meanings they attach to the 
symbols may differ, they share symbols”. The khalījī community was ethnically different 
and, in spite of this ethnic diversity, it found its stability and balance by sharing a common 
lifestyle based on the seafaring activities; on the emergence of a ‘business mentality’ (Izady, 
2002) stemming from commercial and economic activities, and exchanges within the Indian 
Ocean arena; and on the open and inclusive tribal structure (Heard-Bey, 2013).  
In this context, characterized by the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups, 
who were related to each other for economic and commercial benefits, in 1971 the UAE 
federation was proclaimed. At the same time, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman also became 
independent (Kuwait became independent in 1961) from Britain.46 The new states 
established structures and institutions to manage their internal affairs. The British 
withdrawal entailed drawing borders and establishing new states (Potter, 2009). However, 
the sense of belonging to a ‘single’ community was partially resurrected only ten years later 
in 1981 when, along with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, these states joined to form the GCC 
(Naufal & Genc, 2012).  
The formation of the UAE federation (Picture 4.2) was the result of a process of state-
building; it “required to find ways of becoming open and inclusive, of turning fellow 
nationals into fellow citizens, and creating a secure public space in which the abstract, 
impersonal and rule-governed institutions of the state [could] take root” (Parekh, 1995b, p. 
                                            
46 The British presence in the Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman (Muscat) and the Trucial States was 
linked to the need to protect the British ships towards India from piracy, which was practiced by the Al-
Qawasimi family of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah in the Street of Hormuz. British presence in the Gulf dates 
from the winter of 1819–20, when the authorities in British India sent a naval expedition against the al-
Qawasim family. “Upon the conclusion of the expedition, the British imposed an anti-piracy treaty—known 
as the General Treaty of 1820—on all the rulers and governors of the Coast of Oman” (Onley, 2005, p. 30). 
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36). The state-building process required the establishment of political, bureaucratic and 
economic apparatuses to manage state affairs.47 The formation of this new polity did not 
undermine the role and the importance of tribal affiliation, which is still emotionally and 
socially relevant (Tibi, 1990), as well as economically and politically essential in framing 
the balance of power in the Gulf states (Al-Qassemi, 2012; Rugh, 2016). Moreover, tribal 
affiliation symbolically strengthened the sense of belonging among members of the new 
polity by recovering the past and creating ‘national histories’ (Cohen, 1985), and it 
politically reinforced ties among locals through a specific citizenship law (no. 17, 1972) (see 
below). 
Picture 4.2 Map of the UAE 
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Source: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/middle-east/united-arab-emirates/ 
After independence, the UAE authorities found themselves in a position of managing a huge 
wealth deriving from the oil, which was discovered between the 1950s and 1960s both in 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Davidson, 2009b). In order to avoid creating dissatisfaction, political 
and social instability, the ruling families48 decided to involve the local population in the 
                                            
47 For the political and administrative apparatuses, see Davidson, 2005. 
48 The seven Emirates are a family-based system linked to some tribes. The emergence of the ruling families 
dates back “to the 1700s and 1800s. The ruling families were those which had become the strongest and most 
prestigious in terms of marital skills and success in forging political marriage alliances, and by gaining control 
of economic resources with which they could support their followers” (Van der Meulen, 1997, p. 46). 
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defence of state’s interests. This is what Davis (1991) defined as ‘statecraft’, which means 
the ability of the ruling elites to govern with the support of the local population. By 
reinterpreting the past and using the collective memory, the ruling families have been able 
to involve the local population in constructing a consensus among their nationals in order to 
strengthen their rule. When the ruling elite are not able to create a link with the populace 
based on symbols such as a national flag or anthem, they risk losing their hold on people and 
they risk seeing their authority challenged. When there is no link between the ruler and the 
ruled, the former does not have power to legitimate his authority on the latter (Khoury & 
Kostiner, 1990).  
In the UAE, the involvement of the local population in the management of national 
and collective affairs has led to the establishment of a ‘ruling bargain’ (Davidson, 2005); a 
bargain in which “valuables distributed by the state would be exchanged for political 
demobilization” (Kanna, 2011, p. 25). The ‘ruling bargain’ is a strategy adopted by the ruling 
elite who distribute wealth, benefits and good jobs to (‘pure’) Emiratis (see below) in 
exchange of internal de-mobilization and no political pressure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 The UAE as a nation-state 
As said in chapter 3, for Parekh (1995), a political community exists when its 
members share common rules, procedures and institutions in order to manage their collective 
affairs (Parekh, 1995). In 1971, the UAE federation was proclaimed. It was thus necessary 
to ‘build’ the political and economic apparatuses of the new polity. In this regard, the Emirati 
authorities implemented a series of measures with the aim of constructing a political 
community with its own particular laws, institutions and principles (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah 
& al-Mutawa, 2006). At federal level, the highest authority is represented by the presidency. 
The president of the federation is elected by the rulers of the seven Emirates for five years. 
He acts as head of the state. Theoretically, every ruler can be appointed as a president of the 
federation (Davidson, 2005). Practically, since its inception the UAE federation has had only 
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two presidents elected and always within the same family, that is, the al-Nuhayyan family 
of Abu Dhabi49. This is the ‘pathology’ (Davidson, 2005) of the UAE political system, in 
which the traditional rulership of Abu Dhabi prevails. It is the largest and wealthiest Emirate 
of the federation and it is the major contributor to the federal budget; thus “this historical 
association of the presidency with the ruler of Abu Dhabi has now been informally accepted 
by the other emirates” (Davidson, 2005p. 189).  
The implementation of some measures (e. g. citizenship law), as I discuss below, 
serves to differentiate, categorize and identify those who belong and those who do not 
belong. Therefore, the UAE authorities constructed boundaries and identified who were to 
be included and excluded within those boundaries (Yuval-Davis, 2011). In the UAE, 
migrants cannot ostensibly belong to the Emirati nation, which uses its symbols, imagery 
and narratives to build its national identity, and from which migrants are seemingly excluded 
(see below), so “they remain relatively outsiders not only to the nation but also to the state” 
(Parekh, 1995b, p. 37). The Emirati authorities implemented measures aimed at excluding 
foreign workers from benefits deriving from working and living in the UAE (Van der 
Meulen, 1997). In order to reshape and strengthen their national identity in terms of who 
belongs and who does not belong, the UAE adopted several strategies, such as revitalizing 
tribal bonds, encouraging marriage among nationals, reviewing the citizenship law and 
implementing the sponsorship system. 
In the UAE, the political identity discourse is mainly articulated through tribalism, 
which is still “alive and well” (Al-Qassemi, 2012, p. 1). Despite Eriksen (2010) arguing that 
the term ‘ethnic group’ has replaced the term ‘tribe’, in the UAE the tribal identity represents 
a primary identity for youth because it allows them to distinguish themselves from the 
massive presence of foreign workers (Cooke, 2014). For Cooke (2014), the tribal bond is a 
social, political and cultural resource for young people. Tribal links are still important in the 
management of political affairs and the distribution of wealth and jobs (Van der Meulen 
1997; Davidson 2009a). The Emirati political identity is based upon the tribal leadership and 
the prominent role of the ruling families of each single Emirate who are linked to specific 
tribes. The traditional tribal system does not undermine the federal structure because, as 
Davidson (2005) argues, the UAE is an ‘open’ federation in which (apart from a very few 
                                            
49 The first president was Shaikh Zaid al-Nuhayyan who reigned from 1966 (before the proclamation of the 
federation and he was the ruler of Abu Dhabi) to 2004; he was re-elected every five years. The second president 
is Shaikh Khalifa al-Nuhayyan who was elected in 2004. 
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sectors such as army, foreign affairs and immigration) each Emirate acts independently. 
Tribal bonds are reinforced through close family inter-marriages, which connect “all 
members of the Emiratis’ ruling families without exception” (Al-Qassemi, 2012, p. 2), and 
they also serve to set boundaries against millions of migrants who work and live in the 
country. The strengthening of the tribal bonds is fundamental to spread a sense of security, 
belonging and cohesion in the face of a massive presence of migrants, and it also serves to 
wield power and authority. 
One way in which the Emirati national identity is continually reconstituted and 
reshaped is through the adoption of specific marriage strategies (Dresch, 2005). Marriage is 
a political means that is regulated by rules and procedures. Marriage between inter-state 
ruling families is used to preserve and reinforce ties beyond national boundaries. Thus, 
members of a ruling family of an Emirate may marry members of another ruling family in 
the Arab Gulf.50 Marriages between inter-state ruling families guarantee economic security 
and reinforce political ties between the families in the GCC countries (Al-Qassemi, 2012). 
However, marriage is also important far and beyond the ruling families. It has become a way 
to preserve privileges and advantages associated with UAE citizenship (see below). In order 
to reduce mixed marriages, represented by the choice of some Emirati men to marry foreign 
women (Al Awadhi, 2008), in 1992 the federal law (no. 47) established the ‘Marriage Fund’ 
(ṣundūq al-zawāj), which is aimed at increasing the marriage among Emiratis providing 
financial help for marriage costs (Dresch, 2005). Marriage has thus become an important 
tool to renegotiate national identity through the adoption of a political strategy based upon 
the encouragement of marriage among UAE nationals and on the reinforcement of tribal 
bonds. In her research on the importance of tribalism in modern times in the Arab Gulf area, 
Cooke (2014) argues that the choice of a potential partner is driven by the prestige and 
importance of tribal affiliation. Marriage thus reinforces boundaries between nationals and 
non-nationals and strengthens the historical tribal bonds 
In 1972, the UAE adopted a federal law (n. 17) on citizenship (Dresch, 2005). 
According to this law, Emirati citizenship can be granted by law (qānūn), by affiliation or 
dependence (tābiʿa), and by naturalisation (tajannus). It can also be granted to a person “who 
has rendered honourable service to the state, irrespective of period of residency” (Gray, 
                                            
50 The Bahraini king’s son, Shaykh Hussein bin Hamad, married a daughter of the ruler of Dubai (Shaykh 
Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktum) in 2009 (Al-Qassemi, 2012).  
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2015, p. 10). The new federal law (n. 10) of 1975 also established that a national woman 
does not lose her citizenship if she marries a foreign man “unless [she] adopts her husband's 
nationality” (Article 14). Moreover, a Presidential decree in 2011 established that children 
of Emirati women married to foreign men could acquire Emirati citizenship at the age of 18 
(Gray, 2015). UAE citizenship entails having some rights and benefits granted, such as the 
residency, the right to open a business, and become a sponsor, and many other benefits in 
terms of free education, free house and/or land, free welfare, and a job in the public sector 
(Gray, 2015). Citizenship law has increasingly become more flexible since 1975. However, 
I argue that this growing flexibility is the result of the demographic imbalance, which means 
that foreigners outnumber nationals (Davidson, 2005). In order to reshape their national 
identity, the UAE authorities have adopted flexible rules, for example, Emirati women no 
longer lose their citizenship when they become married to a foreign man, as it happened in 
the past. The chosen mode of conducting collective affairs is permeated by the need to cope 
with perceived challenges posed to national identity (Parekh, 1995a). Thus, the adoption of 
a relatively flexible citizenship law is a way of reaffirming the difference between nationals 
and non-nationals. This point becomes clearer when considering that having an Emirati 
passport does not entail having all the benefits and rights of a ‘national’. In the UAE, in order 
to be considered a ‘national’ and having benefits and advantages ensured, it is not sufficient 
to be in possession of a passport. In order to be considered a ‘national’, s/he must have the 
khulāṣat al-qayd, that is the family book (Al Qassemi, 2010).51 For instance, if one has 
citizenship granted by naturalisation, s/he is not considered a ‘national’. Thus, one will never 
enjoy the benefits and rights of a ‘pure’ Emirati national because a naturalized citizen 
possesses citizenship but not nationality. This means that the naturalized citizen is excluded 
from political rights and can lose citizenship if s/he commits a crime or for other specific 
reasons (Fargues & Brouwer 2012). A clear-cut separation between nationality and 
citizenship thus exists (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Nationality is both inclusive and boundary-
making because all nationals are also citizens, and nationality creates a boundary between 
nationals and non-nationals/non-citizens. Citizenship is exclusionary and boundary-breaking 
because all citizens are not nationals, and citizenship breaks the boundaries between 
nationals and non-nationals. However, according to the citizenship law, non-nationals (e. g. 
                                            
51 It is a sort of book in which are enlisted all members of a family beginning with the male head of family, 
and without this book one is considered as a stateless (bidūn) (Dresch, 2005). 
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non-Gulf Arabs, Asians, Westerners and Africans) can become citizens, but they will never 
become nationals.52    
In the 1970s, the UAE adopted the sponsorship (kafāla) system in order to regulate 
migration to the country. Thus, a migrant worker who wishes to obtain a temporary work 
permit to be employed in the UAE needs a kafīl (sponsor). The sponsorship system is a 
mechanism to control migrant workers that enter and work in the country. It also affects the 
migrants’ social behaviour because any illegal actions might compromise their sojourn in 
the country. Moreover, it also determines social interaction because it is a structure of 
dominance (Longva, 1997), in which the employer is primarily involved in the management 
of migration (Vora, 2010). The kafāla system has created a market where citizenship 
guarantees an income (Khalaf, 2014). However, in this market, migrant workers are not free 
to sell and compete in the market because the kafāla system does not allow a migrant worker 
to have residency and work visas without a national sponsor (local citizen or company) and 
s/he is not free to compete in the local labour market for jobs (Longva, 1997). At the 
individual level, through the kafāla system, the UAE authorities delegate to their nationals 
the functions of controlling and managing migration that are typically governed by local 
institutions (Longva, 1997). Thus, the kafāla system delegates to employers the right to 
control the entry of a migrant into the country (Dito, 2014). It is worth noting that the 
involvement of locals in the management of migration serves to spread a sense of security 
and cohesion among locals (Dresch, 2005) because they participate in the management of 
community affairs and it demarcates boundaries between nationals and non-nationals (see 
also chapter 5). 
In conclusion, Parekh (1995a) contends that political identity refers to how a 
community manages its communal affairs, structures its relationships with ‘others’ and 
establishes rules and procedures in order to reshape its identity. This approach allows us to 
recognize that, for example, the involvement of nationals in the management of collective 
affairs, and rights and benefits deriving from being an Emirati national, serve to reshape 
                                            
52 The acquisition of the UAE citizenship is very difficult. It can be granted to people with different procedures 
according to their national origins. Omani, Bahraini and Qatari can obtain citizenship if they have resided 
continuously in the country for three years; non-Gulf Arabs can obtain it if they have resided continuously in 
the country for at least seven years and other nationalities only if they have resided in the country for at least 
twenty years after the implementation of the Federal (citizenship) Law No. 17 of 1972. For non-Arab people, 
it is also required to be proficient in Arabic language (Zahra, 2015). 
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national identity. However, these measures also serve seemingly to limit the participation of 
millions of foreign workers in the Emirati context. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 The UAE beyond methodological nationalism 
As said in the previous section, the UAE have implemented measures, laws and 
created institutions in order to establish the federation. The UAE as a nation-state has 
become an ‘identity container’ (Glick Schiller, 2010), in which the nation is represented as 
a bounded and isolated social space. However, this perspective is reductionist and most 
importantly neglects the role of migrants as transnational actors, embedded in global markets 
and as actors living and spanning their lives within and beyond one single nation-state. This 
is why some scholars (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; Chernilo, 2007; Glick Schiller, 
2010) advocate the need to move beyond methodological nationalism, which is “an 
ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical processes as if they 
were contained within the borders of individual nation-states” (Glick Schiller, 2010, pp. 110-
111). In this approach, nation-state borders are viewed as societal boundaries, thus nation-
state and society are equated, and this leads to conceiving every single state as self-sufficient 
and also as a separate society in which the ‘others’ are viewed as strangers with distinctive 
and particular national norms and customs (Glick Schiller, 2010). For Hanieh (2015, p. 58), 
the adoption of the lens of methodological nationalism relies on the (unsustainable) idea of 
“nation-states as self-contained, enclosed set of social relations, separate from the wider 
region and world market”. 
This approach, in relation to the UAE and the Gulf countries, has two major 
consequences, First, by conceiving the nation-state as the circumscribed and privileged 
social space to analyse and understand social phenomena, it risks losing the idea that flows 
of capital, labour migration and policy frameworks move beyond national borders; social 
phenomena are embedded in and move beyond the nation-state (Chernilo, 2007). For Hanieh 
(2015), in order to understand migration and the role of the Gulf countries, it is important to 
inscribe their development in a regional and global context. In this regard, neoliberal 
economic policies implemented by some financial institutions in the 1970s (e. g. the 
International Monetary Fund, IMF) created instability and uncertainties in some Middle 
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Eastern countries (e. g. Egypt), thus encouraging migration to the Gulf states, which 
supported financially some of these countries in order to alleviate their debt crisis.  
Second, social phenomena are conceived of as including and binding to a specific 
nation-state. As Glick Schiller (2010) acknowledges, this approach leads to viewing 
migration as ‘threatening’ the national cohesion and stability. The nation-state is viewed as 
an automatized and perfect society in which a balance within its borders exists and enables 
it to prosper and flourish (Glick Schiller, 2010). This leads to conceiving of migrants and 
natives as two separated entities. It becomes evident among scholars of transnational 
migration and diaspora, who “have often bound their unit of study along the lines of national 
or ethnic identities” (Glick Schiller, 2010, p. 111) that migrants are viewed as a ‘threat’ to 
social stability and natives as sharing common norms and narratives. As I will discuss in 
chapter 8, these presumed ‘threat’ represented by migrants has led the UAE authorities to 
implement measures to reshape their cultural identity (Parekh, 1995)  
The idea to move beyond methodological nationalism entails acknowledging that the 
UAE (and the other Gulf countries) is a peculiar nation-state in which political, economic 
and financial institutions are not only the products of national and local interests but also of 
regional and global markets. First, the UAE is formed of seven Emirates, which are governed 
by seven different rulers who belong to different families (Davidson, 2005). Second, the 
emirate-level decision making structure revolves around the role of the rulers’ courts, which 
“preside over local governments, most of which possess their own civil services, economic 
affairs departments, public works departments, finance departments, and in some cases even 
their own oil departments, civil aviation authorities, and internals security organizations” 
(Davidson, 2005, pp.198-199). Apart from foreign affairs, immigration and army, each 
Emirate has its own political and economic structures. As Davidson (2005) argues, the UAE 
is more a confederation than a federation because each Emirate wields power on many 
sectors. Third, one of the major challenges to the Emirati national identity is represented by 
the demographic imbalance, which has spread the “fear among some people that national 
society might evaporate” (Dresch, 2005, p. 156). I argue that in order to address this sense 
of insecurity, the UAE authorities have adopted strategies that appear to strengthen the 
boundaries between nationals and non-nationals (see chapter 8). Fourth, there are internal 
divisions in terms of citizenship status, as previously mentioned, which have 
institutionalized ethno-racial and gender hierarchies (see below). 
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All these elements serve to reinforce the idea of the UAE as a peculiar nation-state 
in which its socio-economic and financial development has necessarily required the massive 
recruitment of foreign workers. As Hanieh (2015, p. 63) points out, migration to the Gulf 
countries resulted from the neoliberal restructuring programmes that in some Middle Eastern 
countries started in the 1970s (e. g. Egypt and Jordan), which included “privatisation, labour 
market deregulation, opening up to foreign investment (FDI), increasing integration into 
global financial markets”. The role of the Gulf countries in this process was crucial because 
they provided financial support to those countries that suffered from the debt crisis. One of 
the consequences of the neoliberal restructuring programme was migration that resulted as 
the main means to survive in light of the economic crisis and recession that some Middle 
Eastern countries were suffering, and remittances represented the main tool through which 
some countries and families were able to survive (Glick Schiller, 2010; Hanieh, 2015).  
In conclusion, moving beyond methodological nationalism and the ‘container 
approach’ to society in order to overcome the idea of the nation-state as self-sufficient allows 
us to see that what happens in state territories is not only a product of specific and distinctive 
state policies, but it is inevitably the result of globalization and the embeddedness that 
characterize our globalized world. Scholars who advocate the need to move beyond 
methodological nationalism, such as Chernilo (2007), Glick Schiller (2010) and Hanieh 
(2015) help us to understand the UAE and the other Gulf countries as entities embedded in 
the global market and economy (Hanieh, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Dubai. The emergence of a modern city 
The area in which I carried out the field research was Dubai, and in this section, I 
discuss the importance and the emergence of Dubai from a port city to an international 
financial centre. 
The fluidity, ethnic and cultural diversity, which characterized the khalījī 
community, also included elements of cohesion and unity. Dubai was a port city that 
developed by virtue of the seafaring activities (Heard-Bey, 2013), and its ethnic diversity 
did not undermine its development (Davidson, 2008a). Dubai became an important port city 
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during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries that also contributed to make 
it an international financial centre from the 1970s onwards (Davidson, 2008a). 
In the nineteenth century, Dubai was one of the port cities of the Arab side of the 
Gulf where merchants, fishermen and traders settled down and where goods coming from 
South and Southeast Asia were shipped throughout the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean 
arena. In 1833, Dubai became independent from Abu Dhabi. Members of the Al-Bu Falasah 
tribe, which is a section of the Bani Yas tribal confederation (Heard-Bey, 2013), left Abu 
Dhabi when Shaykh Khalifa bin Shakhbut Al-Nuhayyan (who ruled from 1833 to 1845) 
suppressed a coup plotted by “a number of cousins, merchants, and other powerful Bani Yas 
men” (Davidson, 2008a, p. 13). Khalifa’s revenge “was so extensive that many of the 
perpetrators and their families had no option but to leave Abu Dhabi” (Davidson, 2009a, p. 
13). Thus, members of the Al-Bu Falasah tribe led by Maktum bin Buti Al-Falasi and his 
uncle Ubaid bin Said Al-Falasi (and with other tribes) settled in Dubai, which was 
proclaimed independent from Abu Dhabi, and they started the new dynasty, the Al-Maktum. 
The first ruler of Dubai was Maktum bin Buti Al-Falasi (who ruled from 1833 to 1852) who 
shared his rulership with his uncle (Ubaid bin Said Al-Falasi) for three years (Davidson, 
2008a, 2009a). 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Dubai’s local population was stratified and 
ethnically diverse. In the course of the years, many foreigners travelled and settled down in 
the sheikhdom and became part of Dubai’s social fabric (Kanna, 2011). Dubai’s population 
was composed mostly by local Arabs, Persians and Indians. This multi-cultural community 
resulted from the intense economic and commercial exchanges that occurred in the Indian 
Ocean arena (Davidson, 2008b). In 1902 in Persia, a new law introduced high dues on 
imports and exports on goods going through Persian ports to the Trucial States (Heard-Bey, 
2013). This led the port of Lingah (Southeast Persia) to decline in its strategic and economic 
importance. Thus, goods from India were shipped straight to Dubai (Heard-Bey, 2013). 
Because of the decline of shipping, many Persian merchants were forced to leave their 
country and move to Dubai (Davidson, 2008a). They came especially from the Bastak 
district in Persia and even though they lived in Persia, they “belonged to various Arab tribes 
and were Sunni [see appendix B]” (Heard-Bey, 2013, p. 245). This convinced the ruler of 
Dubai, Said bin Maktum (who ruled from 1912 to 1958), to invite them to establish 
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permanently in the Emirate (Kanna, 2011). These new migrants were gifted an area on the 
Dubai Creek that still today is known as Bastakiyyah (Heard-Bey, 2013). 
The recent presence of Indians in Dubai dates back to 1865 (Al-Sayegh, 1998), when 
they “first arrived as the representatives of British companies in India” (Davidson, 2008a, p. 
89). In Dubai, the presence of Indian merchants was a consequence of the Indian 
government’s decision to “levy duties on precious metals, which led to India’s losing its 
position as Asia’s primary gold market” (Davidson, 2008a, p. 70). The formation of the 
Indian community in Dubai was the result of favourable elements, such as “trade routes, 
economic opportunities, local demands, religious tolerance and the policies of the local 
ruler” (Onley, 2014, p. 247).  
Dubai was also a recipient of merchants from other sheikhdoms (Davidson, 2008a). 
In the 1920s, because of increasing taxes imposed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaykh 
Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nuhayyan (who ruled from 1912 to 1922), many merchant families 
decided to move their activities and migrate to Dubai where the economic environment was 
more convenient than in Abu Dhabi (Davidson, 2009a). Indeed, many other merchant 
families left Abu Dhabi during the Shaykh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al-Nuhayyan’s reign (who 
ruled from 1928 to 1966) because of his reluctance to investing money, derived from oil 
concessions signed in the 1930s with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), to develop the 
sheikhdom thus sharing the benefits with the local population (Davidson, 2009a).  
The historical evolution of ethnic diversity existing in Dubai emphasize the agential 
capacity of some individuals to project their life in a new country, who through practical-
evaluative capacity identify and respond to the changes occurring in external structures and 
are able to cope with them. The merchant families that moved to Dubai planned their 
migration project in light of the contingent socio-economic and legal restrictions that 
constrained their agency in their home countries but, at the same time, those restrictions 
enabled their agency to find new possibilities for action in a new country (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998).  
In the twentieth century, the major economic activities in Dubai were pearl diving, 
fishing and trading. These niches of the labor market were occupied by locals because they 
were seen as prestigious jobs (Al-Sayegh, 1998). Indians were mainly employed in the 
banking sector, and in retail trading activities (Al-Sayegh, 1998; Onley, 2014) and Persians 
controlled the retail trade and food commerce (Al-Sayegh, 1998). The merchant class has 
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been important in Dubai’s economy, and it has also played a key role in shaping Dubai’s 
multi-cultural environment (Vora, 2013). The importance of the Indian and Iranian merchant 
class was directly proportional to the political influence that they wielded on rulers. For Al-
Sayegh (1998, p. 90), the rulers “depended entirely on taxes imposed on the pearling fleets 
and on revenues provided by the customs houses to provide income for himself and the state 
treasury”. Put differently, the rulers turned to the merchant class for financial assistance, thus 
increasing their dependence on this class. However, after the 1960s, when oil was 
discovered, the merchant class was no longer viewed as an ally because the ruler did not 
need their financial assistance (Al-Sayegh, 1998) and they were relegated to a dependent 
position (Kanna, 2011).  
In the way in which the relationship between the Indian and Iranian merchant class 
and the rulers has changed after the 1960s, it is possible to see the rationale of the ‘ruling 
bargain’ (see above). Until the 1960s, the merchant class (mostly Persians and Indians) was 
viewed as a part of the social fabric because they helped the local rulers by providing them 
with financial assistance (Al-Sayegh, 1998). After the 1960s and 1970s, the economic 
development triggered by the oil economy convinced the local rulers to reduce their 
dependence on the merchant class thus limiting their power on the local economy. The local 
rulers decided to share the benefits of the oil economy with the local population by 
establishing boundaries between Emiratis and non-Emiratis (see below). Between the 1960s 
and 1980s, the oil economy and the development of other economic activities transformed 
the UAE society and foreigners became the majority in the population (see chapter 5). It 
follows that the demographic imbalance, which characterizes the UAE, is viewed as “a 
means of political stability” (Kanna, 2011, p. 61) because if “the national population had 
grown in tandem with the expatriate population or, more likely, if it had become larger due 
to dilution through mixed marriages, then the benefits provided by the allocative state would 
not have been at such high level” (Davidson, 2008a. p. 151).  
After the formation of the UAE federation (1971), the local authorities adopted a 
specific citizenship law (no. 17 of 1972) to establish boundaries between Emiratis and non-
Emiratis. The distinction between these two categories is important because the benefits and 
advantages deriving from being an Emirati national are remarkable (see above) and in order 
to have these benefits granted nationals have to be politically ‘docile’ and “keep their 
families ‘pure’ from foreign blood” (Davidson, 2008a, p. 152). In 1992, this aim was pursued 
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through the establishment of the ‘Marriage Fund’, which is a means for the authorities to 
control and preserve the ‘purity’ of the Emiratis by encouraging the marriage among Emirati 
nationals, and thus avoiding mixed marriages (Davidson, 2008a; Dresch, 2005). The 
‘Marriage Fund’ is thus aimed at increasing the marriage among Emiratis by providing 
financial help for marriage costs. This reasoning is politically acceptable insofar as it is 
aimed at preserving the mutual interests of the two parties involved (the ruling families and 
Emirati nationals), but it is ‘anthropologically’ problematic insofar as the Gulf’s ethnic and 
cultural diversity (Izady, 2002) makes the discourse on ‘purity’ meaningless.  
In his work, Abdulla (2006b) describes the evolution and the emergence of Dubai 
from the mid-1950s to the 2000s. In the 1950s, Dubai was a small village formed by palm-
frond settlements (barasti), in which fishermen, merchants and traders were accommodated. 
In the course of a few decades, these barasti settlements were replaced by big villas, luxury 
hotels and compounds where entrepreneurs, foreign workers, and professionals are now 
accommodated. For Abdulla (2006b), Dubai has dramatically changed and evolved to 
become an international financial centre because it has been able to diversify its economy, 
and has created a positive and ‘open’ environment where people coming from different 
countries coexist and interact. Dubai has been able to flourish because its rulers have adopted 
a liberal perspective. In the words of Jamal, the Indian academically-oriented professional 
whom I interviewed   
…it [Dubai] wanted to be a trading hub, and a trading hub meant that it had to have a very 
liberal milieu, it had to have a very liberal atmosphere, a liberal environment which attracted 
people from all over the world to come here. So its economic sense that is a common sense 
for Dubai, where they are willing to compromise a bit on culture, tradition, religion etc. to 
make sure that it is economically sustainable, they are able to sustain itself economically. That 
is more important than the other aspects. That does not mean that they are not kept in touch 
with their culture, tradition, religion etc. they are trying to reinforce all things about national 
identity at the UAE level not at the Dubai level… Dubai realized that for its own growth, for 
its own development it requires to provide a liberal milieu, a liberal space and that’s what it 
has done (Interview with Jamal, 3rd November 2014).  
Jamal grasped the ‘essence’ of Dubai, namely its economic vocation to which is linked 
its survival and prosperity, and it is much more important than its religious and cultural 
identity. However, this economic-oriented policy has not undermined the discourse on 
local traditions, customs and culture (see chapter 8). This (neo-) liberal perspective has 
been promoted especially by the ruler of Dubai, Muhammad Al-Maktum (who has ruled 
since 2006), who considers himself as the “CEO of Dubai” (Kanna, 2010, p. 106). This 
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is why Abdulla (2006b) defines Dubai as a corporation (sharkat). This ‘economic’ 
outlook on Dubai has also implications for the role of religion in the city where the Islamic 
references are marginal (Davidson, 2007). This aspect has also been underscored by 
Jamal, who said 
It has been deliberately attempted of not developing a culture that it is completely congruous 
with Islām. It is a modern worship of Islām that it is practised here generally, where 
accommodation, where a spirit of liberal values these things are more important than a strict 
adherence to Islamic principles (Interview with Jamal, 3rd November 2014). 
The positive aspect of Dubai, as many of my interviewees both Emiratis and non-Emiratis 
underscored, is its multi-cultural context, where Islamic and non-Islamic elements coexist 
(see chapter 8).  
Dubai has developed its economy by attracting foreign investments and its industry 
sector is primarily finalized to the production of goods that would be too expensive to import 
(Davidson, 2007). The diversification process, which started in the 1970s, has been very 
successful because it has integrated Dubai in the international market system (Davidson, 
2007), but Dubai has also suffered the consequences of its participation in the international 
system, whose effects and consequences are mostly evident on South Asian blue-collar 
workers, who, during the 2008 economic crisis were squeezed by loans in order to survive 
in Dubai and re-pay the recruitment agencies (Buckley, 2012). 
Dubai has historically been a very multi-cultural Emirate. Its population was 
stratified and ethnically different. Persians and Indians arrived in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and they allowed Dubai to prosper. These foreign merchants were also 
supported by the local rulers who needed merchants’ financial assistance (Al-Sayegh, 1998). 
However, after the 1960s and 1970s, the merchant class was relegated in a dependent 
position and the local rulers decided to adopt specific tools (e. g. citizenship law) in order to 
have the support of the local population granted through benefits and advantages in exchange 
of Emiratis politically de-mobilized and ‘docile’ (Kanna, 2011). 
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            4.4.1. Neoliberalism in Dubai 
In order to fully understand the development and the emergence of Dubai as an 
international financial centre, it is also important to discuss the evolution of neoliberalism in 
the city. As said earlier, at the root of methodological nationalism, there is the idea that 
nation-states are equated with societal boundaries and they are conceived of as autonomous 
and isolated entities (Chernilo, 2007). However, as Glick Schiller (2010) acknowledges, the 
need to move beyond methodological nationalism has mostly been attempted through the 
adoption of the concept of global cities (Sassen, 1991), especially because it addresses the 
effect of neoliberal restructuring programmes. For Sassen (1991, p. 126), global cities have 
a key component that “gives them a specific role in the current phase of the world economy”, 
namely, they are sites where there has been a shift from a manufacturing to financial and 
service sectors. But more than that, global cities are strategic places not only for the global 
capital, “but also for the transnationalization of labor and the formation of translocal 
communities and identities” (Sassen, 2005, p. 38). Therefore, global cities represent sites 
that are dependent on migration of highly skilled professionals and on migrants who staff 
the service sector of the new economy (Glick Schiller, 2010). In this regard, Dubai can be 
viewed as a global city (Ali, 2010), which has become an international financial hub and 
characterized by a considerable presence of migrants, and in which its neoliberal policies 
have been implemented by the local authorities that have supported and ostensibly driven its 
development. Ali (2010, p. 9) acknowledges Dubai’s vocation to being global in its 
investment on infrastructures, in the creation of a relaxed taxing environment, in the massive 
presence of migrants and the diffusion of a consumer culture which “is largely rooted in the 
shopping malls, clubs and bars”.     
In the last few years, neoliberalism has become a global yardstick in analyses of the 
evolution of markets, social relationships and class inequalities (Harvey, 2005; Navarro, 
2007). The basic definition of neoliberalism relates to the idea that it is a practice that  
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). 
For Steger and Roy (2010, p. 14), neoliberalism is a public policy characterized by the “D-
L-P formula” which means deregulation of the economy, the liberalization of trade and the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (Ganti, 2014).  
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The ‘neoliberalism turn’, as Harvey (2005, p. 12) defined it, has its origins in the 
1970s crisis and events when ‘embedded liberalism’53 “had delivered high rates of growth 
to at least the advanced capitalist countries after 1945”, but that positive and proactive thrust 
was exhausted, and new alternatives needed. In this context, neoliberalism had to dis-embed 
capital from the “web of social and political constraints” (Harvey, 2005, p. 11). In other 
words, state-led planning and state-owned enterprises, such as automobiles and coal, had to 
be dis-embedded. It follows that neoliberalism is linked to class power. This is evident in 
Britain, for example, where the links between the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 
1979, and “the brash entrepreneurs and the nouveaux riches” (Harvey, 2005, p. 31) left the 
Conservative Party appalled because she went against the old traditional and aristocratic 
British classes (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal ideology had restored class power but not 
necessarily the economic power in the old classes. A new class of entrepreneurs and financial 
operators became the upper-class or the dominant class. This role wielded by this new class 
resulted from the shift away from production sector to the world of finance. This widened 
class inequalities because the dominant classes of entrepreneurs, new riches, managers and 
financial operators increased their wealth and political influence. This upper class is also 
dominated by people who work in different sectors and they have “privileged relationship to 
state power” (Harvey, 2005, p. 34). 
In the 1970s, neoliberalism flourished because of the links between the financial and 
political power. This is evident in Dubai, where neoliberalism resulted from its specific 
economic, social and political context. After the formation of the UAE federation, in 1971 
and the 1973 oil boom, Dubai diversified its economy because of the lack of huge oil 
reserves. The then ruler of Dubai (Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum, who ruled from 1958 to 
1990), and especially his successors, started implementing and strengthening the service and 
financial sectors as two important leading areas in order to develop the Emirate. As Hvidt 
(2007a) argues, this development followed precise steps and stemmed from the particular 
context. Dubai’s development is government-led, which means that government and not the 
private sector, leads the local development because “Dubai’s private entrepreneurs are 
politically weak” (Hvidt, 2007a, p. 401). This state-led development resulted from the neo-
patrimonial conception of the state, “which implies that the regime is organized around the 
                                            
53 This expression means that “market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded 
by a web of social and political constraints and regulatory environment that sometimes restrained…economic 
and industrial strategy” (Harvey, 2005, p. 11). 
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ruler as an individual, maintaining other members of the elite in a relationship of personal 
dependence on his grace and good favor” (Hvidt, 2007a, p. 400). This aspect is evident in 
the 1990s, when in Dubai the ruler and “important merchants, such as Al Futtaim and the Al 
Ghurair54, either founded or consolidated large holding corporations that would, in effect, 
control Dubai’s economic trajectory, public space, and public culture” (Kanna, 2010, p. 
108).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Dubai emerged as a city-corporation (Abdulla, 2006b), 
where economic, social, political and cultural power where concentrated in the hands of a 
few people, namely members of the ruling family (Al-Maktum). They envisioned the end of 
the oil industry, and decided to diversify the local economy by developing projects aimed at 
strengthening the financial and real estate sectors. In this regard, between the 1990s and the 
2000s, neoliberalism emerged as a political and economic ideology based on the assumption 
that the vision of Dubai as a city-corporation and the ruler of Dubai as ‘CEO of Dubai’ was 
an ‘unavoidable’ result of Dubai’s history reflected especially in the tribal social structure 
characterized by a hierarchical organization and paternalistic attitude towards members of 
the tribes (Kanna, 2010). Dubai represents the example of authoritarian neoliberalism, where 
the adoption and implementation of economic measures to increase and diversify local 
economy is led by an autocratic regime. As Kathiravelu (2016, p. 227) suggests,  
Dubai as a case study demonstrates that neoliberalism functions through highly regulated 
practices…In Dubai the minority Emirati citizenry has generally been protected from the 
negative and marginalising effects of neoliberal restructuring, such as the increasing precarity 
and the lack of protections for labour and the diminished welfare state.  
In Dubai, like in other Asian and Middle Eastern countries, there has been a top-down 
approach to neoliberalism; it is a state-led neoliberalism (Ong, 2006). Unlike the other 
contexts, such as Singapore (Jun Jie, 2014), in Dubai neoliberalism is constructed through 
the preservation and improvements of privileges and services for some Emiratis; at the same 
time, it tends to disempower the already marginalized and oppressed groups (Kathiravelu, 
2016).  
For Navarro (2007), neoliberal theory is different from neoliberal practice. Despite 
neoliberalism’s claims for a free-market economy, in practice especially in Western 
                                            
54 Al-Futtaim and Al-Ghurair are old Arab merchant families of Dubai who have established the two most 
important financial groups in the UAE. Both groups were able to prosper because of their links with the Dubai 
ruling family (Davidson, 2008a). 
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countries “state interventionism and state public expenditures increase during the past 30 
years” (Navarro, 2007, p. 49, original emphasis). In Dubai, this results from the presence of 
‘flexible citizens’ (Kanna, 2011) who work for companies strictly related to the ruling family 
of Dubai. Moreover, the sponsorship system does not allow the foreign workers to ‘sell’ 
freely their skills in the local labour market because their residence in the country is linked 
to a specific local sponsor. Unlike the foreign workers, the ‘flexible citizens’ are members 
of the Dubai middle-class, they are mostly naturalized Emiratis with a migration 
background, and they are seen as a second-class citizen. But because they are able to manage 
the discourse on modernity and because of their education they are able to shift  
between different scales and cultural worlds in constructing their identities. The ways that 
Dubai’s flexible citizens appropriate neoliberal discourses shows both how neoliberalism, 
rather than being monolithic, is inflected by local meanings, discourse, and histories, and how 
appropriations of neoliberalism mediate local ambiguities pertaining to social and gender 
identity (Kanna, 2010, pp. 101-102). 
They are the “vanguard” (Kanna, 2010, p. 105) of neoliberalism in Dubai because they are 
capable to combine its instances (personal success and individualism) with an ethical vision, 
such as respect for family, traditional and local customs. For Kanna (2010), ‘flexible 
citizens’ have ‘adopted’ neoliberalism as ideology but inscribed within the local context in 
which the ruler (Shaykh Muhammad Al-Maktum) is viewed as a ‘father’, thus not 
challenging the patriarchal system of the UAE society (Rugh, 2016). They represent the 
‘economic arm’ of the ruler but they do not challenge the political structure of the Emirate. 
In conclusion, Dubai, as a global city with its financial and service sectors, has 
prospered in light of the adoption of neoliberal policies that have required, among others, 
the recruitment of highly skilled migrants and the implementation of free tax areas in order 
to attract financial industry and service transnational companies (Sassen, 1991). 
Neoliberalism in Dubai is entrenched with the political power and the new middle-class, 
which consists of naturalized citizens with a migration background. They represent the link 
between tradition and modernity, between neoliberalism as a free market ideology and the 
Emirati context. 
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4.5 Emiratis versus non-Emiratis?    
Having discussed the Gulf’s ethnic diversity and the formation of the UAE, in this 
section I analyse the relationships between Emiratis and non-Emiratis in order to highlight 
that the distinction between these categories is not clear-cut.  
In the UAE, the discovery of oil dramatically changed the relations between the 
rulers and the local population. In Dubai, during the pre-oil phase, the Indian and Persian 
merchants were granted access to the port by paying reduced dues and with the consent and 
support of the ruling family (Al-Maktum). They were viewed as part of the social fabric of 
Dubai and benefited from their position and ties with the ruling family (Kanna, 2011). Today 
the Indian and Iranian merchant class still forms elite in Dubai and is “in a privileged position 
vis-a-vis non-nationals” (Kanna, 2011, p. 61) (see below).  
The formation of the UAE federation, with its borders, political and economic 
systems and bureaucratic apparatus challenged the relations between ethnic communities. 
Two events, the discovery of oil and the birth of the new polity, led to the establishment of 
boundaries among different ethnic communities. For example, the  
relations between the Baloch and the Arabs [in the UAE] changed after the oil economy made 
the region one of the richest in the world. Previously, the Baloch were held in high esteem 
among the Arabs as chivalrous and gallant and regarded as equals, but since the oil boom there 
has been an increasing feeling of aversion and distrust toward them. For their part, the Baloch 
regard the Arabs as unreliable (Jahani, 2014, p. 283).  
However, Cohen (1985) argues that although members of a community are ethnically 
different, this difference does not subvert the sense of belonging to a community, which is 
an aggregate of different elements, bodies, institutions, perceptions and meanings, and where 
people share symbols and dynamics. For Cohen (1985), the difference existing within a 
community relies on the meaning that individuals attribute to shared symbols and to the 
different roles that they exercise within the community (see chapter 7). The old ‘Gulfies’ 
community, which was held together by economic interests and intermarriages, was 
challenged by the two events but they did not dismantle the UAE social fabric.  
The two events (the discovery of oil and the birth of the federation) created a division 
within the UAE society. In 1972, the adoption of the citizenship law (no. 17) established a 
separation between Emiratis and non-Emiratis. A process of identification and categorization 
of people on the grounds of their origins, ethnicity and nationality started. In my view, this 
dichotomy, however, is more complex than it might appear, and it relates to the concept of 
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‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’. The Gulf’s ethnic diversity has made it complicated to define 
who were ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ Emiratis because of intermarriages and mélange occurred 
over the centuries in this area, especially along the coastal areas and port cities (Beeman, 
2009).  
Emiratis is a contested, stratified and multi-layered category that encompasses 
people from different ethnic origins. ‘Pure’ Emiratis are members of the ruling families and 
local Arabs who are able to trace their origins (Dresch, 2005) to the Al Bu Falasah tribe, a 
section of the Bani Yas confederation (Davidson, 2008a; Kanna, 2010). Apart from members 
of the ruling families, ‘pure’ Emiratis are considered those who hold the khulāṣat al-qayd, 
which is obviously possessed by the ruling families (Al Qassemi, 2010). One of my Emirati 
participants, who works in the public sector, before signing the work contract had to bring 
the book to the office so that authorities could verify her ‘nationality’. The definition of the 
category of ‘pure’ Emiratis is rather questionable because historically different waves of 
migration have taken place in the Trucial States; intermarriages have also ‘contaminated’ 
the ‘authenticity’ of the ‘pure’ Emiratis blood genealogy, and also because local tribes 
accepted by affiliation members of other tribes and ethnic groups (Heard-Bey, 2013).   
People who have been granted citizenship are considered as ‘naturalized’ Emiratis. 
There are different types of naturalized citizens. Historically, there are Sunni Persians of the 
Iranian coast of the Gulf (ʿajami), who migrated to the Trucial States at the beginning of the 
1900s (Davidson, 2008a; Heard-Bey, 2013). There are also Baluchis, who have different 
origins, and their presence in the Trucial States at the beginning of the twentieth century 
amounted to about 1,400 (Jahani, 2014); in a few years the UAE authorities granted them 
citizenship in return for military service (Jahani, 2014). More recently, some non-Gulf Arabs 
who migrated to the UAE have also been granted citizenship. They share with locals a 
language, religion and cultural traits; however, they are not considered as ‘nationals’ (Ali, 
2010). Lastly, we also have some members of the Indian elite, who have been naturalized 
because of their longstanding presence in the UAE, their language skills and their historical 
links with the country (Kanna, 2011; Vora, 2013). However, all these naturalized Emiratis 
are not considered as ‘nationals’ (Ali, 2010). 
Emiratis is thus a multi-layered category, in which ‘pure’ Emiratis are granted 
benefits and advantages (free land/house, welfare services, free education) because they hold 
the family book, so they get citizenship (muwāṭin) and nationality (jinsiya), they are citizens 
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and ‘nationals’. Then, there are all other Emiratis, who are naturalized because of historical, 
economic and specific circumstances but are regarded as second-class citizens (Kanna, 
2010). Naturalized Emiratis do not enjoy the same benefits and advantages of ‘pure’ 
Emiratis. Because they do not possess the family book, they are not “eligible for government 
benefits such free education, land grants, housing, direct cash payments and other welfare 
benefits, though they acquire UAE passport.” (Ali, 2010, p. 137). These second-class 
citizens, who represent the elite in the UAE, especially in Dubai, suffers social stigma 
attached to the lack of an Emirati background (Ali, 2010; Kanna, 2010). These Emiratis are 
‘discriminated’ in relation to ‘pure’ Emiratis. They are considered citizens because they have 
an Emirati passport, but they have a ‘foreign’ background because they have been 
naturalized (Kanna, 2010). Naturalized Emiratis can see their status changed if they are 
considered to be posing a threat to state security, or if they commit criminal offenses; they 
are then “Emiratis on sufferance” (Dresch, 2005, p. 143). The category Emiratis is thus 
contested and embraces different ethnic groups, and as such, it reflects the historical ethnic 
diversity of the Gulf region.  
The non-Emiratis category appears to be defined. All foreign workers55, regardless 
of the length of their stay in the country, are considered as contractual workers. As such, 
they are temporary and at a certain point they will have to leave the country. This category, 
however, is also contested and stratified. Vora (2013) has pointed out the importance of 
South Asians in ‘building up’ the UAE, and many long-residence Indians speak Arabic. The 
Indian elite (especially merchants), who has had historical links and longstanding economic 
and commercial relationships with the UAE, is considered as non-Emirati. But, in my view, 
they could be defined as ‘half-citizens’, which means that even though they could apply for 
citizenship they are not interested in it because they have some benefits and rights granted 
by the UAE authorities, such as acting as sponsor (Vora, 2010). Thus, all foreign workers, 
despite long-residence in the country, are always considered as non-Emiratis. This is the 
state of ‘permanent impermanence’ (Ali, 2010), and their children, even if they are born in 
the UAE, “are citizens of their father’s (or sometimes mother’s) country of passport, even if 
they themselves have never been there” (Ali, 2010, p. ix).  
Non-Emiratis is a multi-layered category and it includes members of different 
nationalities and class. Ethnographic accounts have underscored the discrimination that 
                                            
55 The GCC nationals have fewer restrictions on living and working in the country than other foreign workers. 
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South Asians feel as a consequence of their passport, the mistreatment in comparison to 
Westerners, who are sometimes less educated and less experienced, and such discrimination 
becomes evident in terms of salary (Kanna, 2010; Vora, 2013; Gardner, 2008). Non-Emiratis 
is a varied category and is reductive to limit it only to Westerners and Asians. During my 
fieldwork in Dubai (2014 and 2015), I saw many Africans working and living there. The 
presence of East Africans in this region is historically documented (Izady 2002) but the 
presence of Cameroonians and Ugandans is very recent (Malit & Oliver, 2014; Oliver & 
Malit, 2014).  
The UAE authorities seem to not have ‘erased’ their multi-cultural past, which is still 
evident in Dubai (Vora, 2013). They tried to categorize and identify Emiratis and non-
Emiratis through a citizenship law, which demarcated boundaries between nationals and 
non-nationals thus attributing benefits and advantages to the former and excluding the latter. 
As outlined above, the separation between these two categories is not clear-cut. Non-
Emiratis, who have resided in the country for many years and even though they are not 
citizens, feel part of the UAE social fabric and they act as if they were Emiratis (‘half-
citizens’) (Vora, 2010). The second generation of ‘naturalized’ Emiratis, who are defined by 
Kanna (2010) as ‘flexible citizens’ and who are able to enjoy the benefits of the free market 
economy of Dubai (see above), express their belonging to their family traditions and 
customs, and feel that they belong to the Emirati context (Ali, 2010), even though they feel 
second class citizens. 
The discovery of oil and the formation of the UAE federation created boundaries 
among ethnic communities. In the UAE, boundaries are represented by the distinction 
between Emiratis and non-Emiratis, however, because these two categories are dynamic, 
contested and multi-layered the distinction is not sharp and defined, but sometimes they 
overlap. In my view, ethnographic accounts have failed in part to grasp the dynamic and 
contested nature of both categories and have discussed them as two distinct groups, thus 
stereotyping has become a pervasive way to perceive the ‘other’ (Vora, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
4.5.1 Nationality, gender and class  
As mentioned in the previous section, the UAE authorities place limitations on 
migrants in relation to their nationalities and class. This section attempts to emphasize the 
ethno-racial and gender hierarchies existing in the country.  
The division of labour in the UAE, where nationals are employed in the public sector 
and foreigners in the private sector (Baldwin-Edwards, 2011), intensifies existing cultural, 
social and economic differences between nationals and foreigners. As Kathiravelu (2016) 
argues, such divisions create ethno-racial and gender hierarchies. For Vora (2013), these 
hierarchies are evident in local and transnational companies, which set their payment scales 
based on nationality rather than skills. Consequently, South Asian employees are paid less 
than Westerners, who are sometimes less qualified and experienced. The experiences of 
Ester, one of my participants, who had previously studied and worked in Pakistan and in the 
UK, are illustrative of such discriminatory practices. A few years ago, Ester got married and 
moved, first to Abu Dhabi, and then, also with her husband, to Dubai, where she now works 
for an international company. She said “they [Westerners] have very low experience, very 
low qualifications but just because of the passport and their nationalities, they are paid a lot 
higher” (Interview with Ester, 13th October 2015). Companies tend to recruit white 
Westerners because they provide them “a better ‘image’” (Vora, 2013, p. 124).  
Indeed, ethno-racial hierarchies go hand in hand with gender hierarchies: 
“occupations in the UAE are often divided along the lines of gender and nationality as well, 
with companies actively recruiting employees from certain parts of the world for gendered 
occupations” (Vora, 2013, p. 78). In the Gulf region, the majority of migrant women are 
employed as domestic workers (Fernandez, 2014). This specific niche of the local labour 
market, as Gamburd (2009, p. 70) suggests, is not only gendered but also ethnically and 
religiously stratified: “In the UAE, for example, within the housemaid category, housemaids 
from the Philippines are paid more than those from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and 
Bangladesh in that order. Racial, ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes predetermine 
wages”. Moreover, a married man can, as a husband, sponsor his wife and children, whereas 
women cannot act as sponsors unless they are employed in high ranked jobs. Unemployed 
foreign women thus depend on their fathers or husbands for residency (Vora, 2013). Fathers 
can sponsor their children: boys until the age of eighteen, or upon completion of a university 
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degree, and girls until they get married. In Dubai, discrimination thus runs along national, 
gender and class lines. 
Despite the existence of ethno-racial and gender hierarchies, some migrant 
communities are targeted by a further discrimination, which relies on class. Pakistani 
professionals and all other middle-class workers are not discriminated against in terms of 
family reunification, nor are they residentially segregated within labour camps, as it happens 
to construction workers (see chapter 7). The Pakistani professionals share the same spaces 
and facilities with many nationalities including Westerners, Chinese, affluent Indians, 
Iranians as well as with nationals and naturalized Emiratis (see chapter 7). Low-wage 
migrants, however, especially construction workers, cannot apply for family reunification 
because they do not earn enough money; they live in labour camps, mostly with South Asians 
and, to a lesser extent, with East Asians and Africans, and their passports are sometimes 
withheld by employers/sponsors (see chapter 6). John, one of the Pakistani professionals I 
interviewed, said of discrimination that,  
it is not evident, it is not blatant, but of course the feeling is always there, you know. If a white 
man goes, he will get more attention than you, unless you show, you present yourself as 
something different, that you are not a labourer you are an educated guy (Interview with John, 
6th November 2014).  
John emphasized that some nationalities are targeted by discrimination and also underscored 
that it is class-based. This aspect has been underlined by Kanna (2011), who argues that, in 
order to understand the experience of South Asians in the Gulf region, it is necessary to 
separate nationality and class. South Asian working-class people are subject to constraints, 
limitations and discrimination which are not suffered by the South Asian elite and middle-
class (Gardner, 2008).  Vora (2013, p. 131), in discussing racial and class hierarchies among 
Indians in Dubai, underlines how the Indian middle-class “blamed migrants for the racism 
they experienced in their own lives, arguing that because uneducated and unskilled workers 
constitute the majority of South Asians in the Gulf, people assume all Indians are uneducated 
and unskilled”. Discrimination is thus embedded within a system of class differentiation in 
which the perception of the ‘other’ (e. g. Indians) is stereotyped. Ethno-racial and gender 
hierarchies affect the way in which Indians are perceived, viewed and stereotyped by others. 
Despite all being members of the Indian community, class determines how middle-class, 
working-class and élite Indians identify and consider themselves. Thus, class creates a 
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fracture within the Indian community as some of its members have benefits and advantages 
that others do not. For example, old Indian merchants might be viewed as ‘half-citizens’ 
because they “govern the day-to-day lives of migrant workers, thereby assuming 
responsibility for the migrants’ well-being” (Vora, 2010, p. 47). As said in chapter 3, class 
judgements have been observed in other contexts and have characterized the debate on 
migration and class (Oliver & O’Reilly, 2010; Van Hear, 2014). 
In conclusion, the UAE authorities have set limitations on migrants in relation to 
their nationality, gender and class. Some groups of migrants are targeted by discrimination, 
and some more than others. Vora (2013) and Kathiravelu (2015) have highlighted that 
discrimination is also ‘self-perpetuated’, meaning that migrants tend to perpetuate their own 
discrimination through co-ethnic exploitation. For example, within the Indian community, 
discrimination, prejudices and stereotypes tend to shape intra-community relations (Vora, 
2013). Thus migrants, especially those on low-wages, are subject to discrimination both from 
within and outside the ethno-national community; they are targeted by a ‘multi-layered 
discrimination’. 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the historical evolution and the formation of the khalījī 
community in order to illustrate its ethnic diversity, which is also evident in the current ethnic 
composition of the Gulf countries and in the formation of the UAE as a nation-state. By 
moving beyond methodological nationalism, I have argued that the UAE is trapped between 
the need to ‘safeguard’ its own national identity and the need to move beyond national 
boundaries in order to prosper and flourish. I have also discussed the evolution of Dubai and 
its development as an international financial hub that, through the lens of the concept of 
global city, allows grasping how the adoption of neoliberal policies has entailed the creation 
of a relaxed free taxing environment, and at the same time, the creation of institutionalized 
hierarchies.  
After the formation of the UAE federation (1971), the local authorities implemented a 
citizenship law to create a division between Emiratis and non-Emiratis mainly based on the 
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grounds of nationality. However, it is not easy to draw a boundary between these categories 
because they are fluid and dynamic, and sometimes they overlap. There are ‘half-citizens’ 
who, regardless of citizenship, share some of the privileges granted to ‘pure’ Emiratis by 
local authorities because of their long residence in the country (Vora, 2010). Naturalized 
Emiratis, who ‘feel’ second-class citizens, are part of the elite especially in Dubai because 
they work in Emirati companies and combine the neoliberal ethos with the traditional and 
local customs (Kanna, 2011).  
Despite the UAE authorities having tried to divide and distinguish two different 
categories (Emiratis and non-Emiratis), in practice this division seems blurred and contested. 
The enhancement of and references to the past in order to spread a sense of belonging among 
‘pure’ Emiratis and to strengthen the UAE national identity intertwines with the presence of 
migrants (see also chapter 8). The UAE’s history is embedded in the Gulf’s ethnic diversity 
and in its multi-cultural ‘nature’. ‘Pure’ Emiratis recognize the role of South Asians in 
‘building’ the country, and some of them speak Hindi or Urdu as a legacy of their multi-
cultural past, as some of my Emirati participants emphasized.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PAKISTANI COMMUNITY IN THE UAE AND DUBAI  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the extant literature on migration in the GCC countries (chapter 3) 
and the setting of my field research (chapter 4), in this chapter, I analyse the evolution of 
migration in the UAE. In detail, I examine the migration experience of Pakistanis in the 
country and I also introduce some elements and characteristics of the Pakistani community 
in Dubai (e. g. ethnic composition).  
My argument is that migration from Pakistan has historical roots as well as structural 
and cultural shifts that frame and allow it. Migration has been articulated through contacts 
and relations between Pakistan and the UAE. I argue that the Pakistani community appears 
as cohesive but it is internally stratified and in which divisions also emerge; however, as I 
discuss throughout the thesis, this has not challenged their sense of belonging to ‘Pakistani-
ness’. In addition, in light of gendered and racialized hierarchies existing in the UAE 
(Mahdavi, 2011), I contend that social interactions between Pakistanis and Emiratis did not 
appear to be ‘flawed’ by the issue of discrimination, which, instead, has been discussed by 
the extant literature on migration in the GCC countries (Gardner, 2010a; Vora, 2013, 
Kathiravelu, 2016) and I also perceived when I was in Dubai. 
This chapter draws both on the extant literature on migration in the Arab Gulf region 
and my qualitative data collection. It is structured as follows. Before discussing the historical 
evolution of migration of Pakistanis to the UAE, I provide a general overview of the impact 
of migration on the federation. I then analyse the decision-making process and the historical 
links that has triggered the migration flow of Pakistanis to the UAE. The main characteristics 
of the Pakistani community are addressed in the following section, and lastly, I analyse the 
relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis. 
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5.2 Oil, migration and globalization in the UAE 
In this section, I discuss the main characteristics of migration and labour market in 
the UAE. Since its inception in 1971, the UAE has undergone a rapid economic and social 
development, which has dramatically changed the traditional social, economic and political 
structures (Davidson, 2005). However, the lack of skills among the local population and the 
scarcity of human resources available locally represented a problem for the UAE authorities 
and their development projects (Birks & Sinclair, 1980a). 
Since the 1970s, the presence of foreign workers in the country has increased (Table 
5.1).  
       Table 5.1 Nationals and Non-nationals in the UAE (various years) 
  Nationals Non-nationals Total 
1975 201,544 356,343 557,887 
1980 290,544 751,555 1,042,099 
1985 396,114 983,189 1,379,303 
1995 587,330 1,823,711 2,411,041 
2005 825,495 3,280,932 4,106,427 
  2010*  947,997*  7,316,073*   8,264,070* 
       *Mid-year estimate 
Source: GLMM http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-population-by-nationality-emirati-non-emirati-at-census-dates-1975-     
2005-and-2010-estimate/ [accessed 17 June 2015].  
In 2005, South and Southeast Asians were at 87.1 percent and non-GCC Arabs were at 8.7 
percent (ILO, 2009). In 2005, the national population, in terms of gender distribution, was 
quite homogeneous, but there was a large discrepancy between males and females in non-
national population, which was characterized by the massive presence of males (Table 5.2). 
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           Table 5.2 Nationals and non-nationals by sex (2005) 
    Total 
Nationals 
 
825,495 
Males 
 
417,917 
Females 
 
407,578 
Non-nationals 3,280,932 
Males 
 
2,388,235 
Females   892,697 
               Source: Adaptation mine from the GLMM http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-population-by-nationality-emirati-non-
emirati-sex-and-emirate-2005/ [accessed 17 June 2015]. 
There are three main aspects to underline. First, the oil economy changed the UAE society.56 
The traditional economic activities, such as pearl-diving, pastoralism and shipbuilding 
disappeared (Davidson, 2005). Foreign workers were recruited to establish the necessary 
infrastructures to deal with the new needs and aspirations of a modern society (Errichiello, 
2012a). Implementing development projects and building basic infrastructures, such as 
schools and hospitals, entailed recruiting foreign workers; thus their presence became a 
marker of the UAE society, and Emiratis, as nationals (muwātinūn), perceived themselves 
as a distinct community and separate from migrants (wāfidūn) (Khalaf, 2005). Moreover, 
since the 1970s, in the UAE, cities have grown and changed rapidly. Khalaf (2006) argues 
that the multi-ethnic character of the Gulf cities, especially coastal cities such as Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai, relies on the residential segregation of foreign workers in which ethnicity, culture 
and salary determine the settlement of migrant communities in particular neighbourhoods. 
Second, the presence of foreign workers in the UAE has been growing in the last few 
decades, and it has represented an issue for the UAE authorities, because nationals have 
numerically become a minority (Baldwin-Edwards 2011) in their country. One of the major 
concerns for the local authorities is the composition of foreign communities, which is varied 
and internally stratified (Gardner, 2008; Buckley, 2012; Vora 2013). According to some 
                                            
56 In 1938, Shaykh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al-Nuhayyan, who ruled, in Abu Dhabi, from 1928 to 1966, signed a 
seventy-five year concession with the IPC. The oil was discovered in 1958 and the first oil tons were exported 
in 1962. In 1966, Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nuhayyan (who reigned from 1966 to 2004) deposed Shaykh 
Shakhbut, and the first development projects were implemented (Davidson 2009a). In the 1960s, oil was also 
discovered in Dubai and by 1969, three oil fields were underway, and it began to export oil (Davidson, 2008a).  
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estimates, in 2014, Indians numbered 2.6 million, Pakistanis 1.2 million, Bangladeshis 
700,000 (in 2013) Filipinos 525,530, and UAE nationals 1.085 million (in 2015).57 The 
demographic imbalance is thus evident which means that non-nationals outnumber 
nationals.  
Third, since the 1990s, globalization has also accelerated modernization; it has 
mobilized human and material resources, and blurred national boundaries (Fox, Murtada-
Sabbah & al-Mutawa, 2006). Flows of commodities, products, services and people have 
been promoted by the UAE because of the material benefits, which “far outweigh the 
detrimental aspects” (Abdulla, 2006a, p. 181). However, the rulers of the UAE have 
perceived political and cultural globalization as an unwanted intrusion and “as a menace to 
deeply held social values” (Abdulla, 2006a, p. 181). Globalization is seen by the UAE 
authorities as a positive force in terms of economic and commercial benefits, but political 
and cultural globalization is perceived as a threat to the stability of the monarchy and to 
national identity (Abdulla, 2006a). In the UAE, nationals have an ambivalent attitude 
towards globalization. On the one hand, they consider it as a positive force of change that 
has improved their lifestyle and has projected the UAE in the global economy (Khalaf, 
2005). On the other hand, globalization is seen as a threat against local traditions and values, 
and the presence of many migrants from different cultures, religions and nationalities is seen 
as a danger for the Emirati culture and identity (Khalaf, 2002).  
The oil economy, migration and globalization also affected the UAE labour market, 
which is segmented in light of dichotomies between nationals/migrant workers and 
public/private sector. The Emirati labour market, as in the other GCC countries, is 
characterised by a massive presence of nationals in the public sector and migrant workers in 
the private sector (Malit & Al Youha, 2013). To make the local population more self-
sufficient, the UAE authorities have implemented “emiratization” (Davidson, 2005, p. 145) 
of the workforce by encouraging the participation of nationals in the private sector. Such a 
measure is seen both as a way to reduce the dependence on foreign workers, and as a “curb 
on the perceived erosion of cultural and religious identities” (Davidson, 2005, p. 145).  
To sum up, the massive presence of migrant workers has led to a demographic 
imbalance whereby non-nationals represent the majority of the UAE population. The local 
                                            
57 http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-estimates-of-population-residing-in-the-uae-by-country-of-citizenship-selected-
countries-2014/  [accessed 16 June 2015]. 
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labour market is characterized by a separation between the public and private sectors. 
Migrant workers are employed in the private sector and nationals in the public (Davidson, 
2005). This is why the government has opted for a nationalization policy, which aims at 
curbing the presence of foreign workers. This policy has been implemented to deal with 
challenges posed to Emirati identity represented by the demographic imbalance and 
globalization, which are affecting national, cultural, political and religious aspects of the 
country (see chapter 8).  
 
 
 
5.3 The sponsorship system 
In the GCC countries, migration is shaped and determined by the sponsorship system 
(kafāla), which regulates migration and through which a migrant worker (makfūl) can enter 
and work legally in the GCC countries (Dito, 2014).  
 A migrant worker who wishes to obtain a temporary work permit to be employed in 
the GCC countries needs a kafīl (sponsor). The kafīl, who must be a GCC national or a local 
company, takes financial and legal responsibility for the migrant. This means that every 
migrant is tied to a local employer (Lori, 2012). As such, the sponsorship system creates an 
income for nationals and this inhibits their participation in the (private) labour market. 
Therefore, when the temporary migrant workers enter the GCC countries, the kafīl is 
responsible for them (Roper & Barria, 2014).  
The system was established by the Arab Gulf authorities in the 1950s to protect the 
local unskilled and semi-skilled workforce because of the growing presence of foreign 
workers coming from other Arab countries (Kapiszewski, 2006; Baldwin-Edwards, 2011). 
The sponsorship system is based upon the exclusion of migrant workers from benefits and 
advantages of the rentier state58 (Longva, 1997). Dito (2014) contends that exclusion was 
rooted in the tribal nature of the Gulf regimes, where the ruling families59 conceived “the 
                                            
58 In rentier states, “rulers disburse funds in order to build a cohesive, stable state, and buy themselves the 
political consent of their people” (Babar, 2014, p. 409). 
59 The ruling families of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait belong to “ʽAnazas of central Arabia. The ʽAnaza 
tribe is amongst the largest and most ancient Arabian tribes. Its members can be traced back to the Prophet 
Muhammad’s companions and its descendants can be found across the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in non-
Arab Iran and Turkey” (Al-Qassemi, 2012, p. 2). For the ruling families of the UAE, see chapter 4. 
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nation as a “natural” and ethnically “pure” community, as opposed to its liberal 
conceptualisation as a community based on equal rights and duties” (Longva 2005, p. 119). 
Migrants’ exclusion has to be framed within the context of wealth redistribution strategies, 
where the number of beneficiaries needed circumscribing (Dito, 2014). Therefore, exclusion 
is the essential requirement for maintaining wealth redistribution to the GCC nationals, 
which would become impossible if migrants were integrated as equals into the society (Dito, 
2014).  
Through the kafāla system, the Gulf countries delegate to their citizens the functions 
of controlling and managing migration that are typically governed by local institutions (Dito, 
2014). This system plays a key role “in the rentier state redistribution policies, contributing 
towards reproducing and maintaining the existing socio-political power structures” (Dito, 
2014, p. 82).  
In conclusion, as Longva (1997) points out, the sponsorship system relies on the idea 
of dominance in which the relationship between the employer and the employees is regulated 
and framed within the context of power relationships. The employee’s agency is enabled and 
constrained by the employer’s status as a national who has privileges and advantages 
granted.    
 
 
 
 
5.4 Pakistanis in the UAE 
As outlined in chapter 3, the migration project relies on the capacity of 
knowledgeable agents to interact with structures and mobilize their resources to migrate. In 
this section, I discuss the presence of Pakistanis in the UAE; how their ‘migration project’ 
was driven by their social and cultural background where migration was perceived as an 
important experience of their life. I draw on my qualitative data collection. This section 
revolves around three sub-sections. First, the decision-making process and the importance 
of migration for Pakistanis; second, how the historical links between Pakistan and the UAE 
have fostered migration; and third, I discuss the characteristics of Pakistani migrants in the 
country.  
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5.4.1 The decision-making process  
The literature on international migration is mainly focused on two perspectives. The 
first emphasizes the causes that push people to migrate in which such a decision is made by 
individuals on the basis of economic reasons (functionalist/classical approaches) (Goss & 
Lindquist, 1995; O’Reilly, 2012b). The second focuses on the difference between societies 
(structural approaches) (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; O’Reilly, 2012b), which means that 
“migration movements are in large part the result of unequal ‘structural’ relationships” 
(Addleton, 1992, p. 16). However, the distinction between these two different approaches is 
not clear-cut (Addleton, 1992). Afsar (2016, p. 165), in her study on the Bangladeshi 
migrants in the GCC countries, argues that decision-making “is a multi-layered and 
multidimensional process in which the context and causes that prompted the decision to 
migrate and the strategies to overcome barriers in the implementation of the migration 
decision often work simultaneously”.  
The decision to migrate is based on the coexistence of push and pull factors, it relies 
on a complex set of economic, social (and sometimes political) reasons. However, beyond 
the structural factors, migration is driven by a decision made by individuals which is 
entangled in socio-cultural and economic factors. As Osella and Osella (2000) argue, 
migration to the Gulf countries is part of the South Asian background or at least of some 
area of the region. In this regard, there is the existence of ‘culture of migration’ (Massey et 
al., 2008) thus meaning that migration is part of some individuals’ life. As said in chapter 3, 
the decision-making process is driven by habitus which is transmitted from practice to 
practice and it is a decision that occurs especially in times of crisis or difficulties (Elder-
Vass, 2010). For Osella and Osella (2000, p. 120), Gulf migration strictly relates to “the 
male life-cycle … migrating to the Gulf does not only spell an escape from unemployment 
but is also a move away from payyan-hood (young immature status) towards full adult status 
as a householder, defined by the combination of marriage, fatherhood and showing ability 
as a ‘provider’”.  
Migration from Pakistan, and from the other South Asian countries, is considered as 
a ‘rite of passage’ (Osella & Osella, 2000) for some young Pakistani men, which means that 
international migration has become part of their everyday lives (see below). This is what 
Ballard (2003) defined as ‘migration fever’. Naseer, one of my participants, is a Pakistani 
man that migrated to the Arab Gulf region in 1979. He spent five years in Saudi Arabia 
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where he worked for an American oil company and then he was transferred by the company 
to Dubai. Now he is retired, and he still lives in Dubai where he has established his own 
company. He described migration to Dubai as a valued experience but with many problems 
and constraints. He said  
…in our Asian countries if somebody says that I want to take you to Dubai for him is the end 
of the world. Some people I know in Pakistan they sell their land, they sell their animals, which 
is their only means of earning to come to Dubai and if they are not in the right place, they have 
to go back and they struggle actually.  It is true that the life here is unmatchable, it is one of 
the finest place to live but cost of living in Dubai is very very high (Interview with Naseer, 
24th October 2015).  
Naseer grasped the impact of the ‘migration fever’ on the households and the uncertainties 
of the migration experience that in some cases push people to change their migration project 
upon their arrival in Dubai. In the above quotation, the projective dimension of human 
agency emerges clearly, and the need to convert their capital in order to migrate. Migrants 
situated in a specific time and place (Stones, 2005) adopt strategies and mobilize their 
resources in order to migrate. Migration, at least in the South Asian context, is mostly a 
‘family affair’. As Nichols (2008, p. 142) argues, the decision-making process is rarely an 
independent and individual act, but migration is adopted by the extended family in order to 
“earn, save, and remit as much as possible to the home”. Household is thus involved in the 
migration project, which sometimes entails mortgaging “themselves to the hilt to raise the 
necessary cash” (Ballard, 2003, p. 29).  
There are two elements that I wish to underline. First, migration from the global 
South is viewed as a way to alleviate the poor economic conditions and trigger development 
(Castles & Miller, 2009). The migration-development nexus is, however, controversial.60 
Ballard (2003) illustrates the role played by remittances in fostering development in the 
country of origin. According to him, the debate on migration and development should be 
framed within the local and global context where the remittances are a useful tool to start 
development. But it has to be supported by the state or government because a remittances-
driven development is not substantially a proper development especially when the 
government does not put in place actions to foster it. One of my participants, Jamal, who has 
                                            
60 This nexus is still controversial because it is sometimes perceived as a loss of the most qualified people that 
is counterbalanced by remittances. It is sometimes perceived as a way to promote local, regional and national 
development through remittances. However, the discourse on migration-development nexus is full of gaps and 
risks being “unsettled and unresolved” (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 58).  
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spent more than fifteen years in Dubai, described the nexus migration-development as a win-
win situation. He said 
I think it is a win-win situation on both sides. The market benefits, the country grows, the 
expatriates benefit through the money that they make out here, their home country grows in 
terms of remittances, most importantly families of the workers here benefit greatly because 
they are always economically upwardly mobile. So I think the number of cases where people 
who has suffered and not benefited because of the system here is very few compare to the 
number of people who have benefited. So overall, I think it is a win-win situation on both sides 
(Interview with Jamal 3rd November 2014). 
Jamal, as discussed in chapter 2, has a very well paid job in the Emirati government. During 
my field research, I met him several times and he always contended that the migration 
experience is positive for many migrants because it serves, to a certain extent, to alleviate 
their poor economic conditions, and he also argued that would-be migrants are aware of the 
working and living conditions before migrating to Dubai. His reasoning relies on the idea 
that it is better to have a job, with all the constraints and difficulties attached to this job, 
rather than being unemployed in the home country (from my field notes, 28th October 2014). 
However, in the above quotation, Jamal underestimates the uncertainties that derive from 
being a migrant, which demands the need to move to a new country and the separation from 
the family (on family issues see chapter 6). He tends to emphasize the economic advantages 
of migration but he clearly underestimates its social and emotional impacts on migrants’ 
lives (e. g. separation, dislocation). Ahmad (1984) argued that migration from Pakistan to 
Dubai has also psychological consequences that led some migrants to suffer the so-called 
‘Dubai syndrome’ derived from the harsh working and living conditions, isolation, 
separation and loneliness.    
Second, in Pakistan and in other South Asian countries, migration is perceived as a 
‘rite of passage’. For example, Peter, one of my participants, arrived in Dubai in 2008, when 
he was nineteen years old. When his father died he had to find a job to support his family. 
He thus decided to move to Dubai where he has been able to get a good job as an accountant 
in a private company. He defined exactly the condition in which the poor young Pakistanis 
are embedded when they decide to migrate to Dubai, and anxiety and expectations that their 
families ‘put on their shoulders’. He said 
you leave your family and the impression in such class [blue-collar workers] is that once you 
move over there [Dubai] your life is set. I have met some people; they ask what do you do? 
And their answer is “I am in Dubai”, the next answer nobody is going to ask: “what do you do 
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in Dubai?” They are just get satisfied: Oh!!! you are in Dubai so you are settled…When they 
move back obviously they are there for one month or 20 days or 30 days, they spend more 
than normal, because they spend for their families and to provide them with some comforts to 
give them a better life and enjoy as most as we are together. Other people perceive “oh wow, 
he is rich, he is making much”. They want to come to Dubai as well. They are looking like 
people that have made money. Even though the actual thing is that you are not making money, 
you are not making much into that but this sort of things actually make them believe that they 
are making much, and they even take loans to come over here (Interview with Peter, 15th 
October 2015).  
Peter emphasized that migration, at least in Dubai, is perceived by other fellow townsmen 
and family as an experience that can change positively people’s life. This perception is 
reinforced and perpetuated by migrants upon their visits in the home villages because they 
buy things that most of them cannot afford (Osella & Osella, 2000). They tend to project the 
image of migration as a fruitful experience that can lead some benefits and advantages to the 
family (Gardner, 2010a; Afsar, 2016). Peter’s quote resembles the attitude that Osella and 
Osella (2000, p. 122, original emphasis) have recognized among Keralan migrants, who 
leave their  
village as immature youths…visits home are opportunities to demonstrate not only financial, 
but also age and gender-related progress. Consumer goods accumulated in the parental home 
will eventually form part of the gulfan’s own household on marriage. Displays of substantial 
cash reassures onlookers that he is becoming a man of means, with resources to support a wife 
and children. 
In Pakistan, and throughout the South Asian region, remittances and social prestige, which 
derive from being a migrant in the GCC countries, drive migration. Gardner (2010a) 
underscored the importance of being perceived by fellow townsmen and family as a 
successful migrant even though this might not be ‘true’ because the family back home has 
invested money in migration and they expect that their family member is successful and 
could remit as much money as possible back home.  
 
 
5.4.2 The historical links 
In the UAE, the historical presence of Pakistanis relates to the presence of Baluchis, 
who are now naturalized Emiratis and mostly employed in the UAE police forces (Jahani, 
2014). The presence of Baluchi families that originated from the region of Makran, in 
Pakistan, dates back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Baluchi presence 
is attested in Oman (Jahani, 2014; Peterson, 2013). In the UAE, the number of Baluchis 
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increased when in the 1950s Oman sold the Makran protectorate to Pakistan and most of 
them migrated to the UAE to work as luggage porters but also in the military and police 
services (Davidson, 2008a; Jahani, 2014).  
The links between the UAE and Pakistan have shaped over the centuries (Ahmed, 
1984; Addleton, 1992), when many Indians, before the partition of 1947 that led to the 
formation of Pakistan, migrated to the Gulf region including the UAE (Onley, 2014). More 
recently, in 1971, the partition of the East Pakistan province, which led to the formation of 
Bangladesh, represented a turning point in the Pakistani policy. The then Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (in charge from 1973 to 1977) “made a conscious decision to embrace 
Middle Eastern economic and cultural [and Islamic] connections” (Nichols, 2008, p. 143). 
Thus, in order to be recognized as a country linked to the Islamic world, Pakistan hosted the 
Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974 (Addleton, 1992). This was the occasion for 
Pakistan to accrue its credentials as representative of the Islamic world and its belonging to 
the Islamic ‘bloc’ (Addleton, 1992). This also entailed establishing relations with the Arab 
Gulf countries (e. g. Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE)   
In 1971, when the UAE federation was created (see chapter 4), Pakistan was the first 
country that recognized the new polity in the region by establishing its embassy (Ahmed, 
1984). The links became stronger in the 1980s when the airline company of Dubai, the 
Emirates Airline, was established. It happened with the support of the Pakistan International 
Arline, which trained the staff of the emerging company and the first flight of the Emirates 
was between Dubai and Karachi (Davidson, 2008a). This event led some Pakistanis to move 
and settle down in Dubai. One participant’s husband was brought up in Dubai where his 
father moved in the 1980s to work for the Emirates Airline (Interview with Leila, 14th 
October 2015). Rita, one of my participants, moved to Dubai when she was very young 
because her father started working with the Emirates Airline. She studied in the USA and 
UK. After her graduation she got married with an Indian man who converted to Islām and 
moved to Oman. However, in 2012 they divorced, and she decided to return to Dubai, where 
she now works for an international company. Now her parents live in the USA. She moved 
to Dubai because her father  
was a pilot at the Emirates Airline. He worked for the Pakistan International Airline and then 
he passed to the Emirates Airline. He did the first flight of the Emirates; he was part of the 
crew and the team that set up the Emirates. That is why we came here when I was ten (interview 
with Rita, 27th October 2015). 
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Rita’s story illustrated how the links between Pakistan and the UAE, the economic and 
financial activities can also affect families thus pushing them to settle down in a new country. 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Migration to the UAE from the 1960s 
Migration from Pakistan has been cultivated through contacts and relations between 
Pakistan and the UAE, emerging out of a complex set of social, political and economic 
circumstances in both countries (Addleton, 1992). In the UAE, the historical presence of 
Pakistanis relates to the presence of Baluchis, who are now naturalized Emiratis and mostly 
employed in the UAE police forces (Jahani, 2014).  
In the 1960s, in the UAE “over 100 Pakistani families … had come to work as 
shopkeepers, tailors, and barbers” (Davidson, 2008, p. 90). However, other Pakistanis 
migrated to work in the trading and fishery industries, the emerging oil industry and in the 
construction sector.61 Most of these first Pakistani migrants went to the Gulf region and 
especially to the UAE to work in the construction sector and “formed relationships with local 
Arab sponsors and began to obtain visas for their male kin” (Watkins, 2003, p. 62).  
The economic boom in the 1970s pushed the UAE authorities to recruit foreign 
workers in order to implement their construction and development plans. South and East 
Asian countries (Arnold & Shah, 1984) became the first provider of foreign workers to the 
GCC countries which were in need of an unskilled and semi-skilled workforce to implement 
their projects (Tsakok, 1986). At the end of the 1960s, in Pakistan, many infrastructural 
projects that were often carried out by foreign construction companies and financed by 
international organizations were coming to an end (Nichols, 2008). These construction firms 
also moved to the Gulf region to implement infrastructural projects as a consequence of the 
mid-1970s oil boom and recruited experienced Pakistani workers. Migrants from Pakistan 
to the Gulf countries brought a wide range of skills (from unskilled to highly-skilled) 
(Addleton, 1992). Pakistanis worked in every economic sector, from construction to street 
cleaning to shop-keeping and from banking to the university sector. They were mostly men 
who migrated alone, leaving their wives and families at home, and who would send back 
remittances (Tsakok 1986).  
                                            
61 Interview with Abdallah, 19th Ocotber, 2015. 
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Currently, the presence of Pakistanis in the UAE is 1.2 million.62 This number was 
disputed by Abdallah, who argued that Pakistanis in the country are “close to by 1.4, 1.5 
million” (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 2015). In 2014, according to the data offered 
to me by Pakistani authorities in Dubai, there were 800,000 Pakistanis working in the 
country (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 Pakistanis working in the UAE 
 
Source: Pakistani Consulate Dubai. Data collected by the author in November 2014. 
Pakistanis are mostly employed in the production sector (35%), which relates to the 
construction sector, as Khalaf, the member of the Pakistani Consulate told me. Moreover, as 
observable in all GCC countries, the skills of Pakistani migrants have slightly changed over 
the last few decades, and there has been a lack of “a major shift towards more skilled 
[Pakistani] workers” (Arif, 2016, p. 270).  
The presence of Pakistani women in the Emirati labour market has not been 
statistically analysed because most Pakistanis work in the construction sector, which is male-
oriented. Moreover, since the 1970s, the Pakistani government has consciously restricted the 
migration of female domestic workers due to abuse and harassment, which has come to 
characterize this specific niche of the Gulf labour market (Breeding, 2012). These 
restrictions, imposed by the Pakistani authorities, also underline a structural problem which 
seeks to prevent women (and families) from leaving the country.  By ensuring that they 
remain dependent on money sent home by family members working and living in the GCC 
countries, this serves to maintain their subordination. Between the 1970s and 1980s, it “was 
                                            
62 http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-estimates-of-population-residing-in-the-uae-by-country-of-citizenship-selected-
countries-2014/ [accessed 16 June 2015]. 
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only among the small Christian community that women – mainly nurses and teachers – were 
actively recruited for employment overseas” (Addleton, 1992, p. 86). However, these 
restrictions have now been partially removed and Pakistani “women must be at least 35 to 
work abroad as domestic workers” (Timothy & Sasikumar, 2012, p. 26). The few Pakistani 
women whom I interviewed were employed in the professional sector as a result of their 
high level of education. The majority of them migrate to the UAE as dependants (and in 
some cases with their children)63 while just a few of them work as professionals, in the 
domestic sector and some work as housewives.  
As outlined in chapter 3, unskilled and semi-skilled migrants arrived in the GCC 
countries through recruitment agencies (Breeding 2012). However, during my field research 
among Pakistani professionals (see chapter 6), I became aware that they migrated to Dubai 
by using alternative channels rather than recruitment agencies. For example, John, one of 
my participants, who worked in a bank in Pakistan, in the 1970s, was moved to a local branch 
in Qatar: 
I was working in Pakistan in a bank, and I was moved to Doha in Qatar, at the end 1973…I 
worked there for two years, and then I worked in a French bank in Qatar, and I moved to the 
UAE in 1996 (Interview with John, 6th November 2014). 
John, in other conversations, underscored that he was keen to move to the Gulf region 
because he wanted to live abroad but close to his home country. His migration project was 
defined through the contacts and his networks that helped him to migrate; he mobilized his 
resources to migrate and he projected his life in a new country (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).  
Two Pakistani women arrived in Dubai because they got married and their husbands were, 
in turn, brought up in the UAE. Leila got married when she was very young. She moved to 
Dubai in 2000, where her husband already lived and worked. She works in marketing and 
business development for a private company. She had never been abroad, and the UAE was 
the first foreign country that she had ever visited but she easily adapted to the new country 
and social status. She said 
I got married at 21 and my husband was here, my husband was based here and my parents in-
law were also based here. My father-in-law was an ex-pilot of Emirates Airlines, one of the 
first one here. He did the first flight for the Emirates (Interview with Leila, 14th October 2015).   
                                            
63 For family reunification, a sponsored foreign worker has to earn between 3,000 and 4,000 Dirhams per month 
(Zahra, 2015). 
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Ester, another Pakistani participant, studied in Pakistan and then in the UK, where she also 
worked. She decided to return to Pakistan, where she started working with different banks. 
In 2006, she got married and moved to Abu Dhabi, and in 2010 she moved with her husband 
to Dubai, where she now works for an international company. She said 
I moved to the UAE in October 2006, and the visa for moving here was marriage. My husband 
was in Abu Dhabi… It was not for professional reason, it was not for a better life but just 
because I got married…[I spend my social life] with Pakistanis basically because we come 
from the same city, same culture, same religion, friends in common back home (Interview 
with Ester, 13th October 2015). 
Ester’s marriage was arranged by the families of the spouses. She got married with a 
Pakistani man, who was, in turn, an American citizen and his parents had lived for forty 
years in the UAE. For Ester as well as for Leila, marriage represented a chance to move to 
Dubai. The migration experience was not traumatic especially for Ester because she was 
used to living in different countries (US, Kuwait, Yemen and Central America), thus she was 
exposed to different ‘ways of life’ and she adapted easily to the different places.  
Moreover, other Pakistani professionals used different channels to migrate. For 
example, some of them easily found a job through a friend already settled in the GCC 
countries; nonetheless others migrated when they were teenagers so they were brought up in 
Dubai and thus consider it as their ‘home’. Ibrahim, one of my Pakistani participants, arrived 
in Dubai in 1973 and he started working as a chartered accountant. In the course of few 
years, he had good job positions in several Emirati and international companies. He has three 
children that now live between the USA and Dubai. He migrated because a friend of his, 
who lived in Dubai, needed his help. He  
…was invited by a friend of mine in Dubai, and at that time, he was the editor of one company 
where he needed some help because I have been a senior mentor to him. It was in 1973 
(Interview with Ibrahim, 18th October 2015). 
One of my participants, Muhammad moved to Dubai in 1975, when he was very young 
because his father was working in a local company. He studied in the UK and after 
graduation he returned to Dubai where he established his own company of chartered 
accountants. He said 
I came here in 1975, as a young boy, I went to school in Dubai. In fact, I went to this school 
that was run by Italian missionaries, it was called St Mary’s Catholic High School. I finished 
my schooling in Dubai and then I went to UK to do my mechanical engineering…I was born 
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in Pakistan and I came here when I was ten years old (Interview with Muhammad, 25th October 
2015). 
Ibrahim and Muhammad migrated to Dubai by adopting and using different channels and 
had different migration stories. Some of my participants migrated for economic reasons, 
such as better jobs and better economic conditions, while others were born in the Gulf region 
(Oman and Kuwait), and others migrated when they were very young and were brought up 
in the UAE. They mobilized their economic, symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1987) 
(see chapter 6).  
All the stories presented above resonate how their migration project relied on a 
combination of taking advantage of the socio-economic conditions in Dubai, their 
knowledge of the local rules and laws, their capacity to mobilize and use their contacts in 
order to migrate. Their choice was driven by habitus because migration was part of their 
background, but they reflexively made decision to migrate in light of practical and projective 
dimensions (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).  
In conclusion, migration from Pakistan (and this is also valid in many other contexts 
and countries) is a ‘family affair’, where the households are involved in the decision-making 
process (see chapter 6). The relevance of the historical links between Pakistan and the UAE 
has shaped their relationships that still today rely on mutual respect and recognition. In the 
UAE, Pakistanis are employed in different sectors, it is a male-oriented migration; Pakistani 
women migrate as dependants and just a few of them are employed in jobs outside of the 
domestic sphere. Lastly, Pakistani professionals, because of their networks and social status, 
use different channels to migrate in comparison to unskilled and semi-skilled migrants who 
rely on recruitment agencies to migrate (Breeding, 2012; Gardner, 2012).  
 
 
  
 
5.5 The Pakistani community in Dubai 
In this section, I discuss some of the characteristics existing within the Pakistani 
community in Dubai. It draws on my observations, field notes and interviews.  
In 1947, when Pakistan was created, the leaders of the new polity, such as 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (who ruled Pakistan from August 1947 to September 1948) and 
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leader of the Muslim League (ML), had to cope with the problem of identifying elements 
that could spread a sense of belonging (nationhood) among people of different ethnic 
backgrounds and languages. Pakistan is ethnically and linguistically complex. Each ethnic 
and linguistic group,  
identified by cultural markers, often claim they are a “people” or a “nation”. Some seek 
independence and want to form an ethnically or linguistically homogeneous state; some seek 
greater autonomy within a state or province, and others move back and forth between these 
two goals or remain ambiguous (Cohen, 2004, p. 201). 
Political leaders thought that Islām and Urdu language could be useful in spreading a sense 
of unity and cohesion in spite of the ethnic and linguistic differences, thus contributing 
towards ‘establishing’ Pakistani national identity (Khory, 1995). Since the beginning, and 
due to the demography of the country (Cohen, 2004), the growing ethnic nationalism has 
hindered “government efforts to consolidate a singular religious-based national identity that 
could transcend local loyalties” (Qaiser, 2015, p. 106). The common Islamic religion is 
invoked “to inspire a sense of unity, over the years this narrative has eroded and cleavages 
between ethnic groups have grown” (Qaiser, 2015, p. 114). The unequal distribution of 
resources, the military regimes and the different Islamic sects and schools of thought have 
contributed towards a growing ethnic nationalism, which could only be overcome “if all 
provinces believe that they are equally valued by center” (Qaiser, 2015, p. 114) 
As said above, Pakistani national identity is contested because of the ethnic, 
linguistic and religious fragmentation existing in Pakistan itself (Cohen, 2004). During the 
field research, instead of focusing on defining what Pakistani identity is, or who is a 
Pakistani, I asked my participants what and with whom they belonged to a group or a 
community, and in which way they defined their sense of belonging. My participants used 
different elements (music, passport, food) to articulate their ‘Pakistani-ness’ (see chapter 6). 
The fragmentation existing in Pakistan was also reflected within the Pakistani community in 
Dubai, where I found people of different ethnic origins and religious sects. I talked with 
Sindhis, Punjabis, a Baluchi, some Mohajirs, and with people who were born in the GCC 
countries. Some of the interviewees came from wealthy families, such as Omar, who is a 
member of a very rich Pakistani family that supported and helped him to migrate. Some of 
them were Sunni Muslims, one was a Shi’ite Muslim and one participant defined himself as 
atheist but with an Islamic background. However, they all used their ethnic identity only to 
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underline their geographical origins. Some of my participants said: “I am from Baluchistan 
from a town, which is not very big” (Interview with Peter, 15th October 2015). Another 
participant said: “I am a Punjabi but we [his family] have lived in Karachi [Sindh region] 
most of our lives” (Interview with Leila, 14th October 2015), and another one said: “I was 
born in 1941. In 1947 due to Partition, my parents and me moved to Pakistan, in Karachi 
where I grew up” (Interview with Ibrahim, 18th October 2015). 
My participants expressed their ‘Pakistani-ness’ in different ways and their sense of 
belonging was forged at the same time by ‘preserving’ their background and feeling part of 
the Emirati context (see chapter 6). However, ethnic and regional fragmentations 
superficially emerged during my fieldwork in Dubai. For my participants, ethnic and 
regional elements were only ‘re-activated’ when they returned for holiday to Pakistan, but 
in Dubai their ethnicity was subsumed under the ‘label’ ‘Pakistani-ness’ (see chapter 6). It 
is thus evident that they expressed their belonging by overlapping ethnic and regional 
elements but identified as part of their ‘Pakistani-ness’. Yuval-Davis (2011) defines this 
overlapping of different elements as multi-layered belonging expressed and articulated 
differently in light of the specific location (Anthias, 2015). When I asked my Pakistani 
participants to define how and in which way they expressed their ‘Pakistani-ness’, they 
always identified some elements as part of their national background (e.g. Pakistani music, 
Pakistani food, not Punjabi food or Sindhi music), and their belonging was never explicitly 
defined in terms of ethnicity or regionalism.  
The Pakistani community in Dubai appears to be united and cohesive. The 
fragmentation and separateness that one can find in Pakistan seems to not exist in Dubai. 
However, during my field research, I observed that there was a division within the 
community mostly based on different ‘community engagement’ exhibited by some 
Pakistanis (see chapter 7). At the institutional level, as mentioned in chapter 2, I talked with 
Khalaf, the member of the Pakistani Consulate, in November 2014, and he projected the 
image of a cohesive community, where even construction workers, with all the difficulties 
that they have to face, are happy to migrate to Dubai because they can have a job and 
facilities that they will never have in Pakistan. This image was contested by Abdallah, who 
said that the members of the Pakistani authority in Dubai are detached from the reality and 
they try to hide the real working and living conditions of Pakistanis. Paradoxically, when I 
asked Abdallah to talk about the division within the Pakistani community he tended to 
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project the image of a cohesive community (see chapter 2). Still, an image of the Pakistani 
community, detached from the reality characterized by internal differences and divisions 
based on class, gender, and different ‘community engagement’ manifested by some Pakistani 
participants and that is perceived by other Pakistanis as a symptom of detachment and 
indifference towards the whole community (see chapter 7).  
The UAE and Pakistan are both Islamic countries, and when I asked my participants 
if religion could represent a channel that could facilitate dialogue and ‘integration’, they 
replied that Islām was not an inclusive element between Pakistanis and Emiratis. Religion 
emerged as an important aspect of my participants’ private life (in the home), but when it 
came to be articulated in the public sphere, I was informed that it did not represent a way to 
facilitate interactions between the two communities because socio-cultural and economic 
factors (e. g. ethnicity, nationality and profit-making) seem to drive the relationships 
between different communities (Kathiravelu, 2016). Therefore, religion does not change the 
hierarchical social structure and does not affect power relationships. For example, John said 
…religion, I think is not a big factor in having relationships with Emiratis or with the other 
communities…It is a myth that religion binds us together…Religion does not really come to 
play at all (Interview with John, 6th November 2014). 
John emphasized how belonging to the umma was not important. Pakistani professionals 
articulated their relationships with Emiratis mostly on sociocultural and economic levels. 
However, the sharing of the religious space within a masjid during the daily five prayers is 
the only contact that some of my participants had with ‘others’. For example, Ismail said 
…Yeah, I mean my main contact is when I go to the mosque, we see a lot of people there…you 
see them [Emiratis] in a coffee shops, there is no direct meeting because we are worlds apart, 
because of barriers in terms of language, although most of them speak English (Interview with 
Ismail, 7th November 2014). 
Ismail underscored how relationships with Emirati Muslims and other Muslims were 
articulated through their contacts during the daily five prayers; their relationships were 
limited and did not exceed the religious sphere. For some participants, the religious 
dimension could be ‘lived’ easily in Dubai because it is an Islamic city where they could 
find a prayer room (muṣallá) or a mosque and licit food.  For other participants, such as John, 
the religious component was not important in his life. Although Islām might be considered 
as a marker of Pakistani national identity (Khory, 1995), in in-depth interviews with my 
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participants religion emerged only as one aspect of their private life.64 In her book, Ahmad 
(2017) underscores that conversion to the Islamic religion by South Asian domestic workers 
in Kuwait did not erase the asymmetrical power relationships between the employer and 
employee and it did not subvert the hierarchical social structure. In describing the experience 
of one of her participants (Mary/Maryam), Ahmad (2017, p. 141) points out that the Islamic 
conversion does not  
eclipse other bases of asymmetrical difference shaping her relationship with her employer 
most notably differences based on kinship, ethnonationalism, and citizenship. By virtue of her 
becoming Muslim, Mary/Maryam was not considered to be part of the family or to be more 
Kuwaiti. Rather, her Islamic conversion constituted another set of connections, and another 
modality of belonging.    
As Ahmad (2017) emphasized, religion does not eclipse the asymmetrical power 
relationships but, as it happened among my participants, it represents another way to express 
belonging. There is an overlapping of different levels, socio-cultural, economic and 
religious, and the latter is not viewed as of primary importance on the articulation of 
relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis.  Kinship, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship 
represent the main sources of identification and categorization and they tend to articulate 
interactions between communities (Khalaf & Alkobaisi, 1999; Rugh, 2016; Ahmad, 2017).   
The religious dimension of all Muslims, Emiratis and non-Emiratis, is formally 
controlled and monitored by the UAE religious authorities through the General Authority of 
Islamic Affairs and Endowments (GAIAE), which manage “and supervise mosques”.65 
Moreover, the religious authorities release a state-oriented Friday sermon (khuṭba) that has 
to be read and spread to all mosques throughout the country.  
 
 
 
5.6 Pakistanis and Emiratis66 
Vora (2013) in her ethnographic research among Indian middle-class in Dubai 
underscores that neoliberalism has created a split between Indians and Emiratis because the 
                                            
64 My research did not focus on the religious dimension. 
65GAIAE. Goals, Principles and Responsibilities. 
https://www.awqaf.gov.ae/About.aspx?Lang=EN&SectionID=12&RefID=860 [accessed 07 January 2017]. 
66 This section discusses the relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis by focusing on my Pakistani and 
Emirati participants’ perspective. 
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arrival of many Western companies has created a competitive labour market, in which not 
the education and experience but the passport makes the difference, and it is the only means 
that can guarantee a good job and salary.  
As I discuss in this section, in my research among Pakistani professionals (see also 
chapter 6), when I asked questions about relations with Emiratis, and if they feel 
discriminated against because of their nationality, some of them argued that discrimination 
was not an issue. Ester, for example, said 
…I have colleagues who are Emiratis and excellent relationships, I do not have any problems 
and they do not give you any problems, they do not create problems and they try to resolve 
problems. But, naturally there is a sort of boundary and you cannot across it, which is a cultural 
thing. Sometimes when I meet an Emirati, I do not know whether or not I have to shake his 
hands, again it is a cultural thing and I have to wait for his hands because you will never know 
if you could offend him by that. And then also when you talk with them you have to be a little 
bit conscious, especially if he is a customer because you cannot ask everything directly that 
can be offended. So there are certain things that you have to conscious about (Interview with 
Ester, 13th October 2015).   
Ester illustrated how her relationships with Emiratis were affected by intersection of diverse 
elements, such as gender and cultural differences. Moreover, location and space also play an 
important role in articulating and developing relationships with Emiratis. The extant 
literature on migration in the GCC countries emphasizes that discrimination is a problem for 
many South Asian migrants (Gardner, 2010a; Vora, 2013). However, some Pakistanis whom 
I interviewed said that they had not been discriminated against. For example, Peter, who 
moved to Dubai in 2008, during the economic crisis, said 
I have worked with English company, I worked with Indians, I worked with Iranians, I worked 
with quite many nationalities I have never felt that I have been or any discrimination in relation 
to my nationality or country of origin (Interview with Peter, 15th October 2015).  
Other Pakistani participants argued that they have been discriminated against. For example, 
some of them explained that they feel discriminated against in comparison to Westerners, 
“they have very low experience, very low qualifications but just because of the passport and 
their nationalities; they are paid a lot higher” (Interview with Ester, 13th October 2015). 
Nonetheless, Ismail, the British-Pakistani participant, regarded himself as a very lucky 
person because of his passport. He said 
I have realized the value of the British passport… I feel very very privileged to be honest with 
you. It is made me even more grateful to God, because I have not done anything to have that 
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privilege, I do have just because of being born in comparison to somebody who is born in a 
small village in Pakistan, who works sixteen or twelve hours a day. I feel incredibly privileged 
because I have realized that I have been given a lot of things without doing anything to have 
these privileges (Interview with Ismail, 7th November 2014). 
Ismail underscored the importance of his British passport and all the benefits attached to it. 
He also recognized that he did not do anything to deserve that passport. In my view, Ismail 
implicitly emphasized the existence of ethno-racial hierarchies that can affect people’s life 
in the country. 
Based upon my own experience in Dubai, I would argue that you feel that 
discrimination is around you. As a white man, I was not discriminated against and as I 
walked in some shops and restaurants, I realized that, even though some South Asians 
wearing their traditional dress where in line before me, the shop assistant first approached 
me. It is worth noting that people who work in shops and restaurants are not Emiratis but 
Asians.  
The sense of non-discrimination was expressed by some Emiratis whom I 
interviewed. Helen, a young Emirati woman, said  
my opinion is that these people [South Asians] have built and are building our country, what 
could we do? What would Dubai be without them? Really, that is the truth because we are 
such a small population... So, we need these people coming to the country so can they can take 
these jobs and we can take others, higher jobs in the workforce, in the government (Interview 
with Helen 31st October 2015).  
Helen underlined the prominent role of South Asians in ‘building’ the country. At the same 
time, she argued the importance of recruiting foreigners for menial jobs so that Emiratis can 
be employed in prestigious jobs. Some of them are educated and they look for high-status 
jobs in the public sector that still attracts young Emiratis. However, not all Emiratis are 
educated and rich and some of them are not keen to complete their education with a 
university degree even though it is free. Thus, it happens, as I observed during my fieldwork, 
that young Emiratis, maybe coming from poor Emirates such as Ajman or Fujairah (MERI, 
2015), decided to move to Dubai because there are more chances to find a job even in 
customer service. The importance of South Asians in ‘building’ the UAE was expressed by 
Kate, a young Emirati woman, who said 
As I would say the majority of the young generation typically even I would say the middle 
generation, we are fine; they do not bother us because there is the idea that without these 
people we won’t have what Dubai is today, we need other people to be health provider, as 
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educators, as construction workers and so on. So 900.000 people of Emirati we are not enough 
people to build this our country. So we are fine because they are working here (Interview with 
Kate, 6th November 2014). 
Similarly to Helen, Kate recalled the prominent role played by migrants in ‘building’ the 
country and how their presence was necessary to develop a modern country and it has 
become an inescapable characteristic of the UAE society. Lisa, another young Emirati 
woman, had an ambivalent attitude toward foreign workers and their presence within the 
UAE society. She said 
I think it has both positive and negative effects on us. A positive effect, I interact with many 
many nationalities and I have no problems and coming getting with many nationalities, 
Japanese, Chinese, Pakistani, Indians, Europeans, Americans, we all interact with them. We 
know their culture, how they do things, we have studied with them, we have studied with them. 
But, the negative side might be because it slowly you can see the Emirati society is changing 
to be able to tolerate all nationalities. For example, let’s say the dress code, we are more 
conservative but a lot of people here from different nationalities, it is ok for them to wear like 
short things, but it might be not accepted in our society. Some people do accept it, but a lot of 
people as well do not accept it. It is usually the talk of the house, when a lot of people are 
gathered they talk, for example, of the dress code...As well in the workplace, we have a lot of 
competition between us, Emiratis, and other nationalities. They usually even prefer not 
Emiratis, they think [other nationalities] are more professional in some way (Interview with 
Lisa, 26th October 2015).  
Lisa expressed a perceived sense of ‘inferiority’ stemming from being considered inadequate 
to be employed as a ‘professional’. Indian and Pakistani professionals along with Westerners 
are considered more qualified than Emiratis (Vora, 2013). As noted in chapter 4, this has led 
Kanna (2011) to argue that in order to understand the experience of South Asians in the Arab 
Gulf region it is necessary to separate nationality and class. Put differently, South Asian 
working-class is subject to constraints, limitations and discrimination which are not suffered 
by the South Asian elite and middle-class (Gardner, 2008).  
In my research, relations with Emiratis and Pakistani professionals’ perception of 
discrimination are in part determined by their passport, nationality, skin colour or class. 
Pakistani professionals’ assumption is that they are foreign workers, and as such, they are 
subject to limitations and constraints because the Emirati society is shaped in such a way 
that a foreign worker has to be treated as a Gastarbeiter, however, they never hide that the 
passport makes the difference (see chapters 6 and 7). They do not have any expectations, in 
terms of citizenship, and are aware of these limitations and of the working and living 
conditions before migrating to the UAE. However, the existence of ethno-racial hierarchies 
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is undeniable in which Westerners enjoy more privileges than Asians (Vora, 2014). 
Nevertheless, Pakistani professionals regard this ‘discrepancy’ as a consequence of 
neoliberalism which has fostered the free market and competition. Even Pakistani 
professionals are enjoying the benefits of this market ‘ideology’, in which companies, 
especially Western companies, are free to treat their employees as they wish, and are free to 
determine the salaries that have to be paid (from my own observations and field notes).  
In my research, discrimination did not emerge as an issue for my Pakistani 
participants. Some of them experienced and perceived discrimination but, as they 
emphasized, it was not a real issue in their relationships with Emiratis. Their perception of 
discrimination was articulated as a normal attitude, and ostensibly accepted as a matter-of-
fact in light of the assumption that it is a ‘rule of the country’ to decide how to manage their 
internal affairs67; as temporary migrants, they cannot subvert the hierarchical social structure 
(see chapter 7).  
 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the role and impact of the oil economy and 
globalization on the UAE society. Moreover, I have also focused on Pakistanis and I have 
underscored how migration is affected by the specific social, cultural and economic context 
where it is viewed as a ‘rite of passage’ for young Pakistanis. I have also introduced some 
elements and characteristics of the Pakistani community in Dubai as it emerged from my 
field research. It appeared to be a united community but also characterized by internal 
divisions. Their divisions were not expressed in terms of their ethnic and regional belonging 
but in terms of different stances in relation to the Pakistani community in the Emirati context, 
as I explain more in detail in chapter 7.   
Lastly, I have addressed the issue of relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis 
where the latter recognized the role played by South Asians, and then Pakistanis, in 
‘building’ the country. And when I investigated the issue of discrimination, my Pakistani 
                                            
67 Pakistani participants accepted the perceived discrimination being aware that they could not change the way 
in which the internal affairs were managed by the local authorities. It would be an unwanted and dangerous 
intrusion in the UAE’s internal affairs. If the UAE authorities wanted to deal with discrimination, they would 
implement rules to cope with this issue.  
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participants underscored how it was not a problem insofar as it is the local authorities’ 
prerogative to decide how to manage their internal affairs. They seem to accept their inferior 
status and the inequality that comes with such status; at the same time, Pakistani 
professionals (and other migrants) through their class-based benefits and advantages, 
contribute to the ‘naturalization’ of ethno-racial and gender hierarchies (Vora & Koch, 
2015). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MIGRATION AND ‘FLEXIBLE BELONGING’. 
PAKISTANI PROFESSIONALS IN DUBAI 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented a preliminary analysis of the Pakistani 
community in the UAE and Dubai and I argued that, although ethnically stratified, it is 
ostensibly a united and cohesive community, but, during my field research, divisions also 
emerged. This chapter aims to delve into the internal dynamics of the community by 
describing Pakistani professionals as a class and discussing how they construct belonging in 
the Emirati context. By drawing upon the example of low-wage migrants in the UAE and 
Dubai, especially of construction workers, as it emerged from the extant literature, and the 
findings of my own field research on professionals, I argue that both classes of workers build 
belonging in the Emirates but in different ways.     
 Belonging is situational, contextual and temporal. Anthias (2013) affirms the need 
to adopt a translocational positionality approach to understand how belonging is constructed 
(see chapter 3). People build belonging because of shared values, but more than that it is 
constructed because individuals are located in a specific space, place and locale, and 
translocational positionality allows understanding that lives are “located across multiple but 
also fractured and interrelated social spaces of different types” (Anthias, 2013, p. 17).  
My argument revolves around Anthias’ (2015) approach and I further develop it by 
arguing that belonging is also flexible, which means that people belong, at the same time, to 
different spaces, places and locales. ‘Flexible belonging’ means that social relations are 
shaped by fluctuations between ‘preserving’ ‘Pakistani-ness’ and feeling part of the Emirati 
context. As Anthias (2015) argues, we need to look at ‘diversity’ by overcoming a nation-
based approach and adopt a transnational lens that enables us to catch that belonging is not 
fixed. As such, I argue that ‘flexible belonging’ allows grasping the transnational and 
translocational dynamics as well as understanding that people mobilize resources, recover 
past, heritage, tastes and family background in order to affirm their belonging. The notion 
of ‘flexible belonging’ allows acknowledging that to be a Pakistani in Dubai is different from 
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being a Pakistani in Pakistan, where specific characteristics and elements used in order to 
assert belonging may or may not be adopted or ‘re-activated’ in the Emirati context.  
Understanding how ‘flexible belonging’ is articulated and why Pakistani 
professionals feel that they belong to the Emirati context entails discussing the decision to 
migrate to Dubai, their lifestyle, if temporariness affects their lives and the strategies that 
they plan to adopt upon leaving the country. ‘Flexible belonging’ allows acknowledging that 
a lack of recognition and a formal membership (such as citizenship) do not impede Pakistani 
professionals (and low-wage migrants) from constructing their belonging.    
The chapter, which draws on my qualitative data collection and in part on the extant 
literature on migration in the GCC countries, is structured as follows. After defining 
Pakistani professionals, I introduce the concept of ‘flexible belonging’ which relies on 
Anthias’ approach, as discussed in chapter 3. Before addressing how ‘flexible belonging’ is 
built in ‘lived practice’, I introduce the concept of ‘Pakistani-ness’ and how it is defined by 
my participants. After discussing these aspects, I analyse the decision to migrate to Dubai, 
lifestyle, temporariness and transnational and local connections, which are important aspects 
of ‘flexible belonging’. 
 
 
 
6.2 The Pakistani professionals  
The migration of Pakistanis to the UAE is characterized by the presence of unskilled, 
semi-skilled and highly-skilled migrants (see chapters 3 and 5). These terms categorize 
people according to their skills; however, they are not able to grasp the dynamics and the 
process of identification that I observed during my fieldwork (see chapter 2). This section 
focuses on identifying Pakistani professionals by underscoring some of their peculiarities 
and characteristics.  
The Pakistani professionals in Dubai consists of people working in different sectors, 
and this composition emerged clearly during my field research within the PAD, which is an 
umbrella organization formed by several wings (see chapter 7). Some of these wings are: the 
MW, the Engineering Wing (EW), the Journalist Wing and the PPW.68 Pakistanis working 
                                            
68 The PPW was established in 1987 by a group of Pakistani professionals based in Dubai and Sharjah (an 
emirate not too far away from Dubai). http://www.ppwdubai.com/about-us/ [accessed 14 October 2016]. 
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as bankers, doctors, journalists and engineers might be considered as professionals, and what 
differentiates one individual or group from another is how they mobilize one or more types 
of capital (see chapter 3). For example, a Pakistan doctor could use his/her cultural capital 
(skills and competencies) to help irregular migrants that cannot afford to go to a hospital (see 
chapter 2). A banker or an executive could use his/her social capital to help a Pakistani 
migrant to find a job in his/her company.  
As Oliver and O’Reilly (2010) emphasize, habitus, capital and field are three 
elements that we need to consider when discussing class identities and lifestyle. As discussed 
in chapter 3, habitus (used both in the singular and plural form) is the dispositions, 
tendencies, tastes, way of thinking and doing things, prejudices and expectations “and ways 
of seeing the world that we each, individually and in groups, acquire as we travel through 
life” (O’Reilly, 2012b, p. 18). The field, concretely Dubai, is a “set of circumstances within 
which an agent is currently living, experiencing and acting” (O’Reilly, 2012b, p. 18), and 
each field has its own rules, power relations and structures. Lastly, capital, as mentioned in 
chapter 3, might be seen as a resource. 
The combination of these three elements pushed me to acknowledge that Pakistani 
professionals are a category of workers that has a distinct lifestyle, socio-economic 
background, tastes and dispositions. As I discuss below, comparing the different lifestyle of 
Pakistani professionals and low-wage migrants allows acknowledging how they used their 
resources and that both classes of workers articulated differently their relations with the field. 
Habitus, field and capital identify a group and serve to distinguish it from other groups.  
Although members of different wings, Pakistani doctors, journalists, engineers, 
bankers or executives share the same social space, and share, at least partially, the same 
lifestyle, experiences, tastes and dispositions. However, a definition of Pakistani 
professionals was provided by John (see chapter 2), a member of the PPW, who, in order to 
identify people who have been, are or aspire to become member of this wing, said  
… we are a small number of professionals from every area, we are bankers, we have people 
from insurance, we have legal lawyers, we have doctors, engineers, we have different people. 
So it is a group which is organized to bring professionals together, to network, to meet each 
other, we are all from a foreign country, so it is a good platform to meet. We organize events, 
like the last Friday we had an event on legal issues in UAE related to wills and inheritance 
(Interview with John 6th November 2014). 
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John emphasized that, although the presence of the MW and EW, doctors and engineers are 
members of the PPW. The definition of professionals is thus dynamic, fluid and contested. 
To define the Pakistani professional group is a complex task; however, I choose to define it 
as a group of people, such as bankers, journalists, doctors, engineers, executives and 
employees who are able to mobilize, convert and transfer one, two or more types of capital 
(see the above examples) and enjoy the benefits and advantages of living in Dubai, 
characterized by a neoliberal market (see chapter 4), where competiveness, individualism 
and accumulation are tied up with communitarism, philanthropy and support for their fellow 
nationals.  
Moreover, their lifestyle is also a marker of their social status and class. Pakistani 
professionals’ everyday life is characterized, for example, by participating in events and 
activities that revolve around their networks and contacts. Some of these events are 
organized by the PPW and were described by John. He said 
there is a difference in your background, in your thinking, in your mind-set, in your education, 
in your position, in your status, and for professionals we needed… like we have professionals, 
you know, coming and going all the time in this place. We have people who live here for five 
years with family, for two years, for ten years, for twenty years. There is always a constant 
movement in migration. So we said it would be a good platform to have a group, a wing or an 
association where professionals can meet and interact with each other and share your cultural 
identity and reinforce that. So it is a good thing to have that (Interview with John, 6th November 
2014). 
The need to safeguard the interests of the Pakistani professional group is evident in the quote 
above. John also noted that “we [PPW] work to encourage the links and improve the contacts 
within the community, within our group of people and even outside even with other 
communities” (Interview, 6th November 2014). 
The presence of the PPW can, seemingly, make it easier to identify professional as a 
category. But, as John underscored and the different wings existing in the PAD indicate, it 
is difficult to categorize Pakistani professionals only by looking at their job. Hence, my 
definition of the Pakistani professional group is contextual and dynamic, thus suggesting 
that it is a category of persons consisting of “salaried mental workers who do not own the 
means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be 
described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations” 
(Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1979, p. 12). This definition is, in my view, able to grasp the 
dynamism, characteristics and multifaceted nature of Pakistani professionals in Dubai.  
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6.3 ‘Flexible belonging’. Pakistani professionals and social interactions 
In light of the Emirati context and the findings of my field research, Anthias’ (2015) 
approach allows emphasizing the role and importance of different locales and how the 
construction of belonging among Pakistani professionals in Dubai is affected by 
translocational and transnational dynamics. Adopting her approach means emphasising the 
relation between self and society (May, 2011), between agency and structure (Youkhana, 
2015). 
As outlined in chapter 3, for Anthias (2015), belonging is constructed in everyday 
experiences and practices, it is more than shared values and it relates to locations. Belonging 
is emotional and affective ties; it is boundary-making and boundary-breaking. People belong 
‘to’ a group but people belong ‘with’ ‘others’ in everyday life to different locales and 
situations, and through a translocational lens it is possible to treat “lives as being located 
across multiple but also fragmented and interrelated social spaces of different types” 
(Anthias, 2015, p. 15). Anthias (2012, pp. 107-108) reconciles the local and global because 
of her theoretical approach, which is based upon “intersections between a number of 
different social structures and processes, including transnational ones”. Her approach allows 
grasping the situational, contextual and contradictory nature of belonging, as it also emerged 
from my participants’ narratives.  
Anthias’ (2013) focus on locations is suitable to the Emirati context because the 
separation between nationals and non-nationals (see chapter 8) requires a situational and 
contextual notion of belonging. In other words, it means that there is a shift from a nation-
based approach to a transnational and translocational perspective (Anthias, 2013), her 
approach moves beyond methodological nationalism (see chapter 4). The importance of 
place, location and context emerged from the stories of my participants. They emphasized 
that the forms of capital they mobilized, and their decision-making processes were aimed at 
migrating to Dubai because of its multi-cultural milieu, geographical proximity, and in some 
cases, some of them were brought up in Dubai so they had a strong emotional attachment to 
the emirate (locale, field). Thus, they felt ‘included’ in Dubai in light of their personal stories, 
emotional ties and the presence of family members in the city. At the same time, they felt 
‘excluded’ because of the discrimination that some of them experienced but this did not 
challenge their belonging to the local context. Some participants described their life in Dubai 
as being completely assimilated because they spent more than thirty years in the UAE and 
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“you cannot live anywhere else” (Interview with Naseer, 24th October 2015). Another 
participant also said: “…I have been here for forty years and I am part of this society…I 
mean everywhere you have been for forty years, it is your home” (Interview with 
Muhammad, 25th October 2015). Consequently, belonging is not only determined by 
inclusion and/or exclusion, but it is also experience, and it is constructed in relation to 
locations. It is not only a formal membership such as citizenship and/or a specific political 
project such as integration or assimilation that determines belonging.  
In relation to Pakistani professionals and their positionality within the Emirati 
context, the notion of belonging as boundary-making (belong ‘to’) and boundary-breaking 
(belong ‘with’) moves beyond the social locations that Yuval-Davis (2011) identifies as 
ethnicity, age, gender and class. This happens because of the specific context, where 
boundaries are crossed every day as migrants interact in the workplace and everyday life 
with other nationalities including Emiratis. This allows us to acknowledge the need to focus 
on locations and adopt “a transnational lens [that] enables us to see that fixity of belonging 
is not possible” (Anthias, 2013, p. 15). In my view, belonging is thus fluid, dynamic, 
situational (May, 2011) and flexible. 
I want to suggest that this reasoning elicits the notion of ‘flexible belonging’, which 
is characterized by fluctuations between ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the Emirati context, which is 
inclusive of Emiratis as well as other nationalities, groups and social categories. ‘Flexible 
belonging’ means that social interactions are shaped by fluctuations between ‘preserving’ 
‘Pakistani-ness’ and feeling part of the Emirati context. ‘Flexible belonging’ is like a 
pendulum that swings between two ‘poles’ (Figure 5.1). The first ‘pole’ is ‘Pakistani-ness’ 
that is a ‘stable feature’ of my Pakistani participants’ life, but it changes over time and is 
articulated in different ways and with different meanings according to the context, which is 
the second ‘pole’. The context is a variable because it can change, it can be the Emirati 
context (or other contexts) where one can construct belonging in a specific locale, place, 
space or social category.  
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            Figure 6.1 ‘Flexible belonging’ and the two ‘poles’ 
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                           ‘Pole’                                                                             ‘Pole’ 
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             Source: elaboration of the author 
The basic idea of ‘flexible belonging’ is that Pakistani professionals construct belonging by 
activating and articulating aspects and elements of their ‘Pakistani-ness’ in relation to the 
context. This notion seems to embed Pakistani professionals and Emiratis within a social 
structure in which both groups interact as equal. However, this notion does not erase the 
ethno-class and gender hierarchies, discrimination and separateness that take place in the 
UAE (see chapter 5). ‘Flexible belonging’ is based on the relation between self and society, 
which means emphasizing the role of and understanding the self as an active and 
participatory agent in society (May, 2011). This reasoning relies on the assumption that “to 
understand them [individual and society] it is necessary to give up thinking in terms of single, 
isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of relationships and functions” (Elias, 
2010, p. 23, original emphasis).  
‘Flexible belonging’ relies on Anthias’ approach but it moves beyond by 
emphasizing the dynamism and fluidity that in her approach appear to be ‘softened’, and to 
a certain extent, she does not focus too much on explaining how belonging is constructed: 
the elements, characteristics, practices and experiences adopted, lived, embodied and 
activated (or ‘re-activated’) to construct belonging. Moreover, as said above, for Anthias 
(2015, p. 179), access “to material resources is central in belonging inasmuch as it an 
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important part of living with a sense of safety and participation”. ‘Flexible belonging’ goes 
beyond by arguing that economic gains and formal membership do not necessarily determine 
“a greater sense of belonging to society than those who are excluded or involved in casual 
work” (Anthias, 2015, p. 179) for two reasons. First, it would seem that it is possible to 
‘measure’ to what extent an individual belongs to a group or a society. Second, it would be 
misleading insofar as belonging appears to be a class-based concept. People feel that they 
belong despite their jobs, exclusion and temporariness.    
‘Flexible belonging’ means that Pakistani professionals expressed belonging ‘to’ 
their ethno-national community because of their shared values, characteristics and social 
relations. At the same time, they expressed belonging ‘with’ the Emirati context where they 
enjoyed the benefits and advantages of their social status and interacted with different 
nationalities, people and categories in everyday life. ‘Flexible belonging’ moves within and 
beyond ethno-national community boundaries. It signifies that Pakistani professionals were 
emotionally attached to their ‘Pakistani-ness’ as well to the Emirati context. The notion of 
‘flexible belonging’ is thus primarily based on the idea that one belongs to a group or an 
ethno-national community because s/he identifies herself/himself as a member of that group 
since s/he shares culture, values, language, customs and traditions with ‘others’ that are 
interpreted and articulated in light of the context in which one spends everyday life.  
‘Flexible belonging’ is constructed through connections and relationships between 
people and society. It is built in a relational process between self and society but, more than 
that, the flexibility of belonging allows grasping its multidimensional nature because people 
feel, experience and embody differently belonging (May, 2011; Anthias, 2015).  
 
 
 
6.3.1 ‘Flexible belonging’ and ‘Pakistani-ness’  
Before discussing why and how Pakistani professionals feel part of the Emirati 
context, I argue that it is important to understand how they identified themselves as 
Pakistanis. Belonging is expressed through a process of identification (Brubaker & Cooper, 
2000)69 which means that it can be adaptable and negotiated from time to time in reason of 
                                            
69 However, throughout the thesis, I use the term identity when it refers to collective identity, such as Pakistani 
(national) identity or Emirati (national) identity. 
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the space, place and social category. In this section, I discuss how Pakistani professionals 
articulated their ‘Pakistani-ness’. Some of them expressed their belonging by underlining, 
for example, that they wore traditional dress, or listened to Pakistani music and singers, or 
watched Pakistani movies. Other participants underlined how the religious dimension goes 
hand in hand with a ‘Pakistani way of life’. Abdallah, for example, said how the passport 
was important for him and was an expression of his ‘Pakistani-ness’. He said 
I preserve my passport, despite staying in South Africa [where he lived before moving to 
Dubai] for so long, I still keep my own passport and I am very proud of it. I have travelled all 
over the world with it and never had any problems with it. It remains my identity and I am 
proud of it (Interview with Abdallah, 8th November 2015).  
In the UAE, Pakistani professionals identified themselves as Pakistanis by adopting and 
enhancing different aspects (music, singers, religion, movies, dress, food); ‘Pakistani-ness’ 
was intended in different ways. But more than that, all Pakistani professionals expressed a 
strong attachment to their country. For example, the celebration of the Pakistan 
Independence Day on 14th August is considered by the Pakistani community in Dubai as one 
of the most significant events to celebrate. ‘Pakistani-ness’ is a dynamic concept that 
changes, modifies and evolves in light of the emotional and affective ties, personal stories 
and the context; it is never predetermined and it cannot be ascribed. Rita, one of my 
participants said 
I think because I grow up in Dubai I struggled with this [Pakistani] identity… I wanted to go 
to pubs, bars with my friends, but my parents said “no, we do not do that, it is not in our 
culture, your sisters do not go out”, and I could not wear certain clothes. And I would not fight 
against it. So identity is something I really struggled, but now this is my Asian life, I am a very 
comfortably Pakistani and I am very proud of my Pakistani identity now, and I would do 
anything for my country (Interview with Rita, 27th October 2015).  
Rita’s story encapsulates how belonging is contextual, situational and flexible. She was a 
young Pakistani who moved to Dubai when she was five years old. She was exposed to 
diverse cultures and values and she struggled to define her ‘Pakistani-ness’. Belonging was 
addressed in terms of experiences, everyday practices and emotions. She constructed 
belonging by comparing her life with that of ‘others’ and she struggled to escape from the 
attributions ‘chosen’ and applied to her by her family: a Muslim Pakistani woman. As 
Anthias (2013, p. 8) argues, belonging is also “about attributions designated by others 
formally or informally, some of which might not tally with your lived experiences”.    
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Belonging is contextual and flexible. To be a Pakistani in the UAE is different from 
being a Pakistani in the United Kingdom (UK). Ismail, who is a British-Pakistani, underlined 
how his ‘Pakistani-ness’ is determined by the religious dimension and he constructed his 
sense of belonging to the Emirati context by sharing everyday life, rhythms and moments 
with other Muslims regardless of their nationality.70 He also underscored how belonging 
swings between his Pakistani heritage and English background. But he also emphasized that 
Dubai is the place where his religious identity along with his ‘Pakistani-ness’ are currently 
fuelled. He said 
…[in Dubai] I also feel comfortable because as a Muslim. For example, wherever I go, for us 
even a smile or to greet somebody with as-salām, which is peace, is an act of worship…so it 
feeds my soul a little bit…I have a couple of friends who work in the same school they are 
Pakistanis they were brought up in the North-West of England. I am quite close to them simply 
because we are all, not just the fact that we are all Pakistanis, but also the fact that we were 
born and raised in the North-West, so we have a similar kind of sense of humour, an outlook 
of life…we grown up in a similar environment…I am Pakistani by blood, but born and raised 
in England, it is going to be diluted anyway; it is going to be a mix of the two. So, my own 
identity, I am a Pakistani in terms of the fact that my family is Pakistani, you know follow 
certain customs or dress, in terms of everyday life when I speak to my friends we converse in 
English, you know we try to hold on certain values, which English people have as well, but of 
course you have more in common with people who have more in common with you...For me, 
as I am also gaining more knowledge of my religion, I am also gaining a sense of the fact that 
this religion [Islām] is designed to actually override any nationalistic kind of ideology 
(Interview with Ismail, 7th November 2014). 
The above quotation encapsulates how the discourse on ‘Pakistani-ness’ is articulated in 
different ways, such as the role played by religion in forging Ismail’s ‘way of life’. His 
'Pakistani-ness' also manifested itself because he identified himself within a relational web, 
such as kinship. Ismail identified himself and categorized Pakistanis with ‘Pakistani blood’. 
In his words, the biological (‘Pakistani blood’) and cultural dimensions are blended together. 
However, as Maleševic (2004, p. 5) has put it, categorization risks essentializing and 
reducing collectivity to a group of people that “do not necessarily have anything in common. 
Such an attitude essentializes and reduces cultural, political and value diversity of an 
individual to a single clear-cut label such as ‘Asian’”. Categorizing entails labelling groups 
and individuals, and it risks ‘flattening’ them without recognizing the existence of “sub-
groupings and particular ways of being a Muslim, Pakistani and Asian” (Maleševic, 2004, 
p. 5). Ismail felt a sense of discomfort because his sense of belonging was negotiated in light 
                                            
70 This also happens in Western countries. During my field research in the Islamic associations in Italy and the 
UK, I saw Muslims of different nationalities perform their religious duties together (Errichiello, 2007, 2012b). 
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of the British context; the tension between his ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the place where he raised 
underscores the situational and contextual nature of belonging. The overlapping of different 
elements, blood, heritage, dress, customs and religion that are mixed and blend with a 
Western lifestyle is evident. In Dubai he re-discovered his Islamic identity as well as his 
‘Pakistani-ness’ that in England were weakened because of the contacts and interactions with 
a context and a lifestyle that did not fit entirely with him. However, Ismail tends to mix 
together biological and cultural dimensions; it seems that he tends to essentialize the sense 
of belonging; this perspective does not unpack the complexities and diversity existing within 
a group and /or a community in which different categories intersect (e. g. ethnicity, gender 
and class).  
In Dubai, my Pakistani participants’ ethnic identity, such as Punjabi, Sindhi, or 
Baluchi was used to describe their geographical origins (see chapter 5), and when it came to 
define their ‘Pakistani-ness’ they moved beyond regionalism and ethnicity in such a way to 
identify those elements that they considered important and peculiar in relation to their 
personal stories, background and their life in Dubai. However, those elements could also be 
linked to their regional and ethnic origins, but my participants identified those elements as 
peculiar of their ‘Pakistani-ness’ and not as characterizing, for example, ‘Baluchi-ness’.  
 
 
6.3.2 ‘Flexible belonging’ in ‘lived practice’  
As I outlined above, among Pakistani professionals, belonging is flexible because it 
swings between ‘preserving’ ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the Emirati context. In this section, I 
discuss how it works in ‘practice’. Belonging is flexible because one belongs ‘to’ the 
Pakistani community in light of the common values, culture, religion, customs and heritage. 
But at the same time, one belongs ‘with’ other people to the Emirati context because they 
share everyday life and experiences with other individuals. Belonging is flexible because to 
be a Pakistani in Dubai is different from being a Pakistani in Pakistan. The following 
anecdote can help to illustrate this aspect. Leila, one of my participants, said  
...When I go to his [brother] house, it reminds me our childhood, when I see his kids I see 
myself. I see myself in his kids. I give you a very small example. Last time that we were all 
together we had no electricity for about 18 hours. My daughter, the young brother, he is civilian 
also, he is a businessman and he lives in Karachi, his kids extremely spoiled, they did not sleep 
for all night, I could not sleep, my young brother could not sleep, my older brother and his 
kids slept, they did not feel it. Extremely adaptable, they took the shorts off and they slept all 
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night. Got up in the morning they could understand why all of us were so cranky. My older 
brother was extremely upset with me when I said I could not sleep at night. He said “you 
should remember where you come from this is how we brought up with”… I stayed with him 
for three nights and it was freezing and cold…He did not let me know that his house had only 
cold water, he showers with cold water, and he said “you have done it before why it is a 
problem now” and I said “I am not used it anymore” and he said “are you sure?” and I 
showered with cold water … I shamed of myself (Interview with Leila, 14th October 2015). 
This story encapsulates how belonging is flexible and contextual. During the interview, as a 
Pakistani in Dubai, Leila underlined that she was proud of her roots, heritage, family 
background and religious identity. At the same time, she also highlighted a strong attachment 
to the Emirati context where she had lots of friends from all different nationalities and she 
enjoyed her lifestyle in Dubai that was characterized by gatherings with friends, cousins and 
social events. When she went to Pakistan, she felt a sense of discomfort, she felt like an alien 
in her country. However, belonging to the Pakistani context was ‘re-activated’ through a 
symbolic act (to have a shower with cold water) which was done in order to take her past 
and heritage back so that she could feel that she still belonged to that space and locale, then 
her past and experiences were still important to determine her belonging. The symbolic act 
was something that she would never do in the UAE where she is now accustomed to a 
different lifestyle and her ‘Pakistani-ness’ emerged in different ways and with a different 
meaning. To be a Pakistani in Dubai means sharing experiences and everyday life with other 
fellow nationals and individuals, and it also means adopting a different lifestyle which results 
from the context. To be a Pakistani in Pakistan, for my participant, means reaffirming a 
different lifestyle, re-adapting to a different context, and as such, belonging is experienced 
and embodied in a different way according to the specific context. But more than that, in 
Pakistan, ethnicity and regionalism are ‘re-activated’ because they serve to build a sense of 
belonging and this happens by 'recovering' family background, heritage, past and customs, 
whereas, in the UAE, regionalism and ethnic identity are subsumed under the ‘label’ 
‘Pakistani-ness’. As Leila emphasized, there was tension between her lifestyle in Dubai and 
her past in Pakistan. This tension seems to be overcome through a process of 
“contextualization of social experience” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 994, original 
emphasis). In other words, the existing tension between past and present is due to the 
different lifestyle that she had to cope with while travelling back in Pakistan, but she was 
able to contextualize and ‘recall’ her past experiences to deal with the current situation. It is 
not easy to switch between different contexts and situations, and Leila blamed herself, but 
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she was also able to take back her background and contextualize her social experience; she 
engaged with different environments, and after blaming herself, she was able to deal with a 
different structural environment by looking at the past in order to respond “to the problems 
posed by challenging situations” (Morawska, 2007, p. 12). 
Leila also underscored the importance to ‘preserve’ her ‘Pakistani-ness’, especially 
for her daughter, and she also emphasized that she felt ‘at home’ in Dubai. She said 
…I travel back [Pakistan] often in order to maintain connections with her [daughter] roots, so 
she has to know, where she comes from. She speaks Urdu… fluently… she has to know the 
language and where she comes from…I do have Emirati friends…my husband has got good 
and close Emirati friends who come over and they treat us as part of a big family… I am saying 
the Emiratis who are known to us, once you know them, you are part of them (Interview with 
Leila, 14th October 2015). 
This is one of the examples of ‘flexible belonging’ that is constructed through shared values, 
customs and culture with other fellow nationals as well as experiences and practices of 
everyday life in Dubai.  
‘Flexible belonging’ is more than material resources and legal status, even though 
they might contribute to construct belonging. It is flexible because it allows people to 
‘activate’ and/or ‘recover’ heritage, past, customs and experiences in light of the context, 
space and locale.  
 
 
 
 
6.4 ‘Flexible belonging’ and the decision-making process   
The notion of ‘flexible belonging’ relies on the relation between self and society and 
in order to understand Pakistani professionals’ belonging it is important to unpack why they 
decided to migrate to Dubai.  
Dubai is a city that in the last decades has attracted interests from many scholars 
(Buckley, 2012; Vora, 2013). They have discussed the role played by migrants in developing 
the emirate, but when it comes to discussing the everyday life of migrants and trying to 
understand the reasons that led them to choose to migrate to Dubai, scholars have tended to 
overlook the complexity of reasons that push them to move to the emirate, apart from 
economic reasons (Kathiravelu, 2016; Gardner, 2010a; Vora, 2013). However, there are 
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other motives that push people to migrate to Dubai, such as the structural violence in the 
home country (Gardner, 2010a), drug abuse, alcoholism or marital discord, as Afsar (2016) 
suggests. In some of the stories told in Mahdavi’s (2011) book, the decision-making process 
was also driven by love affairs. In this section, I discuss the decision to migrate of Pakistani 
professionals in order to underscore that their decision was linked to different elements, such 
as job opportunities and good salaries. But it was also articulated on different levels: 
emotional, personal and practical.  
During my fieldwork, I asked my participants to explain what they thought of Dubai 
and through their life stories I have been able to interpret the different reasons that pushed 
them to migrate to the Emirate. Dubai is a city where different cultures, religions and 
languages coexist (Vora, 2013). The intersection of all these elements is one of the reasons 
that pushed some Pakistani professionals to migrate. John, for example, said 
Dubai is not an Islamic city in that sense. Dubai is more of a cosmopolitan city, with the best 
of East and the best of West. You see you can have many issues in Dubai but you do not feel 
you are away from home. Dubai attracts you because you have freedom, you have that liberty. 
You have an Indian market in Deira or Bur Dubai and you know you feel you are like in a part 
of India or Pakistan. Dubai in that sense, the peace the security is excellent. You know in that 
way it is a very wonderful place. But Dubai is not an easy city, in the sense that it is an 
expensive city, it is very expensive…[in Dubai] we do preserve our Pakistani identity, we do 
it all time. There are different groups of people who promote cultural activities, who promote 
many kinds of things, which… also projects the image of your country that you have culture, 
we brought up different seminars, exhibitions, shows, so we have all these projects to show 
we have our culture and we relate our culture and identity (Interview with John, 8th November 
2015). 
John emphasized how the globalized nature of Dubai is one of the reasons that pushed him 
and other people to settle in the city. It is where East and West coexist; different religions 
and cultures live peacefully together. But Dubai is also a place where there are issues such 
as the traffic of a big city; modernity and globalization have also brought with them issues 
such as drugs, alcoholism and disease, such as HIV/AIDS (Abdulla, 2006a).71 But more than 
that, Dubai is geographically close to Pakistan and India, so one can travel back and forth 
very easily and cheaply. At the same time, John also underscored the importance of and the 
need to maintain his roots, the links with his ‘Pakistani-ness’, which is a resource (Bourdieu, 
1987) that he tended to ‘preserve’.  
                                            
71 However, I would argue that the spreading of these issues in the UAE does not result from globalization.  
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Dubai as a port city was exposed to exchanges with other cultures, contacts with 
people from different countries with different religions and languages (see chapter 4). Leila 
said 
…I feel it is a very good blend for us at least. As Muslims, it is like you can get everything 
without any problems, as halāl food and so on and we have got no issue for those things, you 
know. You have got a great exposure to East and West, you have the opportunity to meet 
people from all over the world… I fast, I pray, I do all these things but I do because it gives 
me satisfaction not because of anything else. There are days I do not pray at all also…all those 
things…we get together, obviously with the family,  I have a lot of family here also, cousins, 
my daughter is extremely close to everyone and I make sure that she is (Interview with Leila 
14th October 2015). 
In the above quotation, Leila described the attractiveness of Dubai which resulted from its 
past history where different cultures blended together. For a Muslim, Dubai has the facilities 
and entertainments of a modern and global city, and at the same time it allows Muslims to 
go to a restaurant without worrying if the food is licit. Leila was very proud of her ‘Pakistani-
ness’ and family background, and she emphasized the importance, for her daughter, to know 
her roots and her own language which is a symbolic and cultural capital that makes her proud 
of her origins. In Dubai, one can feel at ‘home’ because of its multi-cultural milieu. John and 
Leila articulated the notion of ‘flexible belonging’ as Pakistani professionals who feel that 
they belong to Pakistan, but who at the same time build their sense of belonging by living 
and sharing experiences with other people in Dubai. ‘Flexible belonging’ allows 
constructing an ‘in-group’ identity because people share spaces, tastes, moments, rhythms 
and everyday life with other ethnic, national and cultural groups (Khalaf & Alkobaisi, 1999).  
The multi-cultural nature of Dubai resulted from its geographical position; the 
proximity to the Indian sub-continent has opened the door to the arrival of many migrants 
because  
… Dubai…is very close to Pakistan so it is very easy to go there. You know we have ten flights 
a day to Karachi from here. So it is very easy, it is one and half to two hours’ flight. Today in 
fact, the newspapers are celebrating 30 years of the Emirates starting the operation and the 
first flight was to Karachi. It is very convenient for us because we are very close to our family 
and friends in Pakistan… we have still a lot of family and friends there. So I do go, I visit 
Pakistan three or four times a year for family and personal reasons (Interview with 
Muhammad, 25th October 2015). 
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The physical position represents one of the reasons that drove my Pakistani participants’ 
choice to move to Dubai. Muhammad emphasized how the geographic proximity serves to 
‘preserve’ the links with his roots and family members in the home country.  
It would, however, be misleading to overlook the role played by religion in driving 
and shaping Pakistanis’ everyday life. Dubai tends to ‘preserve’ its Islamic identity at least 
in the presence of many mosques disseminated throughout the city. Religion can also trigger 
the decision to migrate to Dubai. As mentioned in chapter 5, the religious dimension is part 
of their private sphere and they are aware that belonging to the umma does not subvert the 
hierarchical social structure and asymmetrical power relationships existing in the UAE 
(Ahmad, 2017). Abdallah said 
It [Dubai] was close to home and culturally and religious more acceptable… obvious from the 
religious point of view it was more acceptable to be in Dubai than in anywhere and it was close 
to home, my parents are getting old so they needed me close… I think you feel more close to 
your religion and culture here, we have a big expats population of Pakistanis here. So to be 
honest you do not feel to be out of Pakistan here. We consider the UAE as a second home; we 
have very strong relations with the UAE from the very day of independence. Pakistan was the 
first country to recognize the UAE (Interview with Abdallah 8th November 2015).  
There is thus an intersection between at least three different components. The religious 
dimension, the geographical proximity and ‘flexible belonging’ which is constructed by 
overlapping ‘Pakistani-ness’ (belonging ‘to’) with the need to share spaces, locales and 
everyday life with other people (belonging ‘with’). Religion led Ismail to argue that, in 
Dubai, he ‘re-discovered’ his Islamic identity. He said 
I think Dubai is whatever you want it to be. I think Dubai has two parallel worlds. One is that 
it is proud of their religion that shows in the provisions that they have, beautiful mosques, 
malls in which you have prayer rooms. It does not come secondary, you know, we went to a 
zoo in the early part of this year, and there is a mosque in the zoo. They cater to somebody 
who wants to practice their religion and they are proud to help you allow outside that, and it 
is prominent in that sense. In the other sense, I also feel they do not stop anybody else from 
practicing their religion, they respect that at least from what I have seen… there is church here 
and this kind of things. So this is a place where people flowed from all different walks of life, 
from different religion. I think if there was any restriction, they would not have come. I think 
Dubai is can be whatever you want it to be as long as you are not creating any problems for 
the society at large (Interview with Ismail 7th November 2014). 
Religion plays an important role in the decision-making process. Dubai is a place where 
‘diversity’ is articulated and blending with a Western lifestyle resulting from globalization 
(Abdulla, 2006a).  
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Unpacking the reasons that pushed Pakistani professionals to migrate means 
understanding that their decision-making process (for which they mobilize their social, 
cultural and economic capital) is driven by the desire to construct belonging in a different 
locale; nonetheless they continue maintaining the links with their culture, language and 
heritage. These stories and experiences encapsulate how the discourse on belonging is 
framed within a transnational and translocal lens; it is transnational because it is forged 
between the country of origin, destination and, in some cases, beyond; it is translocational 
in the sense that belonging is constructed by moving between different spaces, places and 
contexts. Unfolding Pakistani professionals’ decisions to migrate allows acknowledging that 
‘flexible belonging’ relies on the constant and dynamic relation between self and society, 
between human agency and structure, and the construction of belonging fluctuates between 
‘preserving’ ‘Pakistani-ness’ and feeling part of the local context of Dubai.    
 
 
 
6.5 Lifestyle and ‘flexible belonging’ 
As outlined above, habitus is the way in which people tend to view the world 
influenced by the context (field), tastes, dispositions, background, experiences and habits. In 
this section, I argue that the sense of belonging for low-wage migrants, especially of 
construction workers and Pakistani professionals is felt and experienced differently because 
it is shaped by the way in which both classes of workers lead their lives, their different tastes, 
dispositions (habitus), experiences, practices, and the presence of family members in Dubai.  
As mentioned earlier, Anthias (2013) argues that economic, material resources and 
formal membership could strengthen belonging to a specific context thus suggesting that 
belonging could be viewed as a class-based concept. In the UAE, material resources and 
juridical membership could not necessarily determine belonging. Obviously, they can, to a 
certain extent, facilitate the migration experience and allow dealing with the complexities 
and constraints of migration in the UAE characterized by temporariness and discrimination, 
as some of my participants imparted. Despite discrimination, Pakistani professionals feel 
that they belong to this place where they have spent many years, where some of them were 
brought up, where their children were born and where they also established companies. In 
the Emirati context, belonging is thus characterized by fluidity and flexibility because 
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Pakistani professionals’ life is necessarily articulated, in light of the multi-cultural milieu, 
through social interactions developed, at the same time, both with people of the same ethno-
national community (belonging ‘to’) and with individuals of different nationalities with 
whom they share everyday life, experiences and practices (belonging ‘with’) (Anthias, 
2015). Similarly, low-wage migrants, such as construction workers, who have a different 
lifestyle in comparison to professional migrants, articulate their belonging to the Emirati 
context but in different ways. 
Construction workers express their belonging ‘to’ their ‘Pakistani-ness’ (this is valid 
for all nationalities) because in the labour camps, where they live, they  
create and display some ownership over everyday space…through putting up pictures of 
family, religious deities or inspirational figures…[they tend] to personalise space with 
significant objects expresses a desire to maintain a sense of self through links with their past 
and families back home (Kathiravelu, 2016, p. 152).72   
But they also construct belonging ‘with’ other individuals because they live, work, share 
experiences, constraints and practices in everyday life (Khalaf & Alkobaisi, 1999). This is 
where belonging crosses boundaries of ethnic identity (Anthias, 2013).  
Construction workers share spaces, struggles and practices with fellow nationals and 
other migrants. Belonging is forged in relation to their ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the context in 
which they live. During my field research, I observed that construction workers of different 
nationalities prayed together, they shared spaces, rhythms, gestures and words (in Arabic) 
and this also serves to construct belonging. In their own spaces, places and social categories, 
they articulate their belonging by sharing moments, experiences and struggles with other 
people. This is what Kathiravelu (2016) defines as homosociality, which is a form of 
socialization that serves to spread a sense of unity and cohesion among construction 
workers.73 It means that male migrants share their everyday life with other men in the labour 
camps sleeping, washing and eating within the tight spaces of the labour camps and 
“articulate such intimacy as a normal part of the migrant experience” (Kathiravelu, 2016, p. 
                                            
72 This quote does not refer explicitly to Pakistani construction workers. However, it is important because it 
illustrates how construction workers of different nationalities use the space in the labour camps to build 
belonging.  
73 This term can also be applied to taxi drivers. During my research, I talked with many of them that lived in 
Sharjah. They told me that they were accommodated in flats provided by the taxi company with a small kitchen, 
one bathroom and one big bedroom with six beds. Twelve taxi drivers were accommodated in each flat and 
they slept ‘on shift’ which means that while six taxi drivers were at work the other six could sleep and vice-
versa.   
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157). They ‘preserve’ their past, customs and traditions and they also share spaces and places 
with other people.  
I use the example of low-wage migrants, especially of construction workers, to 
illustrate differences in belonging. Such differences are useful to explain why and how 
Pakistani professionals feel part of the Emirati context, and how this happens differently 
from low-wage migrants. This is where ‘flexible belonging’ allows understanding that it 
would be misrepresentative to emphasize the significance of class hierarchies and social 
status in order to build a sense of belonging. It emphasizes migrants’ agency, and it 
underscores the importance of the relation between structure and agency in migration studies 
in order to better understand how social interactions develop.  
 Table 6.1 Characteristics of migrants74 
Unskilled/semi-skilled Pakistani migrants Pakistani Professionals 
Villages/Towns Urban areas  
Migration background Migration background   
Borrow money No need to borrow money   
Mostly men Men and women   
Bachelor Bachelor/Married couple   
Regularly send money back home to repay 
debt 
Occasionally send money back 
money 
Fixed-term contract Permanent contract/residence visa renewed 
Cannot change employer (modified by law) Cannot change employer (modified by law) 
Passports are withheld Passports are not withheld   
Salaries not paid (on time) Salaries paid (on time)   
Most of them return home Stable or new migration project 
 
 Source: elaboration of the author 
Table 6.1 illustrates some of the characteristics of different occupational groups among 
Pakistani migrants. The individual migration project of these different groups relies on 
different dynamics and characteristics. For unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, the probable 
lack of previous contacts in the receiving country push them to seek agents in order to be 
helped finding a local sponsor and preparing all documents required to migrate to the GCC 
countries (Breeding, 2012; Gardner, 2012). This is done by borrowing money from 
moneylenders or mortgaging their few assets. For Pakistani professionals, there is no need 
                                            
74 The characteristics listed in the table are based upon the relevant literature on unskilled and semi-skilled 
South Asian migrants in the GCC countries (Kathiravelu, 2016), whereas the characteristics of Pakistani 
professionals in Dubai resulted from my research. 
Unskilled/semi-skilled Pakistani migrants Pakistani Professionals   
Villages/Towns Urb n areas  
Migration background Migration background   
B rrow money No need to b rrow money   
Mostly men Me  and women   
Bachelor Bachelor/Married couple   
Regularly send money back home to repay 
debt 
Occasionally send money back 
money 
Fixed-term contract Perma ent contract/residence visa renewed 
Cannot change employer (modified by law) Cannot change employer (modified by law) 
Passports are withheld Passports are not withheld   
Salaries not paid (on time) Salaries paid (on time)   
Most of them return home Stable or new migration project 
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to turn to agents because their networks, contacts and their migration background, in some 
cases, facilitate migration. It is easier for them to move without experiencing the ‘debt 
bondage’ as it happens for the unskilled and semi-skilled migrants (Kathiravelu, 2016). As 
mentioned in chapter 5, the channels through which Pakistani professionals arrived in Dubai 
entailed mobilizing and using their different forms of capital. These two classes of workers 
mobilize and use their capital (cultural, symbolic and social) in different ways. For example, 
low-wage migrants use their assets to obtain economic capital that allows them to migrate. 
Some other migrants use their symbolic capital to help would-be migrants get a job in Dubai 
(Osella & Osella, 2009), while Pakistani professionals mobilize their social, economic and 
cultural capital to move and to get better economic positions and jobs in Dubai. The type of 
capital possessed by would-be migrants determines the route and dynamic of the migration 
project (Van Hear, 2014); however, as Mahdavi (2011) suggests, some migrants are not able 
to capitalize their resources in light of racialized and gendered hierarchies existing in the 
UAE. 
There are other evident differences between the two classes of workers, but I wish to 
focus on how lifestyle affects the migration experience. As one of my participants, a 
Pakistani professional woman, claimed, construction workers seem to be spending no more 
than three to six years in Dubai,75 whereas professionals tend to spend many years, they 
invest money and they bring up their children in the Emirate. Low-wage migrants are mostly 
men and bachelors whereas professionals often have a family-based settlement. This also 
affects the construction of belonging insofar as the presence of children requires interacting 
with the local context. The flexibility of belonging results from dynamic practices which 
necessarily involve a change in the relation between self and society (May, 2011). As 
Gardner (2011) argues, migration has an impact on the families both in the receiving and 
sending countries. Low-wage migrants are forced to migrate alone and leave their families 
back home where they can survive through remittances (Gardner, 2011). The Indian and 
Pakistani middle-class migrants because earn enough money can sponsor their family 
members. Thus, they tend to reconstitute their families in the receiving countries. However, 
there is a disruption within the household; as Vora (2008) points out, in the Gulf countries, 
because of the visa regulation, most migrant families are nuclear and patriarchal, whereas in 
the home countries “extended families are the predominant familial form” (Gardner, 2011, 
                                            
75 During my research, I talked with a Pakistani taxi driver who has lived in Dubai for more than twenty years. 
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p. 17). Some members of the Pakistani middle-class professionals I interviewed negotiated 
different family structures. For example, Katie lives alone but she has many cousins living 
in Dubai; John lives with his wife and their children live abroad; Naseer lives with his wife, 
his married son and niece, they live all together, whereas his married daughter lives with her 
husband’s family; Mahmud, a Pakistani self-employed man, lives in Dubai with his son 
while his wife lives in the USA where their daughter is currently studying. It is evident that 
family is reconstructed in the Gulf countries in light of the migrants’ different migration 
project (Gardner, 2011).  
Lifestyle determines the way in which professionals tend to articulate their belonging 
and social relations with the local context. Rahman, one of my Pakistani participants, 
underlined how his lifestyle is expressed through contacts, social gatherings and events that, 
as emerged in the literature, one cannot find among low-wage migrants. He was thirty-eight 
years old when I met him in November 2015. He works in Abu Dhabi for a Western 
company, but he lives in Dubai with his mother and youngest brother. He is single, and he 
has spent few years in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where he worked in the banking sector. He 
has produced some documentaries on the condition of construction workers and the 
contradictions in the UAE society. He is a member of a group of filmmakers in Dubai. 
Because of his job, Rahman has a high standard of life and he lives in a big ‘gated space’ 
(see chapter 7). I asked him to describe his lifestyle and he said  
It is an interesting lifestyle, there is a lot to do. You know my residence itself has a spa and 
clubs around, you have also most opportunities…to explore the desert, you know there is a 
great beach, there is also outside the city where you can go and stay in a resort in the desert. 
There is also a lot of interesting people now increasingly in Dubai. So in Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
I am connected with some filmmakers who will be experimenting with films, different topics, 
there is a comedy club close to our area where expats, Westerners and South Asians gather. 
So there are lots of people now that are organizing which I think probably 15 years ago would 
not present in Dubai at all. It was a very dry environment just to make money, but now there 
is a more creative people actually experimenting with ideas (Interview with Rahman, 2nd 
November 2015)  
Leisure activities and social events, described by Rahman and which require economic 
capital, are mostly a prerogative of professionals. During my field research, the only leisure 
activity that I observed among low-wage migrants was a walk with friends and fellow 
nationals in a shopping mall, or a walk along the Dubai Creek on Friday afternoon or 
Saturdays. Nevertheless, as my own research was not directly focused on low-wage 
migrants, it is possible that they also participated in more informal social gatherings, like 
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eating a meal together or going to the mosque or a church. However, different tastes, 
behaviours (habitus) and lifestyles seem to not inhibit the contacts between the low-wage 
Pakistani migrants and professionals. For example, John said   
…they [Pakistani low-wage migrants] are from different mind-set; they do not have education 
at all. So they are accepted, we coexist, that’s not the problem. The gardener in my house is 
Pakistani, and we treat him well, no discrimination against him…we treat him well (Interview 
with John, 6th November 2014). 
John emphasized how different tastes, dispositions and habits determine the difference 
between classes. But he also underscored that such differences did not hamper social 
relations. However, it is evident that the relation is limited to employer-employee. In other 
words, even though their good relationship is based on their common ethno-national origins, 
the asymmetrical power relationships cannot be erased, and this is mostly evident especially 
in social gatherings and events where class differentiation relies on creating a fracture 
between the public sphere, in which Pakistani domestic workers or gardeners are relegated 
in a subordinated position, and the private sphere where the relation employer-employee 
seems to be attenuated.   
The multi-cultural nature of Dubai stems from the everyday life of different people 
who live side by side, such as in middle-class enclaves (see chapter 7), go to the same 
workplaces, schools, spaces and share the same interests, way of acting, tastes, dispositions 
(habitus), experiences and practices (Anthias, 2015). Despite temporariness (see below) and 
uncertainties of the migration experience, some of my Pakistani participants consider Dubai 
as a ‘home’ because, as mentioned earlier, they were brought up in the emirate and even if 
they go to study in the USA or UK they prefer to return to Dubai as they feel that they belong 
to the Emirati context. However, as noted, low-wage migrants construct their belonging to 
the Emirati context in a different way and in different places, spaces and locales. Lifestyle 
affects how belonging is constructed but not the construction of a sense of belonging. 
 
 
 
            6.6 Temporariness among Pakistani professionals  
Pakistani professionals’ life is articulated through contacts and interactions with 
other fellow nationals, migrants and Emiratis. Apart from Emiratis, all migrants in the UAE 
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are considered as temporary migrants including children of foreign workers who were born 
in the GCC countries (Naufal & Genc, 2012). Temporariness entails leaving the country 
when the work contract expires. In this section, I explain if and to what extent Pakistani 
professionals’ life is influenced by temporariness, which is tied up with ‘flexible belonging’ 
insofar as the former does not inhibit the latter. Put differently, Pakistani professionals’ 
temporary status has not impeded the construction of belonging and it has not inhibited any 
chance to interact with the Emirati context, thus suggesting that social interactions with other 
fellow nationals, nationalities and Emiratis in the workplaces and, in some cases, also in 
leisure activities have taken place.  
In their ethnographic accounts, both Kanna (2011) and Vora (2013) have emphasized 
that temporariness affects migrants’ daily lives and to a certain extent the discourse on 
temporariness is entrenched with that on inclusion and social interactions with Emiratis. 
Vora (2013) argues that migrants find a way to construct their sense of belonging in light of 
temporariness. Vora’s (2013, p. 89) informants emphasize that their temporary status has not 
impeded to construct a sense of belonging, “Dubai as a whole was a site of belonging even 
as it included several spaces of nonbelonging” (see chapter 3). 
During our conversations, the recognition of their temporary status was one of the 
main elements that my participants underlined. Zia, for example, said 
…the one thing that I have always put in my mind is that this is not my country. One day I 
have to leave this country. It is very very clear to me. Whatever policy they pursue, they put 
in this place, I take it as is their right, whatever they want to do (Interview with Zia, 19th 
October 2015). 
Zia was aware that the UAE was not his country; he is one of my participants who, although 
being born in Kuwait and having spent many years in Dubai, has never had any contacts 
with Emiratis.76 However, this has not impeded interactions with the local context and with 
other people (especially Pakistanis and Westerners, because he worked in a Western 
company). He recognized the role of local authorities to define who belongs and who does 
not belong (see chapters 4 and 8), because, in a certain way, there “exist…hierarchies of 
belonging, and not everyone is allowed to belong (May, 2011, p. 368).  
                                            
76 He has never had any Emirati friend, but he was ‘forced’ to have contacts with Emiratis at least when he had 
to renew his residence permit (iqāma). 
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The discourse on temporariness is entrenched with the local policy and labour market 
as well as the respect that Pakistani participants manifested for the ‘law of the land’. Ester 
underscored how temporariness affects all migrants and, suddenly, if one loses the job, s/he 
risks losing everything. She said 
…You have to be mentally prepared to move to this country. I have seen most Pakistanis they 
come here, they have no assets in Pakistan and suddenly when they lose everything, they say 
“Oh my god, we have to return to Pakistan, we do not have a house (Interview with Ester, 13th 
October 2015). 
Ester underscored that the individual’s migration project should rely on the idea to have 
always an alternative in case the migration experience is not successful. Temporariness 
affects how Pakistani professionals behave and their interactions with the local context. 
Katie, one of my participants, was twenty-eight years old when I met her in November 2015. 
She was born in Oman where her father worked in banking sector. After a while she returned 
to Pakistan where she spent five years. When her father started working in a bank in Dubai, 
she moved to the UAE. She graduated in a prestigious Pakistani University while her parents 
lived in the Emirate. She is single and works for an international company in Dubai. Her 
parents are now settled in Pakistan. She lives on her own in a ‘gated space’ (see chapter 7) 
in Dubai. She said 
…My dad has never actually settled down here because he was always in the stream of mind 
that we could back anytime. So, we never settled down, you know we had things…in storage 
because he did not want to use…I am going into this mind-set as well, I do not know how long 
I will be here, I do not want to buy this painting for my house, I do not want to do this 
(Interview with Katie, 1st November 2015). 
Katie clearly emphasized that temporariness can bring to lead a life ‘in-between’ and she 
inherited this behaviour from her father. But more than that, temporariness represents the 
‘sword of Damocles’ on my participants’ life; hence, the need to project strategies and 
mobilize symbolic, social, economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1987) to deal with 
temporariness. As Ahmad (2017, p. 66) suggests, in relation to migrant domestic workers, 
temporariness “reflect their being in a liminal position between their family households and 
work households…Their temporariness ensures their pivotal role in the dual production and 
reproduction of citizens, families, households, and ethnonational forms in both South Asia 
and the Gulf”.  
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Ismail also underlined how temporariness is an issue recognized by all people who 
consciously decide to migrate to Dubai. He said 
I met somebody here once, when I first came. I think he has a construction company and I 
think he has lived here for about thirty years. He said ‘I still feel like a visitor’, you know, 
because it is a transient place, you know, you feel like you are just passing through because 
there is no opportunity for anybody to become resident or this kind of thing, which again, I 
think, at the end of the day that is…it is a privilege of the people who rule that is their right to 
decide what they want. I do not think anybody can be grown up in a gorgeous place for having 
a policy that it does not matter how long you live there, you know, you cannot become a 
resident. You make your own decision to come based on that; nobody forces you to come 
(Interview with Ismail, 7th November 2014). 
Ismail emphasized how temporariness was closely entrenched with power relations and the 
role of the ruling elite to decide their own policy and rules. These rules serve to categorize 
and identify people on the grounds of their ethnicity and nationality (Brubaker & Cooper, 
2000). Pakistani professionals articulated their everyday life always bearing in mind their 
temporary status and this pushed them also to plan strategies upon leaving the country. For 
example, Katie said 
…a lot of my friends and family are also in this frame of mind where they think we need 
something more permanent now because we are now at that point that we have seen that our 
fathers worked here and they had to go back. So we are realizing ok, this is not permanent we 
need to think of some options. My sister, for example, has applied for a Canadian immigration; 
I have some friends who recently moved to Australia, to Canada. Everyone is thinking of 
permanent place” (Interview with Katie, 1st November 2015).   
Among the young generation the issue of temporariness and the need to find a new place to 
move when leaving the country has become a constant thought because of the experience of 
their fathers and mothers who had to leave the country after many years spent in Dubai. 
Low-wage migrants as well as Pakistani professionals are temporary migrants; 
however, temporariness affects them in different ways. Low-wage migrants, as mentioned 
earlier, have a different lifestyle and their migration project is mostly aimed to return to their 
home country (Table 6.1). For professionals, temporariness is also an issue insofar as their 
permanence in the country is affected by instability and uncertainties. This is the idea 
expressed by Ester, who said 
Construction workers live on day-to-day basis, but people like in my category they have been 
here for 20 years, 30 years or more, at least they have built a house and buy an apartment in 
Pakistan because, or wherever you want, there has to be a forth and back plan, most people do 
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not have it. Dubai lures you, attracts you, the glitter, the glamour, people who come here they 
do not want to leave (Interview with Ester, 13th October 2015). 
Social class articulates how people organize their everyday life, which, in turn, affects how 
people plan their future, how and to what extent they interact with the local context. People 
mobilize different forms of capital to articulate their belonging and to deal with 
temporariness. Rita also underlined how her life was affected by temporariness when she 
lost her job. She said 
Last year I lost my job in Microsoft because of cutting down… When I lost my job here, I lost 
my Emirates ID card and when I did not have an ID card I could not rent a car, then I had to 
be on another visa, a visit visa. All complications come in, everything becomes difficult.  It is 
so scaring; I had to move in another country three times to get my visit visa renewed as a 
Pakistani (Interview with Rita, 27th October 2015). 
Rita underscored how her everyday life was related to the need to have a job, because 
unemployment entails leaving the country in one month. This happens regardless of how 
many years one has spent in Dubai and how many family members live with you in the 
emirate. However, Rita’s story exemplifies how temporariness only superficially touched 
my participants’ life. Her story encapsulates the links between temporariness and ‘flexible 
belonging’. She was born in Pakistan but she moved to Dubai when she was a child; she has 
spent more than twenty years in the city. These elements shed light on the existence of a 
sense of belonging which is constructed over the years; it is not challenged by temporariness. 
When she lost her job she could migrate to the USA, where her parents live now. But she 
decided to remain in Dubai because she considers it as a ‘home’, her daughter went to the 
local school and her ex-husband was in Dubai. Rita’s story is significant because 
temporariness has not affected the construction of belonging to her ‘Pakistani-ness’ and with 
the Emirati context, as mentioned earlier.   
Temporariness might inhibit any social contact and interactions between migrants 
and the Emirati context. However, it did not constrain everyday life and contacts with other 
migrants. Belonging is constructed beyond legal status, formal membership and material 
resources; it is constructed beyond the rules and structures of the field. Pakistani 
professionals are affected by temporariness but it has not impeded them from feeling that 
they belong to the Emirati context. The notion of ‘flexible belonging’ emphasizes the 
dynamic relationship between ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the Emirati context, between self and 
society (Ahmad, 2017). 
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6.7 Transnational and local connections 
Temporariness is a ‘permanent’ status because all foreign workers are considered as 
temporary migrants and to obtain citizenship is nearly impossible (see chapter 4). Pakistani 
professionals are very aware of their temporary status, they try to find and adopt strategies 
in order to deal with temporariness. In this section, I discuss some of these strategies which 
serve to demonstrate that belonging is flexible because Pakistani professionals can build 
transnational and local connections to deal with temporariness. In other words, they can 
construct (or ‘re-construct’) their belonging in a different context.  
Gardner (2008, p. 74) used the term ‘strategic transnationalism’ to argue that the 
Indian elite in Bahrain rely on “historic networks forged in the colonial and postcolonial era, 
and transnational networks that connect them to multiple continents”. It means that when 
they have to leave the country they will use their transnational connections to find a way to 
settle down in a different country. Pakistani professionals, to a certain extent, tend to adopt 
the same strategy. They tend to create transnational networks through their family members 
(children, or brothers or sisters) already settled in Western countries to migrate upon leaving 
Dubai. However, these transnational networks are also developed to facilitate a return to 
Pakistan. Some of my participants expressed a strong attachment to their country of origin 
and have already decided to return to Pakistan, where they have bought a house. For 
example, Zia said 
…I have my own house [in Pakistan]… I have no intention to go to any other country. I will 
feel much more relaxed and happy if I go to Pakistan rather than if I go and settle in Canada 
because, for example, my son is a Canadian residence holder now so he intends to call us to 
settle there, but I have no intention of going and spending the rest of my life there. I would 
rather be in Pakistan than in any other place (Interview with Zia, 19th October 2015). 
Zia emphasized his emotional and affective ties with his home country. As noted above, he 
is one of my participants who has never had any contacts with Emiratis and he is the only 
participants that sent money back home to help his sister who is a widow. This emotional 
attachment to his home country has not hampered him to buy a house in Dubai. Other 
participants underlined the wish to return to their home country. For example, Naseer said 
…I have my own house, I have a plot… since I was born there actually [in Pakistan] and I 
have too much love for my country and I am positive actually that I will be happy there, this 
regards of the shortcomings [shortages] we have there, it is not an issue, it is my own country, 
I do not have to renew my residence, I do not have to ask for a visa, I do not have to ask for a 
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local sponsor there. And I feel proud of that actually (Interview with Naseer, 24th October 
2015).  
But I also talked with people who do not want to return to Pakistan. One of my participants 
said “I will move maybe not to Pakistan but maybe Canada or maybe America, we have our 
family there” (Interview with John, 6th November 2014). This is a very common practice, 
namely to join family members already settled in another country. One of my participants, 
who has children both in the USA and in the UK is likely to move to a Western country 
instead of returning to Pakistan.   
‘Flexible belonging’ allows building transnational and translocal networks that can 
facilitate the process of re-settlement. For Pakistani professionals, this process can be easy 
as well as traumatic. It is easy because they have capital to move and they can use their 
networks to negotiate relocation elsewhere. But it is also traumatic, especially for Pakistani 
women that have to return to Pakistan. Katie’s mother, for example, had problems to re-
adapt to the ‘Pakistani lifestyle’; she said 
…All of their friends are here [Dubai] as well, you know, they used to live in Business Bay in 
Executive Tower before [rich area, in the ‘city-centre’], so she had her community there, 
neighbours and they used to go walking. All of friends for 20 years here. So she is finding a 
bit difficult and then just small things like grocery shopping you do not get a lot of stuff there 
[Islamabad] (Interview with Katie, 1st November, 2015). 
Katie underscored that her mother was accustomed to a specific lifestyle in Dubai, but when 
she returned to Pakistan she had to ‘re-adapt’ to the local environment. Katie’s quotation 
illustrates the flexibility of belonging, thus suggesting that belonging is negotiated in light 
of the context, locale and place in which one lives.   
From my data, I have identified different approaches. Some Pakistani men, who got 
married, want to return to their home country; however, their wives do not want to return 
because Pakistan is considered, by some Pakistani women, as not a safe country. Ester said 
The main thing that I like about the UAE is the security aspect, the safety. Women are very 
safe in this country. I can walk on the street even at 2.00 am and nobody can come and snatch 
my bag, or my mobile or even coming and give me an attack because the system is such that 
women are protected. Same thing is not in Pakistan, it is in large city like Karachi, in any city 
women are not safe…Even when I go and visit Pakistan I am have this conscious, I am always 
looking around, I am not talking on my mobile too much in the public area because I have no 
idea who comes and snatches my bag and phone (Interview with Ester,13th October 2015). 
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Ester emphasized how the issue of safety and security affected her life and how she 
interacted with the local context. Some Pakistani men want to move to a Western country 
where they want to join their family members. Some Pakistani women whom I interviewed 
are ‘forced’ to return to Pakistan because they do not have any other alternative. The above 
quotation is relevant because the issue of safety has also been raised by Pakistani men when 
they talked about the difficulties for their wives to re-settle in Pakistan. 
In spite of temporariness, some foreign workers have found a strategy to remain 
‘permanently’ in the UAE. They have found local connections or intermediaries that can 
help them to overcome the issue of temporariness. This is what in Arabic is defined as wāsṭa, 
which means ‘intermediary’. But more than that, wāsṭa means “influence possessed by an 
individual” (Gardner 2010a, p. 154). In that sense, it is something that is used by people to 
indicate power, but, as Bristol-Rhys (2010b, p. 111) argues, people that have power “do not 
need someone who act on their behalf or to approach a powerful person with their petition”. 
The notion of wāsṭa is important to understand some of the strategies adopted by some 
Pakistani professionals to remain in the UAE. They created local connections, which entailed 
developing contacts and networks with Emiratis in order to negotiate and find a loophole to 
stay permanently in the country. This strategy relates, for example, to the establishment of 
companies. According to the sponsorship system (see chapter 5), in order to establish a 
company foreign workers need a local sponsor who owns 51 percent of the company. This 
strategy has been adopted by one of my participants (Naseer) who also said that if it fails, he 
will return to Pakistan. Suleyman, for example, has also created connections with some 
Emiratis and he has found a loophole to let his retired parents live in the country. Every year 
he renews their residence permit by declaring that he is the only son and that his parents are 
too old and nobody in Pakistan can look after them. In this way his parents, who do not want 
to leave the UAE, can live in Dubai permanently, unless the local authorities decide to not 
renew the residence permit.77   
Migration, temporariness and ‘flexible belonging’ are closely interrelated and 
intersect with class and social status. Transnational and local connections are used by 
Pakistani professionals to deal with temporariness and to define their migration project. As 
such, these strategies are class-based. For low-wage migrants, the adoption of these 
                                            
77 Due to the sensitivity of this topic, my participants asked me to not record with my tape-recorder their 
sentences. I took notes of these strategies in my field notes.  
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strategies is rather impossible. Temporariness affects all foreign workers but, as argued, in 
different ways. 
 
 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have defined Pakistani professionals as a category that encompasses 
not only the members of the PPW but also people of other group of workers (journalists, 
engineers and doctors). In relation to Pakistani professionals, I have introduced the notion 
of ‘flexible belonging’, which relies on Anthias’ (2006, 2015) work. Belonging is flexible 
because people belong at the same time to different categories and locales. It is flexible 
because it swings between belonging to a specific ethnic and/or national community with 
which people share values, customs, culture, religion and language (‘Pakistani-ness’), and 
the context in which people live. As such, Pakistani professionals interact with fellow 
nationals with whom they share religion, culture, or language as well as with individuals of 
other nationalities with whom they share experiences, practices, lifestyle, tastes and 
everyday life. Belonging is then flexible because it fluctuates between ethnic and national 
community and the local context. In Dubai, which is a multi-cultural and globalized field, 
my Pakistani participants felt at ‘home’ because of their lifestyle, tastes, dispositions, habits, 
experiences and personal stories, nevertheless they did not forget their heritage, culture, 
language, customs and traditions (‘Pakistani-ness’).  
To sum up, ‘flexible belonging’ is contextual, temporal and situational. People 
construct belonging because of the specific context, locale and situation (Anthias, 2015); it 
is determined by situations, experiences, personal stories, background and affective and 
emotional ties. If it was not so, in the Emirati context, where it is nearly impossible to obtain 
citizenship, where there is a lack of any policy aimed at integrating migrants and 
characterized by discrimination, it would not make sense to talk of belonging and we could 
not understand, for example, why Pakistani professionals whom I interviewed expressed 
such a strong emotional attachment to Dubai. ‘Flexible belonging’ means sharing 
experiences, affective ties, emotions, practices in everyday life. In this sense, material 
resources and economic gains do not determine but can facilitate the construction of a sense 
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of belonging. ‘Flexible belonging’ is relational, it is constructed in relation to someone 
and/or something to which one feels that one belongs because of sharing experiences, 
practices, tastes and moments. It is a boundary-making as well as a boundary-breaking 
concept (Anthias, 2015). ‘Flexible belonging’ allows grasping the complexities of the 
interrelationships between self and society.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RECOGNITION AND  ‘GATED SPACES’. 
THE PAKISTAN ASSOCIATION DUBAI.  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Pakistani professionals constructed 
belonging and that they felt part of the Emirati context in light of their personal stories and 
background. In this chapter, I examine the role and importance of the PAD (Picture 7.1), the 
only Pakistani association in Dubai, for the Pakistanis; it is a place of identification and 
belonging. 
The extant literature on migration in the GCC countries has largely ignored the role 
of migrant associations. My argument is that the PAD epitomizes the role and dynamics of 
migrant organizations in Western countries (and in other contexts as well) but I discuss 
issues that the literature on these organizations has mostly neglected, such as class 
hierarchies, divisions and their dynamics in a non-Western country. Apart from Chung’s 
(2005) research among Koreans in Los Angeles, the extant literature on migrant 
organizations in Western countries does not consider ethno-class hierarchies, conflicts and 
inter-migrant associations’ relations (Sardinha, 2009). This chapter draws on my 
observations, field notes and in-depth interviews with Abdallah, the key member of the PAD 
(see chapter 2); it also relies on the existing literature on migrant associations.  
The relevance of this chapter for my thesis relates to its contribution to the literature 
on structure and agency in migration studies. As mentioned in chapter 3, migrants ‘bring’ 
with them their national identity, which is partially reconstructed in migration context 
through the establishment of migrant associations. These organizations embody migrants’ 
agential capacity to act in a specific time-place in order to preserve and safeguard their 
customs and traditions. At the same time, they underscore migrants’ knowledge of local rules 
and laws that underpin the formation of these associations. Migrant associations represent 
the capacity of migrants to act and project their life in a new place and their knowledge of 
structures that regulate their everyday life in that context.    
The chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part, I utilize a top-down perspective 
in which the positionality of the PAD in relation to the Emirati context is addressed. In the 
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second part, I apply a bottom-up perspective in which I discuss the PAD as a ‘gated space’, 
which are spaces, sometimes not literally gated, where people feel a sense of belonging based 
on a common lifestyle, practices, experiences and a common ethno-national and cultural 
identity. This perspective also permits to acknowledge that belonging is constructed by 
making and breaking boundaries among communities, groups and spaces (see chapter 6). 
 
Picture 7.1 Façade of the PAD 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. I discuss the importance of migrant associations by 
unfolding their internal characteristics and complexities. The role and dynamics of the PAD 
is discussed in the following section, the analysis of which is based on the observations, 
interviews with Abdallah and conversations I had with participants during fieldwork in 
Dubai (see chapter 2). I then discuss the positionality of the PAD in relation to the Emirati 
context and I argue that recognition (in Fraser’s understanding, see chapter 3) should be 
replaced by gratitude manifested by local authorities by gifting a piece of land to the 
Pakistani community for their contribution to the development of Dubai. The concept of 
‘gated space’ in relation to the GCC countries, which represents the theoretical framework 
of the second part of the chapter, is addressed in the following section. I then expand this 
concept to the PAD which is an open ‘gated space’ where Pakistanis and other nationalities 
interact. Lastly, I address the relationships within the PAD where class inequalities and 
divisions emerged. 
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7.2 Migrant associations. Characteristics and dynamics  
Migrant associations express a sense of belonging and identification (Fortier, 2006). 
Throughout the GCC countries, there are several migrant organizations and/or clubs 
(Gardner, 2010a), and I argue that it is essential to assess their role for migrants. In this 
section, I discuss their dynamics and complexities to unfold their importance to the migrant 
communities and their positionality within the host society.  
My argument is framed on the assumption that it is not the number of migrants that 
determines the number of associations, and it is not the cultural difference with the host 
society that defines their formation, but their establishment is a matter of positionality which 
means that the context and the characteristics of the migrant populations are key factors to 
understanding their role and dynamics.  
Migrant associations have a relational nature which means that they are formed in 
relation to the needs of the members of the group, but one cannot ignore their relations with 
the receiving country because they ‘serve’ to assess to what extent migrants are integrated 
and participate into the host society. They are defined in different ways according to the 
perspective that one adopts. For example, Moya (2005, p. 834) defines them as secondary 
associations that exist “between the primary links of kinship and the equally non-voluntary 
arrangements of tertiary institutions like the state”. For Sardinha (2009, p. 76), a migrant 
association is “an organisation formed by individuals who consciously define themselves as 
members of an ethno-cultural group (based, for example, on such variables as country of 
origin, a common heritage, language, religion, consciousness of kind, etc.) within a larger 
context”.  
Migrant associations embody a group’s identity, heritage, culture and values 
(Sardinha, 2009). Their formation is stimulated by the idea that they are the result of cultural 
difference with the host society and this difference pushes migrant groups to mobilize 
resources in order to guarantee support for their fellow nationals and promote their cultural 
identity (Breton, 1964; Rex, 1973, 1987). As Moya (2005) argues, Breton’s (1964, p. 204) 
statement: “The more different the people of a certain ethnicity are from the members of the 
native community, the easier it will be for them to develop their own institutions”, is 
misleading insofar as where migrants are “culturally different from members of the host 
society have not set up more organisations than culturally similar immigrants have” 
(Sardinha, 2009, p. 78). For example, in Brazil, the Portuguese and Japanese migrants have 
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the same number of associations (Moya, 2005). Additionally, Schrover and Vermeulen 
(2005) argue that it is not the quantity of migrants that determines the numbers of migrant 
associations. In other words, the number of migrants settled in a specific area does not 
determine the presence of migrant associations, but their formation and development is 
influenced by other factors, such as the characteristics of the migrant population, labour 
market participation, social and cultural relations with the host society (Schrover & 
Vermeulen, 2005).  
Migrant associations have a dynamic and fluid nature; they evolve as the migration 
evolves. They respond to the needs and exigencies of the migrant groups but their role and 
importance change in relation to the context especially where discrimination is very common 
(Layton-Henry, 1990). Migrant associations also play a transnational role because they tend 
to maintain links between the country of origin and settlement. They are “transnational 
social spaces that function as transmitters of integration and identity options within a 
transnational social field” (Sardinha, 2009, p. 86, original emphasis).  
Migrant associations have a double role. On the one hand, they tend to preserve 
migrants’ identity and culture; on the other hand, they can encourage the involvement of 
migrants in the host society (Layton-Henry, 1990). Moreover, their structure and activities 
evolves and change over time and they can also play a political role especially when migrant 
groups are discriminated.  
 
 
 
 
7.3 The Pakistan Association Dubai 
Thus far very few studies have been undertaken on the importance and role of 
migrant associations to the foreign communities in the Arab Gulf region. Gardner (2010a, p. 
100), who focused on the Indian associations and clubs, argues that they are “the primary 
social foundation for foreign workers’ participation in the complex public sphere of 
contemporary Bahrain”. For Gardner (2010a), the presence of Indian associations and clubs 
in the public sphere serves to display the division between nationals and non-nationals (see 
chapter 3). These associations and clubs are not agents of change but a public manifestation 
of ‘India-ness’. Gardner’s (2010a) contribution is relevant, but my purpose is, however, to 
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delve into the complexities and dynamics of the PAD by arguing that it is not detached from 
the Emirati context but it forms part of it; it is the only place officially recognized by Dubai 
authorities as a pure expression of ‘Pakistani-ness’. In this section, I examine the history, 
dynamics and activities of the association, which are aimed at involving, helping and 
supporting the Pakistani community. Discussing in detail these aspects will contribute to 
make clear that the PAD is an inclusive organization that, ostensibly, is united and cohesive, 
but, as I discuss in the next sections, divisions also exist. This and the following sections 
draw on my qualitative data collection. 
I define the PAD as an umbrella and voluntary migrant association formed by some 
Pakistani migrants and whose internal and external affairs are managed by the Board of 
Trustees (BOT), which is formed by Pakistani doctors and businessmen. It is officially 
recognized and licensed by the Community Development Authority (CDA) of Dubai as the 
only Pakistani association of the Emirate. It does not receive any economic support neither 
from the UAE authorities nor from the Pakistani government. 
The origin of the PAD can be traced back to 1963, when a Pakistani doctor, in a small 
office in Deira, on the east bank of the Dubai Creek, decided to establish a place where all 
Pakistanis could interact and discuss “their problems as an expat community” (Interview 
with Abdallah, 19th October 2015). In 1973, the then ruler of Dubai Shaykh Rashid bin Said 
Al-Maktum (who ruled from 1958 to 1990), gifted a piece of land to the Pakistani community 
in Oud Metha, on the west bank of the Dubai Creek. In 1984, the current building of the 
association was constructed with the support and contribution of the entire Pakistani 
community, from taxi drivers to businessmen (Picture 7.2).  
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Picture 7.2 The main building of the PAD 
 
 
The Pakistan Auditorium is the newest building, having been inaugurated in September 
2015. It cost about 8 million dirhams and was built with the help and contribution of the 
whole Pakistani community in the UAE (Picture 7.3).78  The association extends on a big 
land area and it consists of one main building and the big auditorium.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
78 Monthly Newsletter Archive of the PAD. See, http://pad.ae/pakistan-auditorium-inauguration-ceremony/ 
[accessed 12 May 2016]. 
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Picture 7.3 Pakistan Auditorium in the PAD 
 
In the PAD, there is also a football pitch and cricket training facilities. There is a small prayer 
room that can accommodate only Pakistani Muslim men for the daily five prayers (Picture 
7.4).  
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Picture 7.4 The prayer room within the PAD 
 
There are also bathrooms (for men and women) where Muslims do the ritual ablutions to 
perform the prayers, as prescribed by religious texts. However, on Fridays, during the 
collective prayer, Pakistani Muslims go to a local big mosque situated in the same area and 
very close to the association. This mosque is also known locally as a ‘Pakistani mosque’, as 
some of my participants told me (Picture 7.5).  
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Picture 7.5 The so-called ‘Pakistani mosque’ 
 
The PAD provides services and facilities to permit Pakistani Muslims to fulfil their religious 
duties. In her research on Pakistani associations in Britain, Joly (1987, p. 72) argues that 
these organizations have been formed to “deal with different aspects of Pakistani people’s 
everyday life”. The Islamic identity of these associations is enhanced because Islām is an 
all-encompassing religion governing every aspects of Muslims’ life.  
The PAD works in collaboration with the Emirati authorities in order to deliver all 
services and organize religious activities that must conform to the religious view of the local 
authorities. The religious aspects of Muslims, Emiratis and non-Emiratis, are monitored by 
the UAE religious authorities through the GAIAE (see chapter 5). 
The PAD is a non-profit organization and  
…it is purely funded by the community itself and that is the uniqueness of this association that 
the community basically gets together, generates funds, generates activities, and looks for 
solutions. We have a very little staff, which are paid, as the office men and the accountant. 
Otherwise, we are all professionals, we work during the day and we come here in the afternoon 
or in the evening and spend some time volunteering doing some social works. So that is the 
basic structure of the association itself (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 2015). 
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Abdallah emphasized how the voluntary participation seems to reinforce belonging and 
cohesion of the community.  
The PAD is an umbrella organization formed by several wings, such as the PPW, the 
Ladies Wing (LW), the MW and the Pakistan Youth Forum (PYF). Thus, “all these are meant 
to actually represent different segments of the community as we have the youth group that 
represents the youth. So what PAD does is to provide a legal platform, an umbrella to this 
system of organizations or wings” (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 2015). The basic 
idea of the PAD was “to develop this as a hub for the community to socialize, and where 
they can do whatever activities they plan under the legal framework” (Interview with 
Abdallah, 19th October 2015). The PAD is a male-oriented association and women, who are 
excluded from the BOT, are involved in the so-called female-oriented activities such as 
teaching Islām and the home-country language, and other activities that are delivered to other 
women or children (Nyhagen Predelli, 2008). The PYF is run by young Pakistanis who were 
born and raised in the UAE. They are considered as migrants by the local authorities and 
their permanence in the country is temporary.79 The presence of different wings in part 
reflects the fragmentation of the Pakistani community, which is varied and stratified in light 
of different ethnic composition, languages, religions, age, gender and classes.  
As emerged from my observations in the association and interviews with my key 
informant (see chapter 2), the PAD aims to support all different groups of the Pakistani 
community. It takes over the role of providing welfare services for the marginalized groups, 
such as irregular migrants. In the UAE (as in the other GCC countries), it is easy to become 
irregular (e.g. by overstaying or running away from the local sponsor) and this status pushes 
people to become isolated or to live as a marginalized group, because if the UAE authorities 
find people living in the country in an irregular status they are deported (Shah, 2009). The 
status of irregularity is destabilizing especially when they have children that are considered 
as irregular even before being born. It thus emerges that within the PAD belonging is not 
determined by social status or class, the association is a place where all Pakistanis can feel 
‘at home’ regardless of their juridical status (regular/irregular). Initiatives are also 
undertaken in relation to Pakistani prisoners. Through an agreement with the Dubai 
                                            
79 In the GCC countries, children “are allowed to stay with the parents under the father’s (or mother’s, if 
employed) sponsorship. In case of male children who reach 21 years of age, the father can no longer act as the 
sponsor to obtain a residence permit…A male child can remain in the country if he is a student or is employed, 
in which case his employer is the sponsor. Female children can remain under the sponsorship of the father until 
they are married” (Shah, 2009, p. 8). 
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authorities, the PAD is provided with a list of Pakistani prisoners with minor offences, and 
through money raised within the Pakistani community, fines are paid and a flight ticket to 
Pakistan is bought so that they can leave the country (Interview with Abdallah, 5th November 
2015). This aspect is important because it means that the PAD has been able to build a 
network with the local authorities and that the sense of belonging is constructed by including 
and supporting also the marginalized individuals (irregular and prisoners).      
During my field research, I realized that in the area called Oud Metha there were 
some national organizations identified as ‘clubs’, such as the Indian Club, the Jordanian Club 
and the Egyptian Club. I then realized that the Pakistani association was the only one in that 
area. I asked Abdallah his idea about the division between different national clubs and the 
PAD. He said 
Indians have a club and have an association. I think by definition the difference between a club 
and an association is [that] a club has got very exclusive membership, it can choose who it 
wants to have as a member and it is limited to a specific number of people. And association 
is, broadly speaking, open for the all community, it has got more members of the community, 
you can have labourers, you can have blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers as 
members of the same association, which you do not probably see in any club. In a club, you 
have people who can actually afford a certain amount and use facilities of that cub, and clubs 
usually do not do welfare activities outside the club boundary. I think association is a much 
broader platform, which connects different segments of the community, and the dimensions 
and the scope of the activities are a lot more than any specific club (Inter4view with Abdallah, 
5th November 2015). 
I will develop this aspect below, but this distinction is important as it reflects class 
inequalities and the positionality of different groups within the migrant community. 
The PAD in order to respond to the needs of the community acts on two different 
levels. In terms of internal relations, it delivers services, provides support and organizes 
activities that can contribute to the welfare of the whole community. In terms of external 
relations, it responds to the needs of the Pakistani community by building a network and 
trusting relationships with the UAE authorities (and other migrant associations) in order to 
support especially the marginalized Pakistani migrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
7.4 The PAD in context. From recognition to gratitude?  
As mentioned in chapter 3, Fraser (1995, 2001) views recognition as a matter of 
justice which means that the role and importance of all groups in social interaction must be 
recognized in reason of the contribution for the stability and development of society. 
Moreover, non-recognition is a matter of cultural injustice and it is the result of a social 
structure based on ethno-racial hierarchies in which some members of the society are not 
granted the same benefits and advantages of the dominant group (Fraser, 2001). In this 
section, I discuss the positionality of the PAD in relation to the overall Emirati context. In 
Dubai, which is an Emirate characterized by the presence of different nationalities and ethno-
racial hierarchies (Vora, 2013), the PAD seems to embody the stability and cohesion of the 
Pakistani community, and I argue that the positionality of the association should be framed 
within the concept of gratitude (see below).   
In my view, in order to understand the shift from recognition to gratitude, it is 
important to analyse the historical dynamics of migration in Dubai. The contribution of the 
migrants in the development of the Emirate and the country has been discussed in chapter 4 
where I argued that before the discovery of oil, in the 1960s, the formation of the UAE 
federation (1971) and the citizenship law of 1972, the different migrant groups (Iranians and 
Indians) were active members of the society, part of the social fabric also through 
intermarriages (Izady, 2002), and were ‘integrated’ within the local social structure. Since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the rulers of Dubai have recognized migrants’ 
contribution to the development of the Emirate by attributing benefits, advantages and also 
gifting pieces of land (Kanna, 2011). For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Iranian merchants in Dubai were naturalized and the then ruler, Shaykh Said bin 
Maktum, gifted a piece of land where they settled down (Bastakiyya) (see chapter 4). The 
Indian Club was established in the 1960s on a piece of land gifted to the Indian community 
by the ruler of Dubai, Shaykh Rashid Bin Said Al-Maktum. Thus, it was a way to recognize 
their social status within the Emirate and the prominent role and contribution of the Iranian 
and Indian merchants to the development of Dubai. In the 1970s, the formation of the UAE 
federation and the oil boom, with the arrival of many migrants from South and East Asian 
countries (see chapter 3), the ruler of Dubai decided to gift a piece of land to the Pakistani 
community as a sign of gratitude for their support and contribution to the growth of the 
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Emirate and because it was the first country that recognized the new political entity (Ahmed, 
1984).  
Before the 1970s, migrants were active members of the society, part of the social 
fabric and wielded a real political power thus contributing to the development and stability 
of Dubai. After the discovery of oil, the formation of the UAE federation and the oil boom 
migrants became functional to the development of the country and to the needs and 
exigencies of the local population thus contributing to the welfare of locals and 
improvements of the Emirate, but deprived of any political role (Al-Sayegh, 1998). The 
formation of the UAE federation entailed the implementation of rules, laws and institutional 
bodies that fostered the development of a modern country, which was mainly based on the 
so-called ‘ruling bargain’ (see chapter 4). In particular, benefits and advantages were only 
granted to ‘pure’ Emiratis who were considered those who were able to demonstrate their 
long-standing residence in the country before the discovery of oil. For example, Shaykh 
Rashid Bin Said Al-Maktum presumably said “Those who were with us when we were poor 
should be with us now we are rich” (cited in Dresch, 2005, p. 141).  
This leads me to argue that recognition was a clear policy pursued in Dubai before 
the advent of oil because Iranians and Indians were active members of the society and they 
had privileges, advantages and political role especially the merchant class (Al-Sayegh, 
1998). In my view, after the creation of the new political entity and the oil boom, recognition 
was replaced by gratitude (imtinān)80 for the contribution of Pakistanis, along with other 
migrants, in the development of Dubai. They did not enjoy advantages and benefits (as 
happened with Indians and Iranians) and did not have any political role. This is evident in 
the current ethno-racial hierarchies in Dubai where “an Emirati, if he is honest, he will say 
for us first is white, from America, Europe, number two Arabs within the region [GCC], 
third Indians, fourth maybe Filipinos and Pakistanis together” (Interview with Ibrahim, 18th 
October 2015). The rationale for the politics of gratitude is the lack of recognition of 
Pakistanis (and other migrants) as full members “of society, capable of participating on a par 
with” Emiratis (Fraser, 2001, p. 24). Put differently, recognition and gratitude reflect the 
different role played by migrants in the history of Dubai.   
                                            
80 The root of the word imtinān is m-n-n which means “to gift, to give, be courteous and to be benevolent 
towards someone”.  
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The PAD is an example of gratitude from the UAE authorities towards Pakistanis for 
their support and historical links. Despite the lack of full recognition of Pakistanis as active 
members of the UAE society (I am adopting Fraser’s understanding of recognition), it is 
indisputable the role played by the PAD in supporting migrants, especially low-wage 
migrants, and in encouraging the dialogue with the local authorities that becomes evident 
through the participation of members of the Al-Maktum, the ruling family of Dubai, in 
events organized by the PAD.81  
By applying the approach of Honneth (1992) and Taylor (1994) (the identity model, 
see chapter 3), in my view, the positionality of the PAD in relation to the Emirati context 
relies on recognition of ethno-national, cultural and religious aspects of the Pakistani 
community of Dubai. In other words, by gifting the piece of land, the Dubai authorities 
recognized the PAD as a place where ‘Pakistani-ness’ could be ‘preserved’. 
By applying Fraser’s (2001) approach (the status model), in my view, there is 
misrecognition because group members, such as Pakistanis or Filipinos, are inhibited from 
participating as a peer with Emiratis in social life. During my field research, I discovered 
that some Pakistani professionals felt that they were socially subordinated (see the above 
quotation of Ibrahim) and the existence of gendered and racialized hierarchies was also 
acknowledged. However, my participants accepted the Emirati hierarchical social structure 
because they were aware that they could not change it. This is where my concept of gratitude 
comes into play. In detail, the participation of members of the ruling family of Dubai (Al-
Maktum) in events organized by the PAD is symbolically a gesture of appreciation towards 
the Pakistani community but it does not erase the ethno-racial hierarchies and it does not 
modify the Emirati social structure. Pakistani professionals whom I interviewed perceived 
themselves as guests; they knew that they could not change the Emirati social structure and 
they could not subvert the ethno-racial hierarchies. When they migrate they implicitly accept 
the rules of the country, thus respecting and following those rules, customs and social norms 
means being and feeling part of the country. Abdallah said 
…if you talk to the local government, to the Emiratis they would say that it is like a guest, and 
a host policy where we are guests, they look after us, and you have to respect the law of the 
land. So, if I go to someone’s house I have to respect their traditions, and their culture, and 
                                            
81 In specific circumstances and to celebrate events some local authorities are invited in the PAD. http://pad.ae/ 
[accessed 12 June 2016]. 
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their rules, and their regulations. So, if I like it, then I will be the guest, if I do not like I am 
not forced to be here (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 2015). 
Abdallah emphasized that some Pakistanis consider themselves as guests and they have to 
respect the ‘law of the land’. In his words, the impossibility to act in such a way to change 
the social structure and the legal norms and rules emerged clearly. They are aware that they 
cannot change their status but they articulate their belonging and relationships with the 
context on a cultural level (Parekh, 2008). The impossibility to change the local social 
structure has also been underlined by Leila, who said  
I cannot change things here … if I want to change something I should be able to do in 
Pakistan…. We are not in that kind of system to make a difference. I am not in that kind of 
system that I would make a difference back home in my country” (Interview with Leila, 14th 
October 2015).  
As Leila acknowledged, Pakistanis cannot subvert the ethno-racial hierarchies but they feel 
that they belong to the Emirati context (see chapter 6). Put differently, they (and all migrant 
communities) cannot change the political, legal and social norms of the country, but they 
can enhance and strengthen the links with the country on a social and cultural level by 
creating a space of sociocultural interaction between the local authorities and the Pakistani 
community, within the PAD, thus perceiving themselves and feeling part of the Emirati 
context. It is thus evident that recognition is not pursued by the local authorities, whereas 
mis-recognition seems to drive social interactions within the UAE. In this regard, the PAD 
embodies the sense of gratitude that the local authorities have expressed to the Pakistani 
community for their contribution to the development of the Emirate. Recognition is an 
anthropological attribute which requires treating all humans as equals (Fraser, 2001, Parekh, 
2006); however, in the UAE, the exclusionary and discriminatory policies and practices 
conspire against this perspective. As said above, when migrants were necessary to drive the 
development and provide financial assistance they were considered as peers in social life, 
but when structural changes occurred, exclusion, discrimination and separateness started 
driving the UAE policies and practices.    
Recognition is a concept based on reciprocity because, in both models (identity and 
status models), the reciprocal recognition is a conditio sine qua non individuals and groups 
are able to define themselves and their social status in society. Thus, there is a hierarchy and 
a dominant group. Gratitude also implies reciprocity insofar as subjects express their 
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appreciation for support and help granted by individuals or groups and it entails a formal act 
of appreciation (through donations, rewards, or participation in events) for individual or 
group’s support and help. However, this sign of appreciation does not subvert rules, 
procedures and mechanisms of institutionalised cultural patterns; it does not modify the 
ethno-racial hierarchies and the status quo of the society as a whole.  
In conclusion, the positionality of the PAD within the Emirati context is the 
expression of the gratitude by the then ruler of Dubai for the contribution of the Pakistani 
community. Importantly, however, the ethno-racial hierarchies and the institutionalized 
cultural patterns do not change because of this gesture. Recognition implies at a certain point 
a change in the social structure in order to overcome the misrecognition by accommodating 
the needs and reduce the inequalities thus “recognizing and positively valorizing cultural 
diversity” (Fraser, 1995, p. 73); gratitude does not involve any change, it is only a gesture 
of appreciation that does not subvert the social structure. It is a personal, subjective and 
emotional gesture towards the community.  
 
 
 
 
7.5 The concept of ‘gated space’ in the GCC countries  
As outlined above, I argue that the PAD can be seen as a ‘gated space’, which is an 
inclusive and open space where social interactions within and outside the Pakistani 
community occur and ethno-class hierarchies and divisions exist. It is thus worth explaining 
the importance and characteristics of ‘gated spaces’ in the GCC countries.  
Neoliberalism has engendered material effects (Ganti, 2014) visible in urban 
environments where the distinction between private and public has blurred (Hvidt, 2007b)82 
and people’s everyday life is under scrutiny by the improvements in information technology 
(IT) and ‘constrained’ by the creation of private spaces for affluent people. The privatization 
of urban landscape is thus embedded in neoliberalism that has led to the creation of gated 
communities in the USA, China, Latin America and Arab Gulf countries (Glasze, Webster 
                                            
82 In neo-patrimonial states, “the centralized ownership structure [is combined] with an extreme concentration 
of power placed in the hands of a relatively small grouped of trusted persons” (Hvidt, 2007b, p. 571). In Dubai, 
there is not a ‘strong’ differentiation between government and private-business affairs. 
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& Frantz, 2006), which have become a marker of consumerism, class distinction and free-
trade ideology (Kanna, 2011). A gated community (or ‘gated space’) is  
a residential development surrounded by walls, fences, or earth banks covered with bush and 
shrubs, with secured entrance. … The houses, streets, sidewalks, and other amenities are 
physically enclosed by these barriers, and entrance gates operated by a guards, key, or 
electronic identity card. Inside the development there is often a neighbourhood watch 
organization or professional security personnel who patrol on foot or by automobile (Low, 
2006, cited in Kathiravelu 2016, p. 139).  
Since the 1990s, the growing privatization of urban areas has been one of the most debated 
and controversial issues because it relates to “social questions about private versus public 
organisation of civic goods and services, the right to a secure environment versus the right 
to access, communal versus individual consumption, inclusion versus exclusion, 
heterogeneity versus homogeneity and efficiency versus equity” (Glasze, Webster & Frantz, 
2006, p. 1). There has been a growing privatisation of the public space, and the spreading of 
gated enclaves where a specific group of people can enjoy services, facilities and amenities.  
In the GCC countries, the concept of ‘gated space’ has mostly been used in relation 
to the Western compounds in Saudi Arabia, where Westerners are accommodated, and it has 
also been used to identify middle-class enclaves and labour camps in Dubai. The middle-
class enclaves represent, to a certain extent, places where the residential segregation between 
nationals and migrants (Khalaf, 2006) appear to be mitigated because Emiratis and non-
Emiratis share the same facilities and amenities. In her research among low-wage migrants 
in Dubai, Kathiravelu (2016) explores the ‘gatedness’ as a strategy to include and exclude, 
to distinguish desirables from undesirables. By comparing gated enclaves of the middle-
class and labour camps in Dubai, she argues that they can be seen as two specific forms of 
‘gatedness’ with two different rationales. Gated enclaves are places where the middle-class 
live ‘segregated’ in a space circumscribed by gates, walls or bushes, but open because they 
can get in and out without any restrictions, they enjoy the benefits of their social status, and 
lastly, they are places where the persistent ethno-racial hierarchies, very common in the 
workplace or outside the walls of the gated enclaves, appears to be attenuated: Westerners, 
affluent Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Emiratis and other communities live together and share 
the same space, facilities and amenities. As Glasze and Alkhayyal (2002)83 argue, gated 
                                            
83 The authors also consider the role of ‘gated spaces’ in Lebanon where the “wealthy clientele finds an 
environment in which to realize a lifestyle which follows images of Western globalized models” (Glasze & 
Alkhayyal, 2002, p.  334). 
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housing estates in Saudi Arabia embody the physical separation between Saudis and 
Westerners, and between a traditional and Islamic lifestyle and a Western lifestyle 
characterized by free movement of women and consumption of alcohol and other elements 
prohibited outside these spaces. In Dubai, gated enclaves are symbols of prestige; they are a 
symbol of belonging where the ethno-racial hierarchies are subsumed by social status, 
privileges and Western consumerism (Kathiravelu, 2016).84  
However, these gated enclaves, sometimes not literally gated, are places where class 
distinction is embedded in the discourse of everyday life. In 2014, I lived in one of these 
gated enclaves, where privatisation and securitization were two important elements. To get 
in and out of the compound, every car had to pass through a gate whose access was limited 
by barriers that could be opened only by asking permission from the South Asian security 
guards. I lived in Mirdiff, in the gated enclave of Shorooq, where I was impressed by how 
everyday life was organized inside it. From my field notes (27th October 2014)  
This is my first day in Dubai. I live in Shorooq, which along with Al-Ghoroob, form the two 
biggest compounds of this residential area [Mirdiff, in the outskirts of Dubai]. My 
accommodation is in a flat at the end of the main road that the night before I did in taxi. This 
morning I have decided to visit the Midriff City Centre and I walked through the compound 
to get to my destination. By walking I have realized how big this space is, many and many 
houses, villas, flats and even a big desert area that push the sand on the car of residents that in 
the morning African men, who get here with bucket full of water on their bicycles, clean under 
a really hot sun just in the early morning. In this compound, this is the word used by taxi 
drivers and my housemate to identify this place, I have seen many Westerners, Emiratis, Arabs, 
and South Asians. My idea is that this is a place where nationalities, because of the residential 
structure and the shared facilities and spaces, are mixed, and ethno-racial hierarchies between 
Westerners, Indians, non-Gulf Arabs and Emiratis seem to disappear. However, they are 
evident in other forms and places. Apart from the clothes and skin colour, it is rather 
impossible to distinguish Emiratis from Westerners, or other nationalities. My compound is a 
gated place where the middle-class has established boundaries with the working-class who has 
free access only because they serve the needs of the residents. They enter because they work 
as security guards, gardeners, cooks, drivers, taxi-drivers, domestic workers or in maintenance 
of the roads and buildings. It is a place where among affluent people ethno-racial hierarchies 
seem to ‘disappear’ but where class division exists.  
However, these are places where the ‘inclusion’ of low-wage migrants is necessary because 
they serve the needs of affluent residents and their social interactions rely, among others, on 
ethno-class hierarchies.  
                                            
84 The lack of research and studies on class inequalities within Westerners and Chinese communities make it 
complicated to assess the presence of unskilled and semi-skilled Westerns and Chinese in these gated enclaves. 
However, during my field research I observed Westerners employed as waiters/waitresses or in sales. 
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In contrast to the gated enclaves, which are the results of neoliberal logic of 
privatisation and securitisation of the public space, Kathiravelu (2016) underscores how the 
labour camps also represent ‘gated spaces’. The labour camp represents a gated community 
where people (South and East Asians, and sometimes Africans) are accommodated and 
sometimes divided on the grounds of their nationality or ethnic group (Gardner, 2010b), but 
where there is no difference in terms of social status. They share the same space and ‘enjoy’ 
the same constraints and difficulties of living in a ‘gated space’ where it is rather difficult to 
go out. For a researcher, it is not easy to enter these camps, and for the people accommodated 
in these places, it is not easy to go out because they are situated in the outskirts of Dubai 
(known as ‘Sonapur’) except when they are transferred by buses to the work sites. In the 
gated enclaves where residents and workers were, to a certain extent, urged to interact with 
each other and women and children feel safe (Kathiravelu, 2016), labour camps are places 
where any kind of relationship between people accommodated in the camps and the ‘others’ 
(non-residents in the camps) does not exist (Gardner, 2010a). These are places where 
exclusion is a rule because access is not allowed to everybody and where the interactions are 
restricted on the grounds of class and nationality.  
In Dubai, both enclaves and labour camps are ‘gated spaces’ where there is, to a 
certain extent, a connection among different nationalities, but gated enclaves include 
Westerners and many other nationalities, whereas labour camps include mostly South and 
East Asians. These ‘gated spaces’ could be viewed as inclusive or exclusive but their borders 
are porous because people can go in and out, and social interactions are determined by 
gender, class, ‘race’ and ethno-nationality. 
 
 
 
 
7.6 The PAD as an open ‘gated space’ 
As outlined above, middle-class enclaves and labour camps are conceived of as 
‘gated spaces’ whose borders are porous and where ethno-class hierarchies take place 
(Kathiravelu, 2016). In this section, I discuss the PAD as an inclusive and open space where 
support and help for low-wage migrants have become one of the main duties of the 
organization along with the need to affirm and ‘preserve’ ‘Pakistani-ness’.  
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My aim is to extend the concept of ‘gated spaces’ to the PAD, thus suggesting that it 
is a space where the common ethno-national and cultural identity represent inclusive 
components aimed to guarantee cohesion within the community. At the same time, the PAD, 
as the other migrant associations, is also an open ‘gated space’ because, as it happens in 
middle-class enclaves and labour camps, interactions and contacts within and outside these 
spaces occur on a daily basis and in specific circumstances. For example, welfare activities 
in support of low-wage migrants regardless of their ‘race’, nationality, ethnicity, gender, 
religion and culture, especially in the labour camps, are a private affair and are managed by 
the PAD, other migrant associations and NGOs (Buckley, 2013; Kathiravelu, 2016). 
Considering the PAD as a ‘gated space’ allows understanding how relationships within and 
outside the migrant associations and communities are developed. This approach, in other 
words, allows catching its positionality in relation to the whole Pakistani community and 
acknowledging that belonging is constructed by making and breaking boundaries among 
communities, groups and spaces (Anthias, 2015). Thus, the PAD as a ‘gated space’ is 
physically limited by its walls but it is an open space because the welfare activities move 
beyond its borders.     
Migrant associations are places where cultural, religious and national identity tends 
to be affirmed. They are ‘gated spaces’ where everyday life is articulated by contacts and 
relationships based on the common ethno-national and cultural identity (Sardinha, 2009). 
However, as I discuss below, social status is also important in shaping relationships within 
the same migrant community. The PAD is embedded in a web of connections where all 
Pakistanis regardless of age, gender, class and religion can feel a sense of belonging. Put 
differently, the PAD is a ‘gated space’ where all Pakistanis (men, women and children) are 
included and nobody is excluded. It is an open space where the sense of belonging is 
constructed on the grounds of a common cultural and national identity and the need to cope 
with precariousness, complexities and difficulties of everyday life in Dubai. The 
positionality of the PAD in relation to the whole community (and the Emirati context) was 
described by Abdallah, who said 
…the [Pakistani] community has increased over the years and as I said we have different 
segments of the community starting from the labourers, so we have blue-collar, we have 
middle-class and then we have an upper class. So, the association’s challenges are how to bring 
everyone together as a community and that’s what we do, to create harmony between all the 
segments… We obviously feel, as a community, that we have a major stake and role to play 
in this part of the world. I believe that Dubai or UAE itself, is a good example of a global 
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village where you have different cultures, diverse cultures getting together that blend in such 
a harmony that you do not see anywhere else in the world. People come from different 
backgrounds; different cultures and they live together in harmony without any conflict, which 
I think is very unique in this age (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 2015).   
Abdallah emphasized the inclusive role of the PAD, where different classes interact on a 
daily basis. It is also important to acknowledge that marginalised migrants who live in the 
labour camps cannot socialize in these organizations/clubs because they are settled down in 
closed spaces where it is difficult to go out and get to these places. The provision of welfare 
services and charity are at work in these places, thus bringing those marginalized groups to 
participate in particular events within the PAD’s walls. However, these organizations and 
clubs do not represent a place for socialization for all Pakistani groups: some people are 
excluded, and some are included. 
The PAD articulates relationships with its members in terms of social cohesion, 
inclusion and equality. This idea was emphasized by Abdallah, who said 
The labourer wing we have, which works on that segment, but they all come to blend in this 
association itself. We have activities, which are purely designed for labourers. Labourers, who 
come and are part of the activities, sport activities to get them together. We have certain 
national activities that actually run by the white-collar workers, labourers, and at the same 
table, we have the businessmen and investors seated with them having a meal together. So, the 
role of the association is to blend the community together. We do diverse activities in the 
labour camps itself. We do medical camps every year, we go to the labour camps, we are 
actually the only community that does this with the collaboration of the Dubai government, 
especially on the Labour Day we do that. The first of May we go the labour camps, we have 
partner hospitals with us, we have six, seven premium hospitals in the town who are partners 
with us. So we take the medical teams to the labour camps, we do free medical checks, free 
health advice, we do certain activities, competitions with gifts, and we have meals for them. 
So all that creates, or at least bridges the gap between us and the labourers (Interview with 
Abdallah, 19th October 2015). 
The PAD is an agent in the public sphere and is a space where ethno-racial hierarchies seem 
not to exist.  As an agent in the public sphere, it has relationships with other migrant 
organizations and its activities are embedded in a series of events in which some of these 
organizations are also involved. Abdallah, as a member of the BOT of the PAD, described 
the collaboration between the association, other migrant organizations and local authorities 
to support construction workers in the labour camps regardless of their nationality, age and 
religion. He said 
we had the Kerala association, and this happened through the CDA…so various associations 
or groups, which are registered with the CDA were invited, even we had the Norwegian club 
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members with us, I think we also had a few Italians also, then we had the Kerala association, 
they had some people that joined us. So, it is a sort of an open invitation. We would like to 
have more associations or clubs joining us in this activity, which I think gives a better image 
of communities getting together for a common scope, especially going to labour camps where 
you have Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Filipinos. So we do not have a 
distinction who’s who and they are all for one category, which is blue-collar workers. So I 
think it is nice to have different clubs joining together in one activity (Interview with Abdallah, 
5th November 2015).       
The cross-national solidarity is an element of inclusion and social cohesion because migrants 
support each other regardless of class, nationality and religion. The PAD, as the other 
migrant associations, is an open ‘gated space’ because it is inclusive of other (migrant) 
communities; in spite of its walls, it articulates belonging by interacting within and outside 
of the Pakistani community.  
  
 
 
 
7.7 Ethno-class hierarchies and ‘community engagement’ within the PAD 
The PAD is an open ‘gated space’ where, like in the other ‘gated spaces’, ethno-class 
hierarchies and divisions take place. In this section, I discuss how these hierarchies are 
articulated and the divisions existing within the PAD.  
The PAD represents a place where ‘Pakistani-ness’ is ‘preserved’. One of the PAD’s 
aim is to create a space for social interactions, and belonging is fuelled by sharing and 
contributing to activities and events that tend to address the needs of the community, also 
involving other nationalities. Moreover, the religious dimension is one of the main aspects 
of the PAD’s activities. ‘Pakistani-ness’ is built by ‘preserving’ heritage, past, practices, 
affective and emotional ties to Pakistan’s national and cultural history as well as to the 
religious dimension. It is undeniable that Pakistani national identity is contested because of 
the ethnic and linguistic (and religious) fragmentation that exists in Pakistan (see chapter 5). 
If, in Pakistan, the fragmentation has led to ethnic conflicts and an increasing ethno-
nationalism (Cohen, 2004), in Dubai, the Pakistani community appears to be more united 
and cohesive than it might seem in the home country.  
However, divisions within the community exist. I have identified two main divisions. 
First, the PAD is a ‘gated space’ where borders are porous and where everybody, as said 
above, can find support and help. But it is also a place where ethno-class hierarchies take 
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place. To illustrate this aspect, it is important to unpack the class inequalities existing within 
other migrant communities. For example, within the whole Indian community, the presence 
of other Indian organizations especially formed on the grounds of regional and religious 
belonging goes hand in hand with the presence of the Indian Club that was founded in the 
1960s.85 The Pakistani community has only an association; it does not have a club. The 
difference between association and club is not only semantic but substantially important in 
terms of exclusion/inclusion. The Indian Club’s membership fees are very expensive;86 the 
club is very exclusive, and as such, it is only for the most affluent Indian migrants. It is a 
place where the low-wage Indian migrants are excluded. However, it can be assumed that in 
the Indian Club, as in the other clubs, class divisions exist because gardeners, security 
guards, cooks and so on are mostly Indians who are employed in menial jobs. In contrast, 
the PAD represents the only Pakistani organization in Dubai where there is a strong 
commitment to create a united and inclusive community. But, there are also class divisions 
within the Pakistani community, as I explain below. The sole existence of the Indian Club 
(of the Iranian Club or of the Egyptian Club) is a symptom of class inequalities that exist 
within the migrant communities in Dubai. It cannot be concluded, however, that class 
inequalities within the Indian community have not been addressed by the Indian Club 
through specific initiatives in support of low-wage Indian migrants, and this would have to 
be investigated in further research about the Indian as well as other migrant communities in 
Dubai.  
In the Indian community, class inequalities are thus evident. The PAD is committed 
to project the image of a cohesive community. However, class inequalities exist within the 
Pakistani group but the PAD seems to overcome this aspect by involving some affluent 
Pakistanis in activities to support the low-wage Pakistani migrants. For example, the PAD 
takes over the role of ‘enculturating’ especially the Pakistani taxi drivers. This process has 
been described by Abdallah.  
                                            
85 There are several Indian organizations, such as the Dubai Kerala Muslim Cultural Center and Indian 
Association Club, which was established on a piece of land gifted by the then ruler of Dubai. For a list of 
associations and clubs in Dubai, see 
https://www.cda.gov.ae/en/SocialRegulatoryAndLicensing/LicensingSocialClubs/Pages/default.aspx 
[accessed 29 August 2016]. 
86 To become a regular member, it costs between 18.000 and 19.000 dirhams, depends on the family members 
and one must have the Indian nationality. See http://www.indiaclubdubai.com/html/home.asp [accessed 28 
July 2016]. In the last few weeks, the page with the details on membership fees has been removed. 
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We [PAD] have language courses in the association, especially English which we designed to 
taxi drivers, we teach them basic words about English, manners, how to deal with their 
customers, how to dress, how to remain clean, personal hygiene, hand hygiene. All those 
things which are important because we believe that any Pakistani even if he is a labourer, he 
is an ambassador of his country. If he interacts out then his action reflects the community, 
reflects the country, and I think it is important especially living in this part of the world, you 
interact with so many people on a daily basis. I believe that it is very important for even a 
labourer, to learn certain rules of the country. Lots of people, out of ignorance actually, break 
the rules here, they just do not know what the rules are, and sometimes it is a language barrier, 
they just cannot communicate proper and sometimes they do not know their rights itself, what 
the basic rights they have in this part of the world. So, I think it is very important when we 
actually reach out them, educate them, tell them “this is your right”, “this is how to behave, 
this is the law you have to respect”, “you are a guest in this country and you have to respect 
the law of the land”. So, we design most of the activities in that fashion (Interview with 
Abdallah, 19th October 2015).  
The existence of different social classes within the PAD is thus evident. The need to teach 
how to behave to the low-wage migrants serves to project the image of a community that 
cares for their labourers. However, the role of ‘enculturating’ is a prerogative of the highly-
skilled Pakistani migrants. Abdallah emphasized the need to learn the ‘rules of the country’ 
because this is a way to feel part of the context; at the same time it is also important that 
Pakistani taxi-drivers spread a ‘positive and ‘good’ image of the Pakistani community 
because they interact every day with different nationalities. The PAD with this kind of 
activity has invested each single Pakistani with the role of representative and ‘spokesperson’ 
for the community; hence the need to ‘enculturate’ them so that they cannot harm the image 
of the entire Pakistani community in Dubai.     
Despite the involvement of all segments of the Pakistani community in activities and 
events, in the PAD as well as in the other ‘gated spaces’ (the Indian Club), class inequalities 
are perpetuated because unskilled and semi-skilled Pakistanis manage the everyday life of 
the organization whereas highly-skilled Pakistanis are mostly employed in managing the 
‘institutional’ aspects such as organizing and managing courses, workshops and contacts 
with the local authorities. For example, during participant observation in the PAD, I realized 
that there were a few unskilled Pakistanis who did not speak English (thus inhibiting, to a 
certain extent, any contacts outside of its walls) and were employed to manage the daily 
affairs of the association (e. g., cleaning and surveillance). Moreover, the BOT of the PAD 
is formed by professionals (doctors and businessmen). 
These class inequalities reflect a second division based on social commitment within 
the Pakistani community, which means that some Pakistanis are more or less engaged with 
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the activities and events organized by the PAD than others. At the beginning, I thought that 
‘community engagement’ was linked to a different way to conceive of Pakistani identity 
especially on ethnic and regional basis. But in conversations with my participants, I 
acknowledged that ethnicity and regionalism were not important insofar as they defined their 
‘Pakistani-ness’ as devoid of any ethnic and/or regional dimension (see chapter 6). This was 
also acknowledged by John, the key informant of the Pakistani professional group (see 
chapter 2), when he replied to my emails in which I asked to explain the division that I 
recognized when I was carrying out my field research in Dubai.87 He wrote  
In Dubai ethnic dimension is not important as all Pakistanis consider themselves as Pakistanis 
first and do not pay importance to their ethnicity. Yes, there is more of a political divide which 
is based on their political inclination and not in ethnicity...Pakistanis in Dubai are very 
politically conscious and have their political learnings (emails received by John, 28th and 30th 
October, 2016). 
John emphasized the importance of ‘unity within diversity’ and he considered the division 
within the Pakistani community as related to different political stances. The division became 
evident in the PAD where, during my field research (see chapter 2), Bushra expressed anger 
and dissatisfaction with some members of the Pakistani community blaming lack of interest 
in the difficulties that some of their members suffered every day. Her anger and discontent 
were direct mainly towards some members of the PPW (see chapter 6) because they were 
detached from the activities of the association. As John said to me, some members of the 
PAD have “a feeling of envy because they consider us [members of the PPW] to be elitist” 
(Interview 8th November 2015).  
During my field research, in the PAD I never saw any Pakistani professionals that I 
had interviewed. This pushed me to acknowledge that the division was mainly based on the 
existence of different interests at stake and especially on the negative image projected 
outside by the PAD that could undermine the credibility of Pakistani professionals and their 
businesses. The division takes place between two groups: the PAD and PPW. The latter is 
viewed as an elitist group, and the former has been defined by one of my participants as a 
“fundamentalist association” (from my field notes, 29th October 2014), because of their 
religious engagement, and a “big politicized” (Interview with Naseer, 24th October 2015) 
                                            
87 During the analysis and writing up phases, I realized that I needed to ask further questions on the internal 
division. Thus, I decided to email John to get explanations on this aspect because he was the first person that 
raised this point (see chapter 2). 
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association linked to the Pakistani government, even though, as noted in chapter 2, Abdallah 
criticized what Khalaf, the member of the Pakistani Consulate told me about the ‘happy life’ 
of Pakistani construction workers in the labour camps. This internal ‘conflict’ was partially 
explained by John, who said 
[there is] a feeling of envy because they [PAD] consider us [PPW] to be elitist…they have 
politics, they have two or three different groups, they have very acrimonious elections every 
three years...there is a lot of bickering between different groups…We do not want a 
fighting…they were fighting in the media, in the newspapers giving, making accusations 
against each other. So I called them [members of the PAD], I spoke to them, and I said “look 
why are people doing this? It is a matter of the community, keep it inside the community, you 
do not have to call the newspapers, …I am saying that as Pakistanis, as a community if we 
have any issue, keep it within the community; you should not spread it outside”…We escape 
from this, we do not want to get at all in riffraff…This is the difference between us. Now the 
association want to build this big hall for events. They started this project seven years ago, 
they did not have money, they came to us about four years back and said: “please, help us”. 
We said, “look, we will help you but keep this hall as a community hall, with an independent 
board to manage that. So it does not become political that you want to use it only for your 
purpose”. They said “yes”…and then they disappeared. Two years back, they again came back, 
and said: “please help us, our work stopped because we did not have money. And we know 
that you, people [PPW], have credibility, and network to raise millions for us. We need seven 
million dirhams”. We said “ok but please let’s keep this independent, no riffraff…no 
fighting”… Then we raised three millions…So the credibility is what they lacked and it was 
what we have and they are envious of that. We can raise millions because of the network we 
have and because people trust us. The people who support us know that we are people of 
integrity, people who are working for good causes, we do not have any politics, we do not 
have any agenda, we stir from national politics, we do not encourage any political involvement 
of people (Interview with John, 8th November 2015). 
John identified the ‘conflict’ within the community as a matter of power relations between 
the different groups to manage the interests and affairs of the PAD. This ‘conflict’, which he 
attached to a specific group, was never attached to an explicit person, but it became visible 
outside of the PAD’s walls. For John, this was a symptom of weakness that should have 
remained within the community. The rationale of John’s reasoning relies on the prestige and 
credibility of the community, especially of the PPW, which is a wing of the PAD that is 
actively involved in activities to raise money and that gathers together affluent and wealthy 
Pakistani migrants. The PPW possesses and mobilizes its symbolic and economic capital to 
help the whole Pakistani community (see below). Disclosing outside the internal divisions 
means ridiculing and compromising the credibility of the entire community. This intra-
community division was acknowledged by some of my participants. But for Abdallah, who 
talked to me as an authoritative and authorized spokesperson of the PAD, the community 
was united and cohesive; ‘conflicts’ might happen but they do not undermine the unity of 
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the entire Pakistani community. For example, John said that the Auditorium (see above) was 
built through money raised by the PPW among its members and contacts, whereas Abdallah, 
the key informant of the PAD said: “It was all from the community, not a single penny was 
taken from any other group, or association, or government and I can tell you that the 
community is so vibrant and ready to help” (Interview, 8th November 2015). Abdallah 
emphasized the cohesion and support of the entire community but he did not recognize the 
considerable contribution given by the PPW. He did not mention that members of the PAD, 
after starting the construction of the building and having realized that they could not 
complete the work, turned to the PPW and its wealthy supporters in order to obtain further 
funding.  
The different perspectives between Abdallah and John might be interpreted as two 
different ways of conceiving of the Pakistani community of Dubai. The former, in my view, 
seems to not want to set boundaries between the different wings within the whole Pakistani 
community (or maybe he wants to conceal to a foreign researcher the existing divisions); the 
latter seems to want to demarcate and highlight boundaries between the two groups.88 
As mentioned earlier, in the PAD I never met any Pakistani professionals that I had 
interviewed; my first impression of the PPW, which took shape in the process of 
interviewing some Pakistan professionals who are members of the wing, was that of an elitist 
group detached from the everyday life of the poor and ‘needy’ Pakistanis. However, this 
impression revealed to be false when I asked John if activities for the poor Pakistanis were 
also a prerogative of the PPW. He said 
…we do lots of social work for them…we support poor Pakistani families who are not able to pay 
the school fees. So in the last seven years approximately we have raised about 10 million dirhams 
and supported five hundred children for the school fees…What happens is that lots of the Pakistanis 
are poor, they have low salaries but many children. And it happens many times that they decide to 
send the sons to school, and not the daughters because they cannot pay the fees, so we say no. Send 
the daughters…we pay fees directly to the school. So we do such social work, then we help out 
people at times have health issues, they do not have insurance, they need treatments, we have 
Pakistanis with serious problems, so we help them. We also help people who come looking for 
employment or they lose their job, or need to find a job because we have good ties and we can help 
out (Interview with John, 8th November 2015). 
John emphasized how the PPW is socially engaged with the Pakistani community. To a 
certain extent, he underlined the social commitment of the professional wing that Bushra, 
                                            
88 This aspect should need further research. 
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during our conversation in the PAD had omitted to describe when she manifested her 
disappointment for the lack of interest and engagement showed by some members of the 
community (see above).  
The PAD is a place that, to a certain extent, tends to perpetuate class inequalities, 
and this results, for example, from the labour division within the association where unskilled 
and semi-skilled fellow nationals are employed in everyday affairs and highly-skilled 
individuals are employed in managerial and other higher-ranking roles. An intra-community 
division is evident between the PAD and the PPW, which is the most economically 
influential Pakistani group in Dubai. However, both groups mobilize their resources to 
support their ‘needy’ fellow nationals. This is where the Pakistani community expresses its 
unity in spite of their internal divisions, which do not undermine the sense of belonging 
because the PAD is an aggregate of different wings, classes, groups, social categories that 
construct their belonging primarily on the grounds of shared values, customs, culture, 
language, religion and symbols (Cohen 1985).  
 
 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have addressed the role and importance of migrant associations in 
the GCC countries. By discussing the politics of recognition, I have unfolded the 
positionality of the PAD in relation to the Emirati context and ethno-class hierarchies. In 
detail, I have discussed the role of the PAD in a broader perspective to articulate its 
embeddedness in the history of Dubai where the presence of migrants was recognized, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, by the local rulers because of their political and economic 
contribution to the development and stability of the Emirate. However, in the 1970s, 
recognition has given way to gratitude which means that the local rulers appreciated the 
support of the Pakistani community by gifting a piece of land but this did not entail erasing 
the hierarchical social structure (top-down perspective).  
I have also discussed the PAD as a ‘gated space’, which leads immediately to the 
idea of a space limited by physical elements (such as walls, bushes, gates). But more than 
that, ‘gated space’ should be conceived of as a metaphor, especially in relation to the PAD 
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and migrant associations, which are places that can be exclusive or inclusive and where class 
inequalities are still persistent (see the dichotomy between association and club), but they 
are also places in which unity and cohesion is granted primarily on the grounds of ethno-
national and cultural identity. The PAD is physically a ‘gated space’ but, at the same time, 
it is metaphorically an open space where cross-national solidarity and the involvement of 
different organizations in events and activities to help and support poor migrants are 
examples of its fluidity, dynamism and of the porosity of its borders (bottom-up perspective).  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
MIGRATION, BELONGING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE UAE 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the presence of foreigners (chapter 3) in the 
setting of my field research (chapter 4), I have then discussed in detail the presence of 
Pakistanis and especially professionals in Dubai by underscoring how belonging is 
constructed (chapters 5 and 6) and the role and divisions within the PAD (chapter 7). In this 
chapter, I analyse the impact of migration on the Emirati identity, which intertwines with the 
presence of migrants because they also contribute towards shaping the Emirati national 
identity (al-hawiyya al-waṭaniyya al-imārātiyya).  
This chapter unfolds strategies adopted by the UAE to cope with perceived 
challenges posed by migration and globalization to national identity. My aim is to analyse 
the process of construction89 of the Emirati identity in light of the changes occurring within 
the country by examining the cultural dynamics that drive this process. Moreover, I move 
beyond the dichotomy between Emiratis and non-Emiratis by arguing the need to ‘include’ 
non-Emiratis in the discourse on the Emirati national identity.  
My argument is that the construction of the Emirati identity seems to identify and 
categorize individuals in two groups: Emiratis and non-Emiratis. It also serves to strengthen 
the role and position of certain (tribal) groups, and rulers, who embody the stability, 
cohesion, and represent both the political and cultural identity of the country. The 
construction of the Emirati national identity is profoundly rooted in the past history and 
collective memory of the UAE. Interestingly, the Emirati national identity adapts and 
responds to changes taking place in the UAE society. I define this process as 
‘nationalization’ (tawṭīn), thus suggesting that the construction of the Emirati national 
identity occurs by reinterpreting the past and recovering cultural heritage (turāth), traditions, 
customs and collective memory. Moreover, Dubai has reshaped and prioritized specific 
elements of its history and heritage (e. g. pre-Islamic history, and the links with the ancient 
                                            
89 I use the verb construct (and the word construction) with the same meaning used by Parekh (1994). He uses 
this word in relation to the need of constructing national identity not ex novo but by recovering the past, 
reinterpreting the past and adapting it to the present needs of society. 
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civilizations) in order to deal with challenges posed by internal and external factors. Dubai 
tends to emphasize specific aspects because they also contribute towards reshaping the 
Emirati national identity. Nevertheless, as discussed in the chapter 6, Pakistani professionals 
feel that they belong to the Emirati context. Thus, I argue that they also contribute, through 
civic engagement, towards shaping and enhancing the Emirati national identity as well as 
developing their belonging to the local context. 
The chapter draws on the extant literature on migration in the GCC countries, the 
concept of national identity and on my qualitative data collection. It is structured as follows. 
Based upon Parekh’s approach on national identity (see chapter 3), I discuss the concept of 
the nationalization of culture. Migration has led to a demographic imbalance, and 
globalization has challenged the discourse on the Emirati national identity, I address these 
issues by examining some elements (e. g. camel racing and traditional dress) aimed at 
‘identifying’ who belongs and who does not belong, and strategies adopted to deal with the 
perceived challenges to national identity. I also analyse the role of Emirati women in 
reshaping the discourse on Emirati identity. I discuss the historical revival as an element 
enhanced by the Emirate of Dubai in order to reshape its emirate-level identity. Lastly, I 
discuss how Pakistani professionals contribute towards shaping the discourse on the Emirati 
national identity  
 
 
8.2 The nationalization of culture  
As said in chapter 3, for Parekh (1995a), national boundaries are weakened by 
globalization and the traditional system of values and norms is experiencing intense changes. 
However, when a society has undergone profound changes, it finds a way to reconstitute 
itself by emphasizing some aspects of its character, past, memory and by developing new 
tendencies and starts a process of self-creation (Parekh, 1995a). In this section, I discuss 
some sociocultural aspects that have been enhanced in order to spread a sense of security 
and stability among the local population in light of the changes occurring in the UAE.  
The traditional Arab and Islamic identity of the UAE is perceived in ‘danger’ because 
of the growing presence of foreigners, globalization and the increasing influence of Western 
culture (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, ECSSR, 2009). Social, 
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economic, political and cultural transformations induced by the oil economy and 
globalization have led the UAE authorities to opt for cultural revival as a strategy designed 
to reinterpret their history and traditional way of life in light of such transformations (Khalaf, 
2000). Cultural revival relates to the concept of the nationalization of culture (Löfgren, 
1989), which is a process whereby the language, traditions, history, myths, values, customs 
and norms are internalized by members of a society, and they become part of the collective 
memory. It is a process in which a boundary is established between those who belong and 
those who do not belong. All elements that represent a shared way of life or a shared culture 
are revitalized and reinterpreted in time of ‘crisis’, when members of a society feel a sense 
of insecurity, a detachment from their country, and their boundaries are blurred by factors 
such as globalization or migration. The nationalization of culture is firmly related to the 
political discourse. For example, Davidson (2008b) and Khalaf (2008), argue that in the 
UAE, the rulers take over the discourse on national identity, thus legitimating their 
leadership and using cultural and symbolic elements to assert their political role. Cultural 
revival aims at reconstituting cultural identity as well as political identity. The rulers act “as 
both patrons-cum-guardians of national heritage as well as state modernisers” (Khalaf 2008, 
p. 41). The rapid changes occurring in the UAE in the last forty years have engendered the 
urge to reinterpret and exhibit the past. This process has occurred by establishing museums 
and heritage villages, encouraging the use of the traditional dress and reproducing old 
traditions such as camel racing.  
In the UAE, museums and heritage villages serve to produce and anchor Emirati 
cultural identity to a historical background in order to display its ‘authentic’ (asāla) image 
devoid of the elements of the colonial past (Cooke, 2014). Museums and heritage villages 
serve to instill pride among locals in their culture. They tend to describe the history from 
ancient times to the formation of the nation (Cooke, 2014). Museums represent a collective 
memory of the past and they become a place where such a memory is ‘stored’ (Khalaf, 2002). 
For Emiratis, heritage villages embody a lively exhibition to capture and experience their 
past. For Khalaf (2002, p. 28), heritage villages represent a nostalgic discourse in which local 
actors perform their past, and it is performed “primarily for themselves, and secondly for 
tourists”. Museums and heritage villages encapsulate the educational discourse because they 
tend to educate young generations about the cultural lifestyle of their ancestors (Khalaf, 
2002). Young generations are not aware of their history and traditional way of life before 
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oil. For nationals, museums and heritage villages are important because they tell young 
generations who they are and where they come from (Bristol-Rhys, 2010b). Heritage villages 
display a cultural discourse because they sometimes become open theater where nationals 
tell stories of their past (Khalaf, 2002). Moreover, these villages also generate a political 
discourse because they celebrate national events and the image of the ruling families is 
enhanced through poetry (Khalaf, 2002), which tends to represent the past, the feats of the 
ruling families, benevolence and the paternalistic role of the rulers. 
The Emirati cultural identity is blending with growing influence of Western lifestyle 
and materialistic culture. Dress code has become a way to mark boundaries between 
nationals and non-nationals. For Khalaf (2005), when different ethnic groups interact in a 
social context, it is necessary to distinguish one group from another, to establish boundaries 
so that differences among different ethnic groups become visible. Emirati dress becomes a 
marker of Emirati cultural identity, and as such, it articulates the discourse on national 
identity on different levels. Emirati dress encapsulates the historical, Islamic, socio-political 
and cultural discourses (Khalaf, 2005). Dress code is perceived as a means that establishes 
boundaries and regulates how nationals and non-nationals “should behave towards each 
other in different context as well as their mutual expectations and obligations” (Parekh, 
1995a, p. 258). Dress (the white kandūra for men and black ‛abāya for women) has become 
a marker of Emirati cultural identity as well as a marker of ethnic belonging, and it also 
serves to uniform all Emiratis with no distinctions in terms of class or tribal affiliation 
(however, differences are evident in terms of style and quality, Khalaf, 2005) (Picture 8.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
            Picture 8.1 The Emirati dress. Statues in Shaykh Muhammad Bin Rashid Blvd 
 
It has become a way to embody Emirati identity. Kate, one Emirati woman whom I 
interviewed, said  
Identity here [UAE], you could say the young generation are very proud of who they are and 
where they come from. I think being a minority this pushes us to want to be different and to 
show how we are the local population. That’s why you find, for instance, many young Emiratis 
still wearing the local dress even in the government it has become like a common uniform. So 
we can preserve it (Interview with Kate, 6th November 2014). 
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Kate emphasized the role that the traditional dress played for the youth, especially in a 
context were nationals are a minority in their own country and it sets boundaries between 
‘us’ and ‘them’; it is a way to affirm their belonging and ‘preserve’ Emirati identity. 
Camel racing is an expression of cultural revival, which is widespread throughout 
the GCC countries (Picture 8.2). It represents a sense of continuity with the past because the 
oil economy has swept away the traditional way of life based on pastoralism and agriculture; 
it is a link between tradition and modernity (Khalaf, 1999). Thus, camel racing embodies 
traditions and “values for the political enculturation of young generations” (Khalaf, 2000, p. 
258). It has also shifted symbolically from the economic realm to the cultural one, even 
though the economic realm is still alive and well (Khalaf, 1999). It serves to spread a sense 
of security and belonging in spite of a growing process of integration of the UAE market 
into the global economy. Camel racing is a way to express Emirati cultural identity 
profoundly rooted in local traditions and customs. Moreover, the participation of the ruling 
families in some important events of camel racing over the year underlines the political 
discourse that links cultural identity and political identity (Khalaf, 2000).  
Picture 8.2 Image of Camel racing exhibited in a metro station   
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Cultural revival is the recovery of ‘authentic’ culture (Eriksen, 2010). Museums and heritage 
villages, dress code and camel racing (and other traditional sports such as falconry) represent 
the ‘authentic’ cultural identity rooted profoundly in the local traditions. By reinterpreting 
and displaying the past, the Emirati authorities are trying to cope with the detachment and 
sense of insecurity perceived by UAE nationals. By recovering the past and encouraging the 
use of the traditional dress in public, they exhibit their ‘authentic’ culture and differentiate 
themselves from foreigners. In the UAE, the nationalization of culture, however, is a way to 
restore the past (cultural identity) as well as a way to legitimate the role of the ruler (political 
identity) and his paternalistic role within the UAE society (Khalaf, 1992). 
 
 
8.3 Women and Emirati identity 
The changes occurred in the UAE in the last years have led the authorities to question 
the importance and depth of such changes and their impact on people’s life. In the UAE, 
everyone speaks “of change as a fact of life” (Longva, 1997, p. 190). Public discourses and 
people’s narratives are permeated by the notion of change, by how the UAE society was 
before oil was discovered and how it has changed afterwards. Parekh (1995a) argues that 
when changes occur slowly people have time to assimilate and adapt.   
However, in the UAE, such changes have been rapid and profound; they have 
severely affected social relations and structures (Parekh, 1995a). This is why nationals feel 
a sense of detachment from their country, they fear that their identity, values, practices, 
beliefs might ‘dissolve’ (Dresch, 2005). This anxiety is a common narrative in women’s 
stories from the older generation (Bristol-Rhys, 2010b). In this context of rapid and profound 
changes, a cultural and social vacuum has been created because old familiar and tribal bonds 
have lost their importance (at least partly). The UAE has become a society where people  
are divided now; we [Emiratis] are not, as I think we used to be, just families, clans and tribe; 
now we are classes of people. There is the ruling family; there are the very rich that are attached 
to them, less rich but still rich; then I guess what you would call upper middleclass; and then 
we have lower class people (interview cited in Bristol-Rhys, 2010, pp. 75-76).  
During my field research, I asked my Emirati participants the importance of the Emirati 
national identity. They expressed a strong emotional attachment to their traditions and 
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customs, but, at the same time, they also expressed the ‘fear of erosion’ of their own identity. 
Lisa, for example, said 
I think it is really important to preserve our identity. It is not like holding on to the past, but 
we should take the past and develop it rather than erasing it or removing it at all or forgetting 
everything. I think it is really, really important, I think we should save the language. I studied 
all in English, in school in University and now I am a bit struggling with the language. I know 
a lot of people who cannot express themselves [in Arabic] they just can express themselves in 
English; you know have half and half. Some of them only know Arabic and some of them only 
know English, but for my experience I know English, because you read only English books 
you watch only English channels and music it is all in English. So you get attached to the West 
world and to the English perspective or thinking and staff like that (Interview with Lisa, 26th 
October 2015). 
Lisa emphasized the risk of being ‘uprooted’; the Arabic language, which might viewed as 
a resource and a marker of their national identity, risks disappearing because of the spreading 
of English in everyday life.  
In the state-building process, women play a key role because they are seen as 
“housemakers and the primary educators of children” (Carvahlo Pinto, 2012, p. 23). In 
traditional society, women are considered a repository of old traditions, customs, beliefs, 
practices and family values (Carvahlo Pinto, 2012). In the Arab Gulf area, women have 
improved their status within society (see chapter 3), however, their role and expectations are 
still limited by religious and cultural norms (Krause, 2009). In the UAE, women are 
considered “mothers of the nation” (Krause 2009, p. 26) and they represent the backbone of 
the UAE society. Women’s role and their position are based upon a family structure, in 
which the “head of state, typically seen as the nation’s ‘father’, leads his ‘children’ to 
prosperity and the good life within the national ‘family’ that transcends private and public” 
(Krause, 2009, p. 25) sphere. Thus, the UAE nation is seen as a family, and in this context, 
women are seen as mothers whose aim is to maintain the traditional family structure and 
values (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Dresch, 2005). This is one way in which the UAE authorities 
pursue the construction of the Emirati identity. 
In the UAE, women are active members of civil society and they exercise their role 
through government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGO), which are 
mostly created by Shaykh’s wives and daughters (Krause, 2009). Through these 
organizations, led by a Shaykha (who is a wife or daughter of a Shaykh) but supported 
financially by her husband(s) or father, a Shaykha “is expected to act in a way that is in line 
with the support of her husband’s or father’s political and economic interests” (Krause 2009, 
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p. 28). These organizations serve to the Shaykh to underline the duties that Emirati women 
have towards their nation and they have to sacrifice themselves for the nation’s welfare 
(Krause 2009). However, in order to enhance the role of women, as ‘mothers of the nation’, 
it is also important to provide them with adequate education; as such, women can contribute 
culturally to create a solid and united nation. It entails developing women’s skills and 
abilities in the face of threaten posed by migration and globalization. In this sense, the state-
directed organizations are subordinate to the political and economic interests of the nation 
(Krause, 2009).   
Apart from the encouragement of using traditional dress by the UAE authorities both 
for men and women (Emiratis, men and women, working in the public sector are required 
by law to wear the traditional dress), it is evident that there is a gender-based task, that is the 
process of construction of national identity involves men and women but from different 
perspectives (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Emirati men address political, and to a lesser extent also 
cultural, issues in terms of their participation in the management of collective affairs, 
whereas women are politically disempowered but culturally empowered because as ‘mothers 
of the nation’ they embody and reinterpret old traditions and customs.  
 
 
 
8.4 The emirate-level identity. The case of Dubai  
Having discussed the measures adopted at the national level to spread a sense of 
security among Emiratis, in this section, I focus on the strategies adopted by the Emirate of 
Dubai in order to preserve its identity. As of 1971, when the UAE federation was created, it 
was soon clear that each Emirate had its autonomy (Van der Meulen, 1997; Davidson, 2005).  
The Emirate of Dubai has reinterpreted the local history in light of the changes 
occurring in the country. Between 2012 and 2013, Dubai population was estimated 
2,213,845 (nationals and non-nationals).90 Dubai is the second largest Emirate in terms of 
land size; it occupies 4 percent of the country (Van der Meulen, 1997). Before the discovery 
of oil, in 1966 (Rugh, 2007), the major economic activities in Dubai were pearl diving, 
fishing and trading. The merchant class has been important in the Emirate’s economy thus 
                                            
90 http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-dubai-estimates-of-total-population-by-sex-and-age-groups-at-various-dates-
1993-2000-2005-2012-2013/ [accessed 09 November 2016]. 
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contributing towards rendering Dubai a multi-cultural Emirate (Vora, 2013). The presence 
of merchants from the Indian Ocean and Persia and trade with the African continent has 
occurred during the pre-oil economy and are not a result of the oil economy (Vora, 2013). 
The traditional activities, such as camel racing and falconry, have been revitalized as 
elements of old and ‘authentic’ local traditions, and the “prehistory of the UAE is now 
written as far back as five thousand years” (Vora, 2013, p. 55). As Vora (2013) argues, the 
past is reinterpreted but devoid of all those elements and symbols that may reconcile the 
Emirate's multi-cultural and colonial past with the present situation. 
In 1999, the Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum Centre for Cultural 
Understanding (Picture 8.3) was opened with the aim of “familiarizing expatriates with 
various facets of local culture” (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008, p. 16). 
Picture 8.3 The Centre for Cultural Understanding  
 
The building has a main structure, where there are offices, a kitchen and the majlis, which is 
a receiving area for visitors and it is a very common area in traditional Arab houses, where, 
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upon my visits to the Centre, I spent some time drinking Arab coffee and eating local pastries 
(Picture 8.4). 
Picture 8.4 The majlis within the Centre 
 
The Centre is a sort of ‘oasis’ in the Al Fahidi area in Bastakyya district, in Bur Dubai, on 
the western side of the Dubai Creek. I visited the Centre and the few traditional buildings, 
surrounding the main building, restored with the aim to display Dubai’s history and 
traditional way of life. 
I participated in two tours in the area close to the Centre and the Creek, and the guides 
illustrated how locals lived before oil was discovered, and the key role played by the Creek 
in everyday life of the locals. During the tours, the guides never mentioned the multi-cultural 
past, the links with the Indian sub-continent, they illustrated how people lived, what they did 
and how their life changed since then. The Centre displays the old traditional way of life 
where fishing and pearl diving were the mainly economic activities, and people left their 
homes and embarked on their ships along the Creek to go fishing (Al-Sayegh, 1998). I 
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walked around the area of Al Fahidi and, in a certain way, I saw how people lived in the past 
especially their traditional houses. However, all buildings that we visited near the Centre 
have been renovated and restored in order to, I would say, remind locals where they come 
from, who they are in spite of the huge wealth and luxury life that some of them live today 
(Picture 8.5).  
Picture 8.5 A view of Al Fahidi, near the Centre for Cultural Understanding  
 
During these tours, I realized that this area has been restored primarily for locals and 
secondary for tourists. In the construction of national identity, all Emiratis are included, and 
the UAE government encourages the participation of all nationals in the nation-building 
process (Findlow, 2005). The guides said that some schools go visiting the Centre in order 
to teach young generation of Emiratis and foreign children local traditions and customs. In 
my view, this Centre is useful in the strategy of restoring the past, recover the old ‘authentic’ 
traditions. 
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When I left the metro station of Al Fahidi, I walked along Al-Mankhool Road (to get 
to the Centre) and looking around I realized that most shops, restaurants and a few hotels are 
run by South Asians and Persians (my personal observations). This Centre is situated in an 
urbanized area where most people are foreign workers with a low income (Picture 8.6).   
Picture 8.6 A view of Al-Mankhool Road 
 
The Centre is located in a multi-cultural area of Dubai, near the Creek where in the 
past seafaring activities and commercial exchanges took place. It serves to create a 
blending and inclusion between Emiratis and non-Emiratis. Its aim is to involve 
foreigners (tourists and migrant workers) in their activities to show who they 
(nationals) are and that they are like everybody. Kate, who worked in the Centre, said 
to me  
This center is very important for Emirati identity because what it does, it helps clear the idea 
of Emiratis from the expats perspective, so we help them fix understandings, tell them the 
reason why we do these things and help them understand look we are just people like 
everybody else. If you want to have an Emirati friend, you have to come and look for us 
because we are too small, we do not have too many people to find, especially the young 
generation, the ones that speak English (Interview with Kate, 6th November 2014). 
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Kate underscored that the Centre has the role of ‘enculturating’ foreigners on local traditions 
and history thus contributing towards facilitating interactions between Emiratis and non-
Emiratis. 
It seems that Dubai authorities have adopted a strategy aimed at reinterpreting their 
past and old traditions but devoid of all those elements that might represent a link with the 
Asian and African world. They have ‘swept away’ their multi-cultural history in order to 
affirm their ‘authentic’ roots in the Arab and Islamic world. However, in this strategy, the 
Islamic references are also marginal. For instance, the consuming of alcohol is allowed in 
international hotels (Davidson, 2007). During my field research, for example, I never 
listened to the adhān, which is the call to prayer, by loudspeakers on mosques. In this regard, 
Jamal said  
It has been deliberately attempted of not developing a culture that it is completely congruous 
with Islām. It is a modern worship of Islām that it is practised here generally, where 
accommodation, where a spirit of liberal values these things are more important than a strict 
adherence to Islamic principles. At the end of the day, they have given you the choice to 
practise your religion for the Muslims as such, and given equal space for other religions to 
coexist with Islām. You have some churches here, two Hindu temples (Interview with Jamal, 
3rd November 2014). 
Jamal underlined that Dubai has, in a certain way, de-emphasized its Islamic identity, and 
its open-minded and liberal milieu has been important to its economic growth and 
development. Moreover, the existence of Christian Orthodox church, the Catholic church in 
Oud Metha and the Hindu Temple on the west bank of the Dubai Creek, are examples of the 
coexistence of different religions in the Emirate. As mentioned in chapter 7, their coexistence 
does not entail being recognized as peers in social life. In other words, their presence is 
tolerated but it does not erase the hierarchical social structure.   
Dubai is a multi-cultural Emirate where foreign workers represent about 90 percent 
of the total population (Al Awad, 2008). Because of its economic strategies and activities, 
Dubai is a liberal milieu where economic needs and religious principles are accommodated. 
However, because of the presence of many foreign workers, local authorities have revitalized 
local history and traditions but ‘neglecting’ those elements of Dubai’s multi-cultural past. 
Even in terms of Islamic rules Dubai is more liberal (Davidson, 2007) than Abu Dhabi and 
Sharjah. These aspects are evident in the mélange between tradition and modernity (Picture 
8.7).  
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Picture 8.7 Image of traditional life before oil exhibited in a metro station 
 
In my field notes, I wrote  
In Dubai, modernity is fused with tradition (Picture 8.8). I have been impressed by the 
astonishing modernity of Dubai metro stations, but when I have walked inside I have realized 
that in some stations the past is still alive and well because it is displayed on the walls where 
the traditional way of life is ‘frozen’ in some pictures but revitalized by exhibiting it (4th 
November 2014). 
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Picture 8.8 The external façade of the metro station of Dubai Mall 
 
 
It can be argued that the decision of Dubai authorities to reinterpret their past and local 
traditions but ‘diluting’ its multi-cultural nature and even creating a liberal environment in 
terms of Islamic principles, reflect two main choices. First, it serves to create a liberal 
economic milieu in order to attract investments and investors from non-Islamic countries as 
well.  
Second, it serves to create an ideological and cultural boundary between who belongs 
and who does not belong. If Dubai authorities had instead chosen to enhance multi-cultural 
past and Islamic identity, they would have spread a sense of belonging and cohesion between 
many Muslim foreign workers (Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Arabs, Indonesians and 
many others) and locals. This would have meant involving most foreign workers in the 
collective memory, in the history of the Emirate and of the country. Instead, migrants have 
to perceive their presence as temporary, and their status is “of permanent impermanence” 
(Ali 2010, p. 162). Perhaps, this would also have undermined the authority of the ruling elite. 
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However, if strategically the exclusion of its multi-cultural elements could play a positive 
role in cementing the Emirati national identity, foreign workers are an integral part of Dubai 
and the Emirati society and, as Pakistani professionals told me, they feel that they belong to 
the Emirati context regardless of a formal membership (see chapter 6). During my field 
research, I observed that the prehistoric past and heritage are recovered as autochthonous 
elements and expression of the Emirati ‘authenticity’. One such example is the Crossroads 
of Civilizations Museum where it is clearly displayed and exhibited the variety of 
civilizations that have historically contributed to the growth and the diversity of the entire 
Gulf region.91 This strategy aimed at ‘creating’ local and national histories in which 
autochthonous elements were considered as more prominent and important than the recent 
and multi-cultural past in which, to a certain extent, some foreign workers might identify 
themselves.   
Every society contains internal diversity (Parekh, 1995a), and this might lead to an 
overt or covert conflict, or people might coexist peacefully. In the case of the UAE, this 
internal diversity, represented, amongst others, by the seven Emirates with their 
characteristics and peculiarities, does not ‘compromise’ the discourse on the Emirati national 
identity.92 The seven Emirates share some features, elements, a collective memory, past and 
history, which render the coexistence 'possible' and contribute towards creating ‘internal 
stability’ embodied by the presence of the ruler (Davidson, 2005). A ruler wields power only 
when he is able to mobilize patrimonial networks, personal, cultural, religious, and 
ideological resources (Davidson 2005). The ruler represents and defends the interests of his 
Emirate and those of the federation.93 He takes over the discourse on political and cultural 
identity (Khalaf, 2002). He proposes initiatives, and establishes (with other institutional 
bodies) rules in order to manage collective affairs (political role). He also acts as a ‘guardian’ 
                                            
91 This is how the Museum is described: “Ancient peoples in the past, without International Law, without 
Diplomatic missions, without schools to teach foreign languages and without international platforms to bring 
the world together; could exchange goods, even when all come from different ethnic backgrounds, beliefs and 
religion” http://www.themuseum.ae/story [accessed 17 November 2016]. 
92 I am not saying that there is no opposition and discontent among Emiratis, but, the UAE is an autocratic 
regime in which there is a “subtle controls placed on almost civil society organizations, religious groups, media 
organizations, and workers’ associations” (Davidson, 2005, p. 70). Thus, there is little leeway to oppose openly 
to the authorities.  
93 The rulers of the seven Emirates are members of the Supreme Council of Rulers (SCR), which elects the 
President of the federation. Because of the institutional apparatus, at the top of the decision-making structure 
there is the President of the federation, who is always a member of the Al-Nuhayyan ruling family of Abu 
Dhabi that is “the largest contributor to both the federal budget and the UAE’s GDP” (Davidson, 2005, p. 189). 
The six emirates sometimes, in order to ‘survive’, need economic support of Abu Dhabi. Thus, they support 
federal policy and safeguard the emirate-level interests.  
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of old traditions, and customs (cultural role). He manages the cultural discourse by 
participating in some events (e.g. camel racing), promoting initiatives (e.g. poetry contests), 
and investing in cultural activities and organizations (e.g. the Centre for Cultural 
Understanding in Dubai) aimed at enhancing cultural identity. 
 
 
 
8.5 Civic engagement and belonging among Pakistani professionals in Dubai 
Despite the construction of a sense of belonging by the UAE authorities, which aimed 
to distinguish Emiratis from non-Emiratis and the nationalization of culture, the discourse 
on the Emirati national identity cannot prescind from the presence of migrants. Expressions, 
such as ‘nationalism for nationals’ (Koch, 2015) and ‘citizenship as belonging’ (Koch, 
2015), serve to grasp the internal dynamics within a nation-state. However, they limit the 
idea of belonging to individuals who share a legal status, culture, ideas and practices thus 
excluding the ‘others’ (Koch, 2015). In this section, I discuss how the discourse on the 
Emirati national identity is entangled in the presence of Pakistanis (but it also relates to other 
foreigners) in the country. 
Before discussing the link between migrants and the Emirati national identity, it is 
important to define the concept of nationalism (Özkirimli 2010). Primordialists argue that 
nationalism derives from primordial ‘givens’ (e. g. place of birth, kinship) (Geertz, 1993); 
as such, they “provide a basis for an easy ‘affinity’ with other peoples from the same 
background” (Brass, 1991, cited in Hutchinson & Smith, 1994, p. 83). For primordialists, 
nations were inherent in the human condition and they were viewed “as forms of extended 
kinship and as such were ubiquitous and coeval with the family” (Smith 2009, p. 8).  
Modernists argue that nationalism and nations are modern phenomena that reflect economic, 
social and political changes. For modernists (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2008), nationalism 
postulated the existence of a community with a shared culture, where the loyalty of citizens 
was primarily directed towards the state and its institutional apparatus. Ethno-symbolists 
emphasize the crucial role of ethnic symbolism (language, religion, kinship) and the role of 
ethnic ties as “basis and point of departure for the creation of many nations” (Smith 2009, p. 
27). As such, nationalism relies on symbols, traditions and customs, thus suggesting its 
predominant cultural dimension (Smith, 2009). Since the 1990s, ‘new’ approaches, such as 
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the reproduction of nationalism in everyday life (Billig 1995) and feminist approaches 
(Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989), have adopted an interdisciplinary perspective, and new 
methodological approaches in order to explain the complexities and dynamics of nations and 
nationalism. These ‘new’ approaches have tried “to rectify the elitism of mainstream theories 
by bringing macro-level and micro-level analyses together” (Özkirimli 2010, p. 170), or by 
combining a top-down perspective with a bottom-up perspective. For Parekh (1995b, p. 37), 
nationalism is a theory that explains how a state is constituted and it is “also a theory of the 
nature, boundary, functions, rationale and the proper basis of the authority and the unity of 
the state”. It should be understood as a “specific manner of conceptualising and constituting 
the state and relating its members” (Parekh, 1995b, p. 42). In other words, nationalism tends 
to spread a sense of belonging among people who share a common culture, language, past, 
history and heritage within a nation, which is defined by Anderson (2006) as an ‘imagined 
community’, thus suggesting, as Yuval-Davis (2011, p. 84) contends, that the nation “resides 
in the minds of the people who view themselves or specified others as belonging or not 
belonging to that nation”. Some scholars focus on historical and political aspects (Parekh, 
1995b; Gellner, 2008) and others on cultural dimension (Geertz, 1993; Smith, 2009) of 
nationalism. The different approaches underscore the need to set boundaries between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, ‘included’ and ‘excluded’, and they emphasize that nationalism is an ideology 
(theory or approach) aimed at constructing stability and cohesion among people who share 
the same elements (e. g. culture, religion, language, customs). 
However, nationalism in the Emirati context seems to rely on a different assumption. 
In other words, despite the UAE efforts to implement laws and adopt measures in order to 
categorize and distinguish Emiratis from non-Emiratis, the discourse on the Emirati national 
identity cannot be detached from the reality, namely the presence of millions of migrant 
workers who have resided in the country for ages. The point is if migrant workers contribute 
towards shaping the discourse on the Emirati national identity. In spite of the division 
between Emiratis and non-Emiratis and the exclusion in terms of lack of political 
participation and advantages deriving from being an Emirati national, Pakistani 
professionals, as it emerged throughout my thesis, expressed a strong emotional attachment 
to the country, they felt that they belonged even though they were not citizens. As I have 
been arguing, understanding how their sense of belonging is constructed entails discussing 
the relationships between Pakistanis and Emiratis, and acknowledging that the separation 
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between Emiratis and non-Emiratis is a ‘false’, contested and multi-layered insofar as 
Pakistani professionals in their everyday life, practices and experiences also contribute 
towards shaping the discourse on national identity.  
It then follows that the construction of the Emirati identity cannot disregard the 
presence, role and links with the migrant communities, such as Pakistanis. In the discourse 
on national identity, one cannot neglect the presence of foreign workers. Pakistani 
professionals, for example, participate actively in events to celebrate the UAE National Day 
(2nd December) because they feel part of the context and they consider Dubai as a ‘home’ 
(see below). This means that the Emirati national identity cannot be framed upon an 
exclusion-centred narrative but it should be shaped by an inclusion-centred narrative. As 
Vora and Koch (2015) suggest, most of the narrative on migration in the GCC countries 
relies on the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy; they argue that this approach, amongst others, 
de-emphasizes the significant role of non-nationals in the management of migration, 
especially when they act as sponsors (e.g., the old Indian merchant class, Vora, 2010), and 
the co-ethnic exploitation (Kathiravelu, 2016). As argued in chapter 5, looking at the 
migration experiences and practices (e.g., a migrant who acts as a sponsor, co-ethnic 
exploitation and the role of migrant brokers and middlemen) entails recognizing that 
migrants appear ‘included’ in forms of governance in which nationals are also involved 
(Vora & Koch, 2015; Kathiravelu, 2016). For Pakistani professionals, as mentioned in 
chapter 6, belonging is constructed by feeling part of the context because they share with 
‘others’ experiences and practices (Anthias, 2015). At the same time, Emiratis reshape the 
discourse on national identity by ‘including’ Pakistani professionals (and other foreign 
workers) because they share with them the everyday life (see chapter 7). Kate, one of my 
Emirati participants, emphasized the links with the South Asian countries as part of the old 
generation’s everyday life. She said 
…If you think like my grandfather, my grandfather generation I would say the south Asians, 
like Indians they were always mix with us, they were the best traders. The best friends, things 
like that. Then there was problem because so many were coming in at once, the Emiratis 
became close to themselves, very protective, because they were all strangers we do not know 
who they are. Now it is becoming that the young generation are opening themselves and ok 
let’s try to make a volunteer group, do project where we have different nationalities (Interview 
with Kate, 6th November 2014). 
In the above quotation, Kate underscored how the historical links with the South Asian 
countries have been important in the recent history of the UAE. At the same time, Kate also 
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highlighted the ‘fear of erosion’ which was embodied in the physical presence of millions of 
migrants (e. g. Indians) in the country. However, the Emirati youth are now ‘accustomed’ to 
their presence; migrants are still part of their everyday life and they are involved in projects 
and activities by Emirati youth. This sense of cohesiveness does not erase the hierarchical 
social structure. As said in chapter 7, migrants and Emiratis do not interact as equals but 
exclusionary policies (e. g. second class citizen status) and practices (e. g. discrimination on 
nationality, gender and class) serve to reinforce the divisions. 
Both Emiratis and Pakistanis construct their sense of belonging by sharing 
experiences and practices in workplaces and in other locales. For Pakistanis and other 
foreign communities, this means cultural and economic ‘inclusion’ in light of a formal 
‘exclusion’ based on the impossibility to obtain the Emirati citizenship. Abdallah, who is a 
member of the PAD (see chapter 7), underlined the importance of links and feeling part of 
the Emirati context. He said 
…We [Pakistanis] do a solidarity walk every year for the UAE national day, on the 2nd of 
December, which is again first of this kind, unique solidarity activity, which is done by the 
Pakistani community only…[it] is again a gesture as a community towards UAE that we are 
part of the society and we celebrate the national day (Interview with Abdallah, 19th October 
2015). 
This quote is relevant because Abdallah emphasized the involvement of the entire Pakistani 
community in the local context by organizing and participating in events that are 
symbolically, politically and culturally important to the host society. This is the expression 
of belonging ‘with’ the Emirati context in terms of engagement with the local milieu 
(Anthias, 2013).  
Civic engagement, through the solidarity walk organized by the PAD and ‘Emirati 
nationalism’ displayed by Pakistani professionals during the celebration of the UAE 
National Day or during the Flag Day (3rd November) by wearing hats and t-shirts with 
Emirati symbols and by exhibiting the Emirati flag (Picture 8.9), are elements that contribute 
towards involving and enhancing the links between Emiratis and Pakistanis. 
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Picture 8.9 Pakistan Education Academy adorned with Emirati flags for the Flag Day  
 
But more than that, civic engagement and the ‘Emirati nationalism’ exhibited by Pakistani 
professionals means that the ties between the two communities are, at least symbolically, 
strong, that the separation existing at juridical level seems to not affect the sense of belonging 
that my participants exhibited and explained to me during my field research. Moreover, as 
outlined in chapter 6, the participation of Pakistanis in these events contributes towards 
constructing their belonging to the Emirati context. The adoption of an inclusion-centred 
narrative proposed by Vora and Koch (2015), and discussed in this section, seems to erase 
the inequalities existing and ‘institutionalized’ by the UAE authorities (e. g. sponsorship 
system). However, the lack of rights, discrimination and divisions in terms of citizenship 
status conspire against this inclusive approach. The discourse on the Emirati national identity 
is reshaped and revitalized by recovering the past, history and dealing with the current 
sociocultural and economic milieu in which foreigners represent the driving force of the 
UAE economy and society; however, they are not equally treated. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has unfolded the process of construction of the Emirati national identity 
in light of the changes taking place within the UAE society. Social transformations driven 
by the oil economy, migration and globalization have dramatically affected the traditional 
system of values and life. These changes have been so rapid and deep that some people have 
perceived a strong sense of detachment from their country (Dresch, 2005). It has thus 
appeared necessary, for the UAE government, to reshape and reinterpret the past in order to 
spread cohesion and stability among Emiratis (Khalaf, 2002, 2005).  
National identity has a dynamic, fluid, multi-layered, stratified and adaptable nature 
(Parekh, 1995a). The construction of the Emirati national identity is from time to time 
reconstituted because members of a society re-examine and reflect on it in light of new 
circumstances, challenges and needs of their society (Parekh, 1994, 2008). Thus, the Emirate 
of Dubai, even though has a strong Islamic background, has reconstituted its character by 
de-emphasizing its Islamic identity in order to deal with demands of the global labour 
market. In Dubai, the reinterpretation of history, devoid of its multi-cultural nature (Vora, 
2013), contributes to the construction of the Emirati national identity because it creates 
cohesion and belonging by recovering the prehistoric origins of the coastal area.  
The nationalization of culture can contribute towards creating and spreading a sense 
of cohesion and belonging among locals; nonetheless, I have also argued that it would be 
misleading to overlook the role played by foreign workers through civic engagement in 
shaping the narrative on the Emirati national identity. Pakistani professionals feel that they 
belong to the Emirati context and their participation in public events serve to reinforce their 
sense of belonging to the country. However, this inclusive approach does not serve to erase 
the exclusionary policies and practices that took place in the country.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the thesis, I have discussed migration and its links to belonging, class, national 
identity and recognition in the UAE and Dubai by focusing on the Pakistani community, and 
especially on Pakistani professionals. As has been recently suggested (Vora & Koch, 2015), 
it would be misleading to think of nationals and migrants in Dubai, and in the GCC countries, 
as two dis-embedded and entirely separated groups. Migrants and nationals can be seen as 
two dynamic and reciprocal categories: there are nationals because there are migrants and 
vice versa. Throughout the thesis, I have been arguing the need to explore and analyse 
migration in the UAE and Dubai by adopting an inclusive approach that takes into account 
the historical evolution and the contemporary socio-political dynamics of the Arab Gulf 
region. However, as I have been remarking in the thesis, this approach does not subvert or 
erase the hierarchical social structure existing in the UAE (and in the other GCC countries). 
The inferior social status, the lack of rights, and discrimination that characterize migrants’ 
life in the UAE are subject to criticisms in Western countries (HRW, 2006). At the core of 
the relationships between Emiratis and non-Emiratis there is a hierarchical social structure 
in which benefits and advantages have been granted to some Emiratis in light of their 
nationality. Moreover, citizenship can be granted only due to specific events and 
circumstances, as we have seen (see chapter 4); however, being an Emirati citizen does not 
necessarily entail being recognized as full member of the Emirati society. Recognition is 
thus not granted equally to all human beings, everyone is not treated as equals. In the UAE 
context, racism and discrimination seem to represent a driving force of the political-economy 
and cultural dimension through which social relationships and interactions between Emiratis 
and non-Emiratis are framed. In this context, “the political-economic structure…generates 
‘race’-specific modes of exploitation, marginalization and deprivation” (Fraser, 1995, p. 80). 
From a cultural perspective, racism and discrimination seem to be framed on the grounds of 
a supposed Emirati purity of blood genealogy, which, as I have argued, is not 
anthropologically sustainable (see chapter 4).  This has generated cultural racism, which is 
defined by Fraser as “the pervasive devaluation and disparagement of things” (Fraser (1995, 
p. 81) coded as ‘different’. In the UAE, cultural racism is evident in forms of exclusion, 
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marginalization, depreciation and de-evaluation of skills and competences of those who are 
non-Emiratis. However, cultural racism does not affect all non-Emiratis equally, as some 
nationalities, as I have been arguing throughout the thesis, are more targeted by racism and 
discrimination than others. Thus, for example, white Westerners are in a privileged position 
and enjoy more benefits and advantages than Indians or Pakistanis. As Fraser (1995, p. 81) 
argues, racism and discrimination “are injustices of recognition”. Thus, misrecognition 
seems to be a crucial element of the relationships between Emiratis and non-Emiratis. The 
inclusion-centred narrative does not erase these forms of injustices and the form of 
‘institutionalized’ racism embedded in structures and everyday practices, and migrants have 
to deal with discrimination and racism in their everyday lives. However, we cannot neglect 
that migrants keep on travelling to and settling in the GCC countries, even though they are 
fully aware of the working and living conditions that they will encounter upon migration 
(Gardner, 2012; Buckley, 2012); neglecting this reality would entail a risk of 
underestimating the practical-evaluative and projective dimensions of migrants’ agency 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) and their capacity to make choices. The inclusion-centred 
narrative is a way of looking at migrants’ agency as empowering individuals who, to a certain 
extent and in light of their specific social status and class, are able to cope with the difficulties 
and uncertainties that their migration project entails. 
In the thesis, I have discussed and explored the evolution and dynamics of the 
presence of Pakistani professionals in Dubai. As such, the thesis contributes to a deep 
knowledge of migration in the Arab Gulf countries in several ways (see chapter 1). First, by 
focusing on Pakistanis it introduces new subjectivities and stories in understanding migration 
in the Gulf region. As noted throughout the thesis, Pakistanis are sometimes subsumed under 
the label ‘South Asian’ (Gardner, 2010a; Vora, 2013), thus overlooking that they have a 
specific migration pattern that differs from that of Indians, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans. 
These differences are mostly evident when considering the history of migration and the 
socio-economic dynamics in this region. For example, the old Indian merchant class 
migrated to the Gulf region at the beginning of the twentieth century, while Bangladeshis 
migrated in the 1990s after the oil crisis of the mid-1980s (Owen, 1985; Birks, Seccombe & 
Sinclair, 1986; Abella, 1995). Sri Lankans also arrived in the 1990s and theirs was mostly a 
female-dominated migration (Gamburd, 2009). The Pakistani community, which migrated 
to the UAE in the 1960s, is mostly based on a male-oriented migration; it is ethnically and 
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religiously stratified, as well as stratified in terms of class and social status. Thus, the thesis 
responds to the need to include and explore new subjectivities and stories to better 
understand migration in the GCC countries. For example, the establishment of the Emirates 
Airline, which exemplifies the links between international migration and international 
relations (Weiner, 1985), led some Pakistani migrants to migrate and settle down in Dubai, 
thus reinforcing the links between Pakistan and the UAE (Davidson, 2005). 
Second, the risk of homogenisation has been highlighted throughout the thesis, and 
as noted previously, there is a need to introduce new subjectivities and stories in order to 
fully understand the wide range of experiences and difficulties that migrants have to cope 
with in the GCC countries. The risk of homogenisation has been evident in previous studies 
which have mostly focused on the dichotomy between nationals and non-nationals, thus 
identifying two distinct categories that were often ‘flattened’ without emphasizing the 
differences that exist within some of them, apart from a few studies that have focused on 
Indian merchants, middle-class and construction workers (Gardner, 2010a; Buckley, 2012; 
Vora, 2013).  By focusing on Pakistani professionals, I have introduced new subjectivities 
which highlight a different perspective. For example, the issue of discrimination is 
important, and although it has been addressed by scholars who have emphasized the ethno-
racial and gender hierarchies existing in this region (Vora, 2013, Gardner, 2010a, 
Kathiravelu, 2016), my study provides a further contribution by emphasising how Pakistani 
professionals confirm as well as contest narratives of discrimination.  While some of my 
Pakistani participants felt discriminated against, others emphasized that they did not perceive 
the hierarchical social structure as discriminatory, and they considered it a prerogative of the 
local authorities to define how to manage their own internal affairs. Obviously, this 
perspective is embedded in the Pakistani professionals’ life who experienced their migration 
differently from that of unskilled and semi-skilled migrants. They have found a different 
way to create a “set of connections, and another modality of belonging” (Ahmad, 2017, p. 
141). Through the lens of the inclusion-centred narrative (Vora & Koch, 2015), I have 
illustrated that the Pakistani professionals felt differently ‘included’ and expressed their own 
modality of belonging. The hierarchical social structure existing in this country is 
perpetuated via a management of internal affairs (e. g., the sponsorship system) in which 
nationality drives the political and socio-economic decision-making process. The Pakistani 
professionals can feel ’integrated’ but they are not treated as complete equals. 
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Third, the debate on structure and agency has hitherto represented a stumbling block 
in migration studies (Bakewell, 2010) and I have addressed this debate by focusing on the 
‘duality of structure’ approach (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; Morawska, 2001). By adopting the 
duality of structure perspective, I have introduced and discussed the notion of ‘migration 
project’ as a fruitful tool to bring structure and agency to the core of migration studies. The 
notion of migration project fits with the historical-sociological evolution of migration in the 
Arab Gulf countries (Errichiello, 2012), and especially with temporariness (Ali, 2010), 
which is one the most recent issues debated in migration studies (Dauvergne & Marsden, 
2014; Vosko, Preston, & Latham, 2014). As argued throughout the thesis, the migration 
project does not have an inherent determinacy; on the contrary, it relies on migrants’ agency 
(reflexivity and ‘projectivity’) to adapt and respond to the changes occurring in a specific 
time-place, and to their knowledge of structure (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Morawska, 
2001). As such, the migration project is class-based because, as it has been acknowledged, 
migration is undertaken by those who are able to mobilize resources (Van Hear, 2014). It is 
obviously undertaken by highly-skilled migrants, but also by unskilled and semi-skilled 
migrants. The individual stories story told by Mahdavi (2011, 2016) and Ahmad (2017) 
illustrate how domestic workers were able to change their migration project, to adapt to new 
circumstances and events that took place in the migration context. For example, the 
conversion to the Islamic religion by South Asian domestic workers emphasizes migrants’ 
agency to interact with local structure and the need to change their migration project, because 
some of them could decide to live permanently in Kuwait (Ahmad, 2017). I argue that the 
establishment of migrant associations is also illustrative of migrants’ agency and their 
knowledge of structures. Migrant associations demonstrate the capacity migrants have to 
deal with local rules and laws, and the needs migrant have to embed their migration 
experience within a place that embodies their sense of identification and belonging. The 
notion of migration project thus contributes to the debate on structure and agency in 
migration studies by emphasizing that migrants should not be perceived as disempowered 
individuals, but as agents who are able to deal with the instability and precariousness that 
the migration experience entails. The inclusion-centred narrative requires a recognition of 
migrants’ interaction with the local context. In other words, this narrative emphasizes 
migrants’ agency to interact with structure; however, their agency is constrained and enabled 
by the hierarchical social structure existing in Dubai. As Vora and Koch (2015) suggest, in 
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the Arab Gulf region, migrants and nationals do not appear as two different categories but 
as simultaneously and differently inclusive and exclusive.  
To conclude, an individual’s migration is a project that is shaped over time and space 
by competing demands, in a ‘dance’ in which some are more powerful than others to take 
the steps and choose the direction.94 The Pakistani community, which appears as united, is 
at the same time divided, but I have realized that those divisions have not challenged the 
community’s cohesiveness. In my view, intra-group ‘conflicts’ could be seen as normal 
within a huge migrant community. The internal ethnic and religious diversity of the Pakistani 
community has not undermined their collective cohesion and sense of belonging, which was 
expressed and manifested in different ways and with different meanings. In light of the 
Pakistani professional migrants’ emotional and affective attachment to the UAE, I would 
argue that the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, nationals and non-nationals is misleading 
and that, in spite of the lack of any official policy aimed at integrating migrants, Emiratis 
and non-Emiratis seem to coexist peacefully. As Pakistani professionals explained to me, 
they feel that they belong to the UAE. However, they are not equally treated, and they are 
not in a position to fundamentally undermine or subvert the hierarchical social structure. In 
other words, their agency is always enabled and constrained by structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
94 I wish to thank Karen O’Reilly for raising this point. 
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APPENDIX A95 
Leaflet96 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
95 The leaflet had a different page orientation, but it has been adapted as long as possible to the format of the 
thesis. 
96 The leaflet was prepared before undertaking my first field trip. At the beginning I decided to focus on South 
Asian migrants in the GCC countries because I could not predict if and how many Pakistanis I would have 
been able to interview.   
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APPENDIX B 
Glossary 
 
 
ʿabāya, it is worn by Emirati women and it is a black ankle-length cloak and a long black 
scarf to cover hair (shayla)  
adhān, the call for prayer which is done by a muʾadhdhin 
ʻajami, non-Arabs or Persians 
Allāh, the Arabic word for God 
arkān al-Islām, the five pillars of Islām 
asāla, authenticity 
barasti, palm-frond settlements  
bidūn, stateless  
burqaʿ, kind of veil worn by women with two holes for the eyes, made of a fabric that falls 
from the center of the forehead and covers her face. The corners further down the 
burqaʿ are attached to the two sides of the bandage that covers the head thus creating 
the effect of a mask 
dāws, traditional boats 
ḥadīth (plural ʾaḥādīth), saying. It indicates all sayings of the prophet Muhammad. It is one 
of the sources of the Islamic religion and studied by ʿulamāʾ 
hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. It is the fifth pillar of Islām. It is the pilgrimage that every good 
Muslim must undertake to Mecca at least once in his/her life 
al-hawiyya al-waṭaniyya al-imārātiyya, Emirati national identity 
al-Imārāt al-ʿArabiyya al-Muttaḥida, United Arab Emirates 
imtinān, gratitude 
iqāma, residence permit 
Islām, literally "submission (to God)", the name of the religion of Muslims. It is 
characterized by five pillars (arkān), which are shahāda, ṣalāt, zakāt, sawm (siyām), 
ḥajj 
Ismāʿīlï, memebrs of the Ismāʿīliyya, a shīʿa sect  
jinsiya, citizenship 
kafāla, sponsorship system 
271 
 
kafīl, sponsor 
kandūra, it is worn by Emirati men and it is a loose ankle-length robe, and usually white   
khadim al-ḥaramāni, “Custodian of the two holy places" of Mecca and Medina. Honorific 
title given to the Kings of Saudi Arabia 
khādimāt, domestic workers 
khalījī, related to the Gulf 
khulāṣat al-qayd, sort of family book 
khuṭba, Friday sermon 
madrasa, Islamic religious school 
majlis, meeting place; common room in a traditional Arab house  
makfūl, the person who is sponsored 
mashyakhat (in English sheikhdom), is the geographical area, a place, or a polity dominated 
by a shaykh and his family 
masjid, mosque 
mohajirs, migrants and their descendants that migrated from India to establish in Pakistan 
after partition in 1947. This Urdu word has its roots in Arabic, where it is spelled 
muhājirūn, who are those migrated with the Prophet Muḥammad from Mecca to 
Medina where the Islamic community (umma) was formed in 622 A.D.  
muʾadhdhin, the person who pronounces the adhān  
al-mujtamaʿa al-khalījī, community of the ‘Gulfies’ 
muṣallá, the prayer room   
muwāṭin, nationality 
muwātinūn, nationals 
qānūn, law 
Qur’ān, the Holy book of the Islamic religion 
Ramaḍān, the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar dedicated to fast (sawm) 
as-salām (alaykum), the peace be with you, it is a form of greeting used by Muslims 
ṣalāt al-jumʿa, the collective prayer that must be made in common in the mosque every 
Friday 
ṣalāt, prayer. It is the second pillar of Islām. It is performed five times a day: at dawn (ṣalāt 
al-ṣubḥ or al-fajr); at noon (ṣalāt aẓ-ẓuhr); afternoon (ṣalāt al-ʿaṣr); sunset (ṣalāt al-
maghrib); evening (ṣalāt al-ʿishāʾ) 
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sawm (siyām), fasting during Ramadan. It is the fourth pillar of Islām  
shahāda, an expression of faith in the Oneness of God and that Muhammad received and 
delivered God's final revelation to humanity. It is the first pillar of Islām 
sharīʿa, the principles and practices of Islamic belief 
sharkat, corporation 
shaykh, (shuyūkh), honorific title given to the ruler of a tribe 
shyikha, wife or daughter of a shaykh   
Shīʿa, party, faction, group of Muslims who consider ʿAlī (cousin of the Prophet 
Muhammad) and his heirs the only legitimate successors of the Prophet. It is divided 
into various sects, each of which is identified with one of the different lines of  ʿAlī’s 
descendants 
ṣundūq al-zawāj, marriage fund 
Sunna, tradition. The path of the Prophet, which becomes for all believers the authoritative 
example of the Islamic life. Sunni Muslims are those who follow the path of the 
Prophet and differentiate from Shīʿa 
tābiʿa, affiliation or dependence 
tajannus, naturalisation  
tawṭīn, nationalization 
turāth, heritage 
ʿulamāʾ (singular ʿālim), religious scholars 
umma, the universal community of believers 
wāfidūn, migrants 
wāsṭa, intermediary 
akāt, almsgiving. It is the third pillar of Islām 
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APPENDIX C 
List of participants, dates of the interviews and nationality 
 
In the table, I have included all participants whom I interviewed and with whom I had 
conversations during my fieldwork in Dubai. However, I could not include the tens of 
waiters/waitresses and taxi drivers that have also contributed with their words, thoughts and 
stories to the thesis. 
Table C.1 List of participants 
Participants Date of interview/conversation Nationality 
Jamal     28/10/2014 conversation 
03/11/2014 interview 
    26/10/2015 conversation 
 
Indian 
John     29/10/2014 conversation 
06/11/2014 interview 
     21/10/2015 conversation 
08/11/2015 interview 
 
Pakistani 
Khalaf      05/11/2014 conversation Pakistani 
Kate 06/11/2014 interview Emirati 
Ismail 07/11/2014 interview British Pakistani 
Hussein 07/11/2014 interview Jordanian 
Ester 13/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Leila 14/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Peter 15/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Ali 15/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Mahmud 16/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Ibrahim 18/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Zia 19/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Omar 19/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Abdallah 19/10/2015 interview 
05/11/2015 interview 
08/11/2015 interview 
 
Pakistani 
Naseer 24/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Muhammad 25/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Lisa 26/10/2015 interview Emirati 
Rita 27/10/2015 interview Pakistani 
Helen 31/10/2015 interview Emirati 
Katie 01/11/2015 interview Pakistani 
Rahman 02/11/2015 interview Pakistani 
Rashid      03/11/2015 conversation Pakistani 
Bushra      05/11/2015 conversation Pakistani 
Suleyman 09/11/2015 interview Pakistani 
 
